

ESSAYS
Moral *and* Philosophical,
ON
SEVERAL SUBJECTS.

VIZ.

A VIEW of the HU-	X	TWO DISCOURSES ON
MAN FACULTIES.	X	DECENCY.
A SHORT ACCOUNT of	X	AN ESSAY ON SELF-
the WORLD.	X	LOVE.

Written about the Year 1732,

BY

ALEXANDER Lord PITSLIGO.

Forbes (A.)



LONDON:

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MDCCLXIII.

ESSAYS ON Moral and Philological SEVERAL SUBJECTS.

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MANKIND'S FACULTIES. DECEITFUL.
A SHORT ACCOUNT of AN ESSAY on SELF.
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ALBANY: T. LONGMAN, 1733.



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PART I

DIALOGUES

ON

SEVERAL SUBJECTS,

BETWIXT

TWO INTIMATE FRIENDS.

A

B


DIALOGUES

ON

SEVERAL SUBJECTS

BETWIXT

TWO INTIMATE FRIENDS



PART I.
A
V I E W
OF THE
HUMAN FACULTIES.

I. *Of MAN in general.*

LUCINUS and ÆMILIUS.

L. * * * * * HERE are not (my dear Æmi-
T * * * * * lius) two more common words,
* * * * * nor a more common distinction,
* * * * * than of body and soul. The pro-
perties and operations of these two are intirely
different * : and nothing is more shameful and
unfortunate, than to confound them together.

B 2

Æ. My

* *Quid enim homini accidit infelicius, quid turpius,
quàm confusio actionum mentis corporisque?* Boerhaave
Dissert. de Chemia.

Æ. My dear Lucinus, you are intirely in the right: and we are farther said to be made up of body, soul, and spirit; a distinction not only used by St. Paul, but which we have also from * good heathen philosophers.

SENSATION is assigned to the body, though 'tis the soul that properly feels thro' the bodily organs; the passions or affections are appropriated to the soul; and truths, or principles, are of the province of the mind or the understanding; according to that distribution of Antoninus.

L. BUT to go a degree lower than sensation (for life may be conceived without any operation of the senses, as when they are shut up in a deep sleep) simple life is a thing as different from body, or matter, as any thing we can imagine. And therefore life is sometimes called by the name of spirit, and considered both as a principle or spring by which matter (whose property is to rest) is moved, and the body of animals kept (for a while) from dissolution and corruption:

—“Dum spiritus hos regit artus.”

* Ὁ, τί ποτε, τὸ ἐν σαρκίᾳ ἰσχύον, αἰσθητικόν, καὶ τοῦ ἡγεμονικόν. *M. Antonin. Lib. II. 12.*
 Σῶμα, Ψυχὴ, Νῆς. Σῶμα ὁ αἰσθητικὸς, Ψυχὴ ὁ ἡγεμονικόν, Νῆς δὲ γνῶσις. *Lib. III. 16.*

OF this sort of life or spirit, every living creature has a share, a worm as well as a man; the particular frailty of whose life we may be easily convinced of, though the apostle had not told us "it is but a vapour." And yet we have no other barrier against that amazing state called eternity! If the thought of death or simple extinction raises horror, what would the prospect of endless existence raise, without some latent hope, or supposition of happiness! A man makes this supposition secretly when he thinks at all of that state, otherwise nature could not bear the prospect: and we must confess our quiet, or rather indolence, as to an article of such importance, is chiefly owing to our stupidity.

Æ. BUT notwithstanding all the stupidity and weight that loads us, there is still in our nature some expectation of immortality, some hopes of a future life, and a more perfect existence after this scene is over. To which, if we add our desire of dominion and esteem, even in this world, we may conclude there is really something of worth in us; and our pride may be a sort of argument for our dignity. And this elevation of mind is not infused into us by politicians, divines, officers of the army, or any set of men whatsoever, but may be said to be a part of our constitution.

DIOTREPHEs loved pre-eminence. Cæsar was not taught to desire dominion : every man loves it (less or more) though not equally qualified to gain it, nor equally successful. Besides, the rewards promised by politicians and commanders, rather respect the conveniencies and glory of this life than the future. And whether the reward be temporal or eternal, the encouraging, or the amusing people with the hopes of it, supposes a desire in them before-hand of such things ; otherwise the designing men could have no fund to work upon, and might as well talk to horses.

I CONFESS there are other arguments besides the pride of man, which may help to shew his dignity. He grows weary of every thing here (friendship only excepted) as if nothing were worthy of his attention. But then, as nothing is able to satisfy him, any thing is sufficient to amuse him. So that we must consider man in different lights, before we can understand his condition ; and after all we can think about it, our knowledge must remain imperfect.

L. IT is by viewing man in those opposite lights, that he is sometimes called the glory of the creation, and sometimes its disgrace ; and both epithets are true. There is still in human nature something that is bright and lovely, good and kind ; some remains of excellency, some ruins

Part I. *the* HUMAN FACULTIES.

ruins of grandeur, some sparks in the midst of ashes and rubbish.

THE scripture informs us, “that Man was made after the image of God; and that we are his offspring.” ’Tis remarkable that St. Paul cites this passage from a heathen poet: and there was great address in it, since he was reasoning with the polite men of Athens. But if our pride should be apt to rise from the account the scripture gives us of our origin, we shall find in the same books very different characters to keep us low. We are called “but dust,” the worms are our nearest kindred: ’tis told us, “we are but vanity in our best estate,” and that “the imaginations of our heart are continually foolish and wicked:” with much more to that purpose.

THE philosophers were much divided in their opinions concerning man. Some exalted him too high, others sunk him too low; without considering the strange mixture of his composition, which indeed seems to make him a-kin to the highest and lowest beings, the loveliest and the hatefullest things.

NOR is it to be forgot, that though mankind in general are made up of contrarieties, yet, as my lord Rochester says, “man differs more from man, than man from beast.”

Æ. NOT only so, but the same man differs as much from himself at different times.

L. 'TIS a strange composition, human nature! But those who talk and write against the dignity of man, and the immortality of the soul; who affirm there is no virtue, no friendship, no honour; can only argue from what they feel in themselves, and what they observe in the world. The first point might be readily yielded to them: though we are not absolutely sure but they may have a greater belief of virtue, and more conscience than they own; as there are others who may have less of either than they pretend to. And as to the observation of the decay of virtue in the world, there is nothing oftner mentioned in the scripture than that. In short, whatever the opinions of particular persons may be, human nature will still remain in its rank: and the unhappy choices of the multitude will serve to confirm the sacred text, "man that is in honour, and understandeth not, is like the beasts that perish."

II. *The BODY.*

L. WHAT do you think of this Body of ours?

Æ. It is by this wonderful piece of mechanism, that we hold correspondence with the visible world about us.

L. THE

Part I. *the* HUMAN FACULTIES. 9

L. THE body, as to its outward figure, is certainly beautiful. Few are so fantastical, as to find fault with the human shape. Nor are the parts within less wonderful in their contrivance and use. Many engines are constantly playing. With what incredible force does the heart send out the blood! And how much work is done within us (as *Antoninus* said) and we feel nothing of it! When we feel least of it, we are in the best health.

ANATOMISTS tell us, there is hardly an instrument in mechanicks or hydrostaticks but we meet with in the human body; and indeed in the body of inferior animals: scarce any part of a house or a ship, hardly a common utensil, but we find in this surprising fabrick. They talk of levers, wedges, pullies, ropes, sieves, strainers, beams, tubes, vases, receptacles, and more things than I have English for. You may see * *Boerhaave*.

Æ. SOME of those laborious, penetrating, honest inquirers into nature, have really made great discoveries; and there remains still much to be discovered. Any body may know thus far, that this outward vehicle of ours is made

B 5

up

* *Deprehenduntur enim ibidem fulcimenta, columnæ, trabes, propugnacula, hypomochlia, cunei, vectes, trochleæ determinantes, funes, præla, folles, cribra, filtra, canales, receptacula. Institutiones 40.*

up of an infinite number of parts, organs, or instruments curiously adjusted, and acting in a mutual subserviency each part to another, as well as for the safety and pleasure of the whole system.

L. FLESH, and blood, and skin, and bones, are familiar words, and we think very little about the composition and texture of the things. But we are surprised when we hear that flesh itself is but a collection of small fibres; that every muscle may be divided into lesser ones, and these again into lesser, till they become too small for discovery; † surpassing even the force of imagination.

THE action of the muscles, and the motions performed by their means, is a new matter of wonder. As some of these motions are voluntary, there are others without any design of ours. The voluntary motions are often accompanied with satisfaction, as the mind directs them either to real use or vanity: and we are beholden to the muscles for dancing, as well as walking: to these the politician owes his shrugs, and the nice lady her gestures.

Æ. BUT at the same time, that we admire the texture of the flesh, we see evident marks of frailty stamp'd upon it, or something worse. The mixture of blood, and other fluids, makes the

† Institut. 393.

Part I. *the* HUMAN FACULTIES. II

the consistency the more difficult to be preserved: and upon the breach of so many canals and vessels, which a very ordinary wound may occasion, we see a considerable disorder, and have even some horror at the sight. A putrifying sore is still more disagreeable.

L. It were prudence in us, however, to view our constitution sometimes on its weak sides, that we may not forget the materials we are made of, or imagine a statue of plaster to be a statue of brass. The wisdom of the maker is still seen in the admirable contrivance of the machine, though it were to last but a day; and we have good reason to subscribe to that text, "We are fearfully and wonderfully made."

Æ. WONDERFULLY indeed! but then the tenderness of our frame must not so frighten us, as if it were every moment to fall to pieces; and consequently under the notion of shunning danger, make us shun the duties of society. The body is strongly fenced, and can bear considerable shocks after all. We are only to keep our brittleness in view, as a guard to sobriety and temperance. For there is certainly a good deal of truth in that common proverb, "surfeiting destroys more people than the sword."

How intemperance (a general term for all excesses) comes to be such a ruin to the poor fabrick, is no hard matter to account for. The bones,

'tis

'tis true, have a firmness: but then, how are they joined together? and how many vessels are employed in conveying nourishment even to them? the whole body may be called but a bundle of pipes and vessels wrapt up in skin. Some of the fluids run in larger channels, and with greater briskness, whilst others naturally are but slowly filtrated. What a pressure must a surcharge of meat and drink occasion? how must the various canals be affected? here a ferment, there stagnation. The ideas would be a little nauseous, if pursued farther.

L. But since 'tis much more agreeable to consider things in their good order, than in their corruption, it may be very entertaining to look into some books of anatomy; wherein such discoveries are given, as cannot fail to raise admiration and delight. And there is this moral inference to be made, that as all the parts of the body (united, as St. Paul says, by joints and bands) contribute to the good of the whole in a mechanical way: so all men ought to serve one another freely and chearfully, as members of one body or society: and the good emperor has an useful criticism upon the difference between the words member and part, the former implying a more vital union than the latter; for instance, a branch of a tree, or any inanimate thing, is separated from the body without pain, which

which is far otherwise in the loss of an arm, or in the least hurt of any animated part of the body. This example might be much farther pursued with great pleasure: all the members being found to act in concert and harmony. No schism, no appropriation, no contempt, no oppression.

Æ. FEW criticisms are of so much use. But notwithstanding all the agreeable things that are to be observed in the contrivance of the body, its charms lie principally in the outside. The figure of the inward parts, and the endless branchings of the veins, are looked at with more complacency in wax-work and copper-plate than in their reality; which must give the dissectors themselves some uneasiness, not to be entirely overcome by the longest practice. But the shape and air strike a reverence, the skin and features a delight: the features more than the skin, and the air more than the features: so that the air gives delight and reverence both. We shall leave more observations to lovers. In the mean time, we must do the soul the justice to confess, that 'tis she that's properly the mistress. No man can be in love with the finest statue. Nor would life, added to beauty, be the attraction, if some qualities of the mind were not supposed. This must hold, without dispute, in rational love: and as to the simple impressions

impressions on the eye (which irrational animals may share in, for any thing we know to the contrary) whatever is agreeably felt, if it is not excited by the soul, is at least felt by the soul; and to it we must have recourse, as the seat of life itself, as well as of sensation and reflexion.

I SAY we must have recourse to some other thing than the body, for all our perceptions and faculties, of what kind soever. The body is but a vehicle enlivened. We cut and mangle a dead body without much compassion, and without any injury, as if it were a log of wood.

L. WHAT it is that ties two things together so different in their natures, men have no notion of: We see in fact, and sometimes to our great affliction, a deplorable alteration in the body, or the visible part, from whence we conclude a separation of the invisible; or that the soul or spirit has withdrawn we know not whither.

Æ. THE dissolution of the body shews a little of its composition. As it "returns to the dust," "so it is of the dust." But into this strange composition the four elements may be said to enter, and other things often mentioned by philosophers and common men, oil, sulphur, &c. It must be owned too, that these ingredients are more happily mixed in some persons than others, as Shakespear observes of Brutus; from whence may proceed the difference of constitutions, and
even:

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even of tempers. And this should engage people to pity one another, or to be very civil at least. If a man thinks his neighbour has too much fire, he should consider whether he himself may not have too much phlegm; and on the contrary.

L. If some people heard us, they would be apt to think there is too much said concerning the body; others, that there is too little: and I am of the latter opinion; considering that it is the body which takes up the most of our care: in so much, that Antoninus calls death a release from the drudgery about a carcass.

III. *The* SOUL.

Æ. YOU asked me what I thought of the body. Pray what do you think of the soul?

L. MANKIND being so much in the dark, as to the nature of all things, can only consider them in some of their properties and operations.

Æ. It seems the lowest operation we can conceive of the soul, is to give life and motion to an organized body, which the most curious organs cannot give; since they are but matter reduced into shape and proportion. 'Tis agreeable to see a fly making its motions in the air; or cleaning its little legs, by some principle foreign

reign to its light body. But a small touch puts an end to the activity.

L. IT is an odd sort of enquiry, whether matter might not have thought superadded to it? 'Tis easy, and no less true, to say that infinite power can do every thing it pleases. But then, men should take care, under the appearance of modesty (or however real it may be) not to make impertinent suppositions. If life were superadded, matter would be enlivened; and if thought were superadded, matter would be thinking: whereas the settled idea of matter is something that is inanimate, unactive, and incapable of thinking.

IF we were to search for mere life, or if any person could tell us where it is to be found, I believe the answer would be, "not in the smallest fibres;" for they are but threads: "neither in the thinnest membranes," for they are but threads woven together. If "it is in the blood," as the scripture (Gen. ix.) seems to intimate, it still escapes our discovery; and the blood itself must be reckoned but a vehicle for the life.

Æ. ANOTHER text in the same book (Gen. ii.) says, "God breathed into man the breath of life, and he became a living soul." We must content ourselves with an historical account of our own being, instead of a philosophical:

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phical: and if we should want to know how life has been infused into the meanest animals, we must only conclude, that the fountain of life has communicated to them their portion of it some way or other; and without grudging them their manner of existence (many of them having the advantage of us in some faculties) we ought to study to make the best and the thankfullest use of our own.

THAT which is called the vegetable life, consists chiefly in a circulation of fluids, in order to the support and growth of the body they belong to, without any power of sensation. Vegetation is but growing: and even stones and metals (some think) have a growth of their own.

L. BAGLIVI is of that opinion *.

Æ. PLANTS are bodies organized to admiration. They draw nourishment from the earth by their roots: they seem to be nourished also by the air, and may be killed by the air; they have perspiration, but no respiration, which seems to be peculiar to the animal life, and is the lowest of its operations.

LIVING

* *Evidenter sequitur posse lapides adinstar plantarum crescere ac vegetare: quia revera lapidum pori permeabiles sunt.* Upon which he tells of a shell-fish, called *Dactilus Marinus*, found in the midst of stone alive, and very agreeable to the taste, not far from Naples. *De vegetatione lapidum.*

LIVING creatures can move from one place to another, and have their roots within themselves for their nourishment. Which roots (says Mr. Boerhaave) are the absorbent veins in the mouth, stomach, and intestines.

L. SOME animals, fixed in their shells to rocks, are an exception from that power of local motion: though they have still some inward spring of their own, and may be said to move in their own houses.

Æ. LIFE certainly, in the lowest view we can have of it, implies something more than matter, or matter and motion together, and may be called immaterial, or a thing that cannot fall under the cognizance of any of the five senses. 'Tis finer and quicker than flame: it cannot be extracted by the best chemists, nor kept in glasses. Mr. Hobbes triumphed over the expression "immaterial substance," as an instance of insignificant speech: and he would have had reason on his side, if he had first proved that there was no substance, nor any thing in the universe, but what we can see and touch, &c.

L. SNEERING is no proof.

Æ. BUT now, though all my life may be called immaterial, it cannot upon that account be called immortal or unextinguishable. Immortality is a term appropriated to the soul. The

Part I. *the* HUMAN FACULTIES. 19

The beasts have a life as well as men, and are unwilling to part with it; yet the scripture speaks as if it ended with the destruction of their body, and they are said to perish. 'Tis true, Solomon speaks of the spirit of man, and the spirit of the beast, that the one goes upward, and the other downward; and I think some philosophers talk of different principles, to which higher and lower spirits are united, after quitting their respective bodies. But when revelation stops short, conjectures are often very unsatisfying, and often very improper.

L. It still bears a good moral meaning, that the spirit of man tends to somewhat of a superior kind than the beasts are capable of; nature having made them groveling, as Salust expresses it, "*Prona atque ventri obedientia.*"

THIS we know for certain, that the life of man and beast is subject to ruin, and under great necessities, while it subsists; especially the life of man, who not only wants food, but raiment. Sleep is a want common to all animals on this earth; as if some operations of life needed to be suspended, to keep it from wearing out: for other operations go on; we breathe, the blood circulates, digestion advances, &c. Mean time it is remarkable, that the present wants of mankind (and sleep in particular) contribute very much to any peace and quiet they enjoy:

soldiers

soldiers must rest on their marches, and the plodding statesman drops asleep in the midst of a project that would have embroiled Europe.

Æ. BUT of our necessities some are real, others only imaginary: both of which subject us to great dependence. By the real necessities, all men depend upon one another, and the highest ranks depend most upon the lowest, who work both for their own subsistence, and for theirs that are idle. By the imaginary necessities, some put themselves under the dependence of men in power, and sometimes do very dirty work for the wages they receive. But in all our wants, whether imaginary or real, the body wants nothing; for it feels nothing. 'Tis properly the bodily life that wants meat and cloathing, and it is luxury and pride that want delicacies and ornaments.

How life comes to fail, notwithstanding all the repairs it is constantly getting, and all our anxiety about it, is only to be resolved into the will and appointment of its author. 'Tis just such another mystery, that the bodily frame wears out, and becomes no longer a fit habitation for the soul.

CERTAINLY it might have lasted longer: and we hear of lives in the beginning of the world, near a thousand years old. That some of the softer parts harden too much with time, and

and the strainers cannot perform their functions, is what experience shews; but a new question may arise, Why that hardning of the softer parts? Besides, we often see the machine destroyed before it is half worn, even in infancy; and this without any violent accidents. Man is the poorest creature in the world, in many instances: we may judge how it becomes him to be proud. "Pride was not made for man."

L. POOR ignorant man! the difficulty is as great to know how life is kindled, as how it goes out. That it enters into the body, is but a way of speaking; perhaps the body and it are formed together. I have sometimes thought men have been too prying with their glasses, and their enquiries. Whatever be of that, they discover nothing to lessen their difficulties. Nature still keeps her mysteries to herself.

WE see indeed, in a gross manner, how we are thrown into this world with the distress of our mothers, and pain to ourselves, though we have no remembrance of it. Our stay must be short, from the nature of our bodily frame. "The cords are loosed, and the wheels broken." Death comes, and puts an end to our labours, our designs and our impertinencies.

THIS life is a state of tryal, and has many epithets. 'Tis called a voyage, a passage, an inn, a pilgrimage; sometimes a play, and a farce,

farce, but it always concludes in a tragedy. A little earth is cast upon the head (says Mr. Pascal), “& en voila pour jamais!”

IV. SENSATION.

Æ. BUT how little have we seen of the soul of man! that principle of reason, that immortal spirit capable of inexpressible joy and sorrow even here, and of both these hereafter in a degree infinitely higher, when this clog of a body is thrown off!

L. If you please, we will talk a little more of our inferior state and condition. As life is a considerable remove from matter and motion, sensation carries us a stage beyond life, and as it were into another region; but still a very low one. However, if men cannot account for simple life, no wonder they cannot account for sense and feeling. 'Tis much if Mr. Hobbes was in earnest in what he says of the cause of sense. You may see how far it is satisfying *

Æ. SOMETIMES one would hardly know whether to laugh or be angry at Hobbes. But though the cause of sensation is hid from us, the advantages of it are very obvious. The senses are the canals of pleasure: they may be said to bring intelligence to the soul, and to the whole man safety and delight. They are noble presents

* Leviathan, Chap. 1.

presents from our creator, and we see what a loss it is to be deprived of any one of them. If they are sometimes the conveyances of pain, this is owing to some accidents they are not answerable for; and very often the pain is of our own procuring.

If the organs are indisposed, the senses must be so likewise: and if they are lost, the senses are lost. 'Tis the body that furnishes these organs, which probably has made the emperor "assign the senses to the body."

THE bodily senses are also called the external senses, as they serve us in the commerce with things in this visible world. They are commonly reckoned five: and this number has obtained a sort of prescription. In our English Apocrypha they are called the * "five operations:" and though feeling is a word that may be applied to them all, yet in common discourse

* ["They received the use of the five operations of the Lord, and in the sixth place he imparted them understanding; and in the seventh, speech, an interpreter of the cogitations thereof." Ecclus. 17.] Whatever may be in Grotius's conjecture, that this passage has been put on the margin (and it looks to have been so) by some follower of the Stoicks, it still shews that this way of classing our external senses is pretty ancient: and it seems even to answer the purpose well enough; for we can find out no other operation for discovering and surveying the qualities of outward things, and for putting them to use.

discourse it is appropriated to one of these five powers in particular: sometimes we say, a light strikes the eye, a sound the ear. But 'tis the hand that is usually said to touch. And hence touching, and the other four senses, are considered as active; because they can be applied to particular objects, as the mind directs; by whose orders they also suspend their operations. A man may shut his eyes when he thinks fit. But upon the matter, all the senses are rather passive than active, which I believe you will readily grant.

But though the number of those operations has been limited to five, the number of sensations or perceptions may be called infinite, both as to the objects and the degrees. By the degrees I mean the higher and lower sensations of pleasure and pain, two words that include every thing that delights us or afflicts us; though in this place 'tis only what concerns the body that is under consideration.

E. Of those five operations (you know) the sight and hearing are reckoned the noblest; probably because they are of a greater reach, and serve more eminently for conveying knowledge to the mind. The eye can take in half the firmament, the ear can hear at a great distance, and both can receive instruction by words: whereas the other three senses (speci-

ally the touch and taste) can only act by an immediate application to the object.

L. THERE is a remarkable difference between the two last named senses in one respect, that the taste is for one's self alone, and so may be called but a poor solitary pleasure: whereas the touch is a means of union with another person, and in so far may be called a social pleasure; and it serves often as a conveyance of friendship.

Æ. YOU design to be merry.

L. NEITHER merry nor grave. You must have had the women in your head yourself, and I don't deny that they were in mine: but setting them aside, I will appeal to any man, if he would not prefer the kiss of a friend's cheek to the best wine upon earth.

Æ. HE must be a sorry friend that would not.

L. THE greatest observers have only discovered the organs or instruments belonging to each sense; and 'tis probable they have not discovered them all neither. Thus touching and tasting are but faintly explained by the discovery of certain * nipples under the skin (differing in their

* *Papillæ molles, pulposæ, medullosæ, nervosæ, pyramidales, in nervis subcutaneis duris, exutâ membranâ exteriori emollitis, ortæ, hinc admodum sensiles factæ, affluentî assiduò tenuissimo liquore humectatæ, epidermide tenuissimâ*

their figures) as the proper instruments of these two senses; though the small instruments are indeed described with great labour and exactness. And as we know but some of the instruments, so we know but some of the occasions or conditions (not the causes) requisite to affect us so many ways as we find we are affected. So that the greatest philosophers have recourse only to the * “appointment of the adorable Creator.” The cause of simple life is not to be reached; much less the cause of sensation: and the cause of pleasure or pain less still.

Æ. FEELING or sensibility (it seems) is diffused through all the body, without and within, and so is considered as the foundation of what is most usually and strictly called pleasure and pain. The rest of the senses convey what is agreeable (the eye sights, and the ear sounds, for instance) but

tenuissimâ defensæ; illibatâ sua sensibilitate, intra sinus, foveasque, sub cuticula latentes; in locis tactui exercendo propriis, nempe linguâ apice digitorum in manibus, pedibusque, contractiles; iterumque emissiles; sunt organum corporeum quo explorata corpora tangi dicuntur. Boerhaave Institut.

He shews afterwards by what means touch arises, and how the different perceptions are excited of heat and cold, &c.—*Tactus igitur fit*—483. He goes very far, yet must stop short.

* *Non ergo videtur diversitas, hæc idæarum pendere tantum a varietate illâ, quâ ultima pars nervi constituitur, sed a multis aliis præterea non quidem causis, sed ex instituto conditoris adorandi conditionibus.* 571.

but they are not said to create that severe rack-
ing pressure which goes under the name of pain
or torture, nor that gentle agreeable impression
called pleasure. A new wonder arises,

“How the same nerves are fashion’d to sustain
“The greatest pleasure, and the greatest pain!”

L. ’Tis remarkable how much the present
frame of the body is liable to pain, and often
seized with it to extremity.

Æ. ’Tis remarkable too, that the extremes
of pleasure are much fewer than those of pain,
from which no fibre of the body can promise to
be exempt; and as to the point of duration,
pleasure has but little to boast of. Intense pain
may continue long, intense pleasure cannot.

L. MANKIND are in some delusion as to
that point. Mr. Boerhaave and others are very
good, for shewing the frame and texture of the
organs belonging to each sense. Mean time the
touch and taste are generally most gratified,
and the taste yet more than the former. And
to these two senses may be referred all that is
called luxury: the smell is but gratified in a
manner for diversion. Elegance is properly the
pursuit of the eye. Sometimes, ’tis true, all
extravagance is called luxury: as the luxury of
building, gardening, apparel, &c.

To enter into all the bad consequences of indulging the senses, were an endless affair. There are few persons but know too much of it from their own experience; with relation to their estate, their character, and the body itself. And if they want authorities, they may see what Horace says of the effects of gratifying a sweet tooth, as Dr. Cheyne calls it: “*Dulcia se in bilem vertunt.*”

BUT the inconvenience of sensuality is one thing, and the injustice of it another. Mere selfish gratification, without regard to society and friendship (supposing the heart not to be engaged in the pleasure) is a thing below humanity, but 'tis infinitely more agreeable to think of what nature has done for our support and delight, than what we do ourselves to our uneasiness, our destruction, and our dishonour. We have the benefits and pleasures of all the senses to think of, and we can never think of them enough. Mr. Boerhaave is in *raptures, speak-

* After having said many things of the ear, from the best authors, and his own observations, he adds, “*Supra omnem verò admirabilitatem constructa apparet cochleæ spiralis fabrica, &c.*” 562.

He had said of the nose: “*Sunt præterea in humanarum carnis recondita, & artificiose variis locis disposita, quatuor officula spongiosa—Sunt hæc quatuor officula mire fabricata ex tenuissimis osseis lamellis, papyro tenuioribus—*493.

“*Nares*

speaking of the very organs: how much more satisfaction must it give to reflect on the uses, the delights, and the certainty of the operations themselves? To suppose them fallacious, were to give ourselves the lye, as well as to unhinge all society, law, and commerce. A man distinguishes his friend well from a stranger, he knows his very foot before entering the room. Witnesses are admitted upon their knowledge of facts: and a judge, from his conviction of the proof, acquits the innocent or condemns the guilty: to say nothing of more familiar distinctions, known to young and old.

Æ. SOMETIMES, you know, we must have recourse to one sense for confirming another, or rectifying its mistakes. But this can never overthrow the certainty of the senses in general. If a stick appears crooked in the water, there needs no more but to take it out, to be convinced that it is straight. 'Tis the philosophers that perplex people, or rather confound themselves, with their subtilties and their marks of certainty: an honest farmer is at no loss to know whether he is sleeping or waking.

L. THE quickness of the senses, as well as the health of the body, depends very much on

C 3

fobriety

“ *Nares investiuntur membranâ crassâ, molli, myriadibus vasculorum arteriosorum ornatâ — Membranâ hæc sollicitè se insinuat — Unde mirabili instituto —* 494.

sobriety and good rules; though, to be sure, there are higher motives for sobriety than health and pleasure. And besides that the body is thus kept righter for the exercise of its proper functions, the mind is freed from an excessive trouble in seeking after those seeming necessities of luxury which grow upon us the more they are indulged, and make us delicate and fretful, uneasy to ourselves and others.

Æ. BESIDES the five senses, the naturalists generally speak of a sensorium, or common sense, which they reckon the ground of all sensation, or a medium, as it were, for modifying the impressions and conveying them to the mind. The eye, say they, knows not that it sees, nor the ear that it hears, till this common sense interposes its verdict.

THIS makes no addition to the number of our senses, whether it be granted or denied; it only serves, as a new instrument, to account in some dark manner for their operations. And perhaps it is owing to this medium or canal, among other things, that having two eyes and two ears we do not see nor hear double.

MANY other things belong to the animal life, which we may call indifferently sensations, actions, powers, faculties. Physicians speak of the action of the stomach, as well as that of eating and drinking. What name shall we give

give sleeping, which puts a stop to most of our powers and actions? what shall we say of hunger and thirst? some have called them internal senses: sensations they are at least, and sometimes extreme pressures; and our pleasures arise mostly from such uneasy preceding sensations. Thus rest and motion are agreeable by turns: and that faculty of moving from one place to another, may be said to enlarge our confinement, (for we are but prisoners here on earth) so that the taking a walk becomes a pleasure, were it but in a chamber. In short, we are so wonderfully contrived, that we can hardly speak sense when we attempt to give any description of ourselves; and must leave many things untouched after all. We feel our wants, and are eager to satisfy them right or wrong. We have indeed strong arguments within us of our indigence. Without nourishment the poor animal starves in a very little time. Without sleep he is intolerably uneasy, and 'tis as great a necessity upon him as the former. But let us suppose all that is necessary for the subsistence of the animal life, meat, drink, clothes, sleep, lodging, and all these to the full, and of the best: what should poor man do without objects to entertain the rest of his senses! How melancholy must he be, and how little joy would his finest ideas often give him? I say often, be-

cause sometimes there is a pleasure in them : but no body can promise himself the continuance of that pleasure, and sometimes a man would quit it for a pipe of tobacco. And if ideas yield to the senses, these must yield to the affections. For if the affections are not gratified, or any one of them that chances to have the dominion for the time, what good could the whole earth do us ? Let a man in such a situation try how he can suffice himself, and make the best of his self-love that he can, he will find so little pleasure from that fountain, that he would wish he were out of existence.

V. IMAGINATION.

L. SELF is indeed a poor center, as Bacon says. But our imagination imposes upon us, I know not how.

Æ. WE hardly know what imagination is.

L. 'Tis a dark affair indeed. This faculty has such a dependence upon the senses, that Mr. Hobbes calls it nothing but decaying sense ; and he compares it to the tossing of water after the wind ceases. But the comparison is lame. A thousand things are imagined that never entered into the senses : and the images of former impressions are recalled at pleasure.

FAN Y

FANCY is another word for the same faculty; and both words are taken promiscuously for the faculty and the act, and sometimes for the thing imagined. Thus we say "a mere imagination, a mere fancy."

SOMETIMES this faculty is taken for invention, and is distinguished from judgment: the one laying the materials in order, which the other collects. And sometimes fancy is taken for choice or taste: We say "a person of a good or bad fancy."

Æ. I believe the fancy is a real faculty of the soul: you know * Milton calls it so, and describes it finely.

IT serves to recall the images of things formerly perceived, and so they are more languid than in the first impression; as the idea of the sun

* ————— But know that in the soul

Are many lesser faculties that serve
Reason as chief; among these, Fancy next

Her office holds, of all external things,
Which the five watchful senses represent,

She forms imaginations, airy shapes,

Which reason joining or disjoining frames

All what we affirm, or what deny, and call

Our knowledge or opinion; then retires

Into her private cell: when nature rests,

Oft in her absence, mimic Fancy wakes

To imitate her; but, misjoining shapes,

Wild work produces oft, and most in dreams;

Ill matching words and deeds long past and late.

Par. Lost. B. V.

sun and light is very poor and imperfect at midnight.

L. BUT as we can recall absent images, they come sometimes upon us uncalled in a very tumultuous and irregular manner, and when we would gladly be rid of them; so that we may be said to dream even in the day-time. It may be called dreaming, though we do not entertain these imaginations voluntarily, since they are for the most part but castles in the air. Nor is it future prospects only that intrude upon our imagination: there is hardly a trifle that we have done or heard of, twenty years ago, but what breaks in upon us, and often the most unseasonably in the world. 'Tis difficult to fix the attention so long as not to wander before the Lord's prayer can be repeated. All which argues some distemper in our internal frame, and yet very few I believe are sensible of it.

Æ. THAT may be called involuntary imagination. One and the same faculty may be said to be both passive and active. The mind has certainly a power of raising images or appearances of things within itself, and it often feels them raised it knows not how.

BUT though we can tell many things the fancy can do, 'tis impossible to tell every thing. It adds, it pares, it joins, it separates, it mixes, it jumbles, it builds, it razes; in short, it works wonders

wonders in its own shop, and the best description will still be inferior to its power. It can frame new ideas upon the model of old ones: as when we suppose a person we have not seen, to resemble one we have seen; and when we frame an idea of Constantinople from what we have seen of London, or perhaps but from a map of London. This sort of coining is very often a forging. Nor must it ever be forgot, that such images are quite wrong, or rather no images at all; that are formed when the particular sense is wanting or hurt: as in the known story of the blind man, that reckoned scarlet was like the sound of a trumpet.

L. How the imagination imposes upon us when the senses are entire, is still harder to explain. But sometimes we say, the imagination is imposed upon, when 'tis the sense that is mistaken; as when the stick appears crooked in water: but the error lies neither in the sight nor in the fancy, but only in our pronouncing too hastily. Hence we may see the advantage of that great rule, "Not to judge according to appearances;" especially in things relating to religion and common life. As to religion, 'tis well known how hasty imaginations, or rather hasty conclusions, bring all things into calamity and ruin. And the bad effects of rash judgment are no less seen in life: we see others
in

in a glittering situation, we immediately pronounce them happy: and by a natural consequence think ourselves miserable, if we have not the like finery. Ben Johnson makes Fungoso faint away, upon seeing another beau get into the fashion before him. The same sort of judging obtains in household furniture, equipage, and titles. 'Tis true, it may be called staring rather than judging, when we have no other standard of felicity but to gape and admire with the mob,

“ Qui stupet in titulis—”

But such is really the case, and such influence has imagination both on private quiet and the public, that the want of a ribbon may endanger a government. Pride indeed mixes with the admiration: from what other source can it proceed, that a man in perfect health is not easy to travel the length of a street, unless he have a coach? and that another is not easy in a very fine coach, because it has not a coronet?

Æ. 'Tis this faculty of imagination, however, that makes the greatest figure in life, especially in company, and still more when there is a stock of memory along with it. 'Tis also the work-house of poetry, and sometimes of politicks. Examples are needless.

L. To

L. To make a figure in company, there must be also a stock of confidence.

Æ. NOTHING truer. Mean time invention has much the advantage of bare imagination: and every man either wishes for it, or boasts of it. Some persons indeed have a very ready talent. But even in this readiness of invention a man has nothing to call his own: for though expedients come in his head, yet he is not master of that art when he pleases; and 'tis a very common way of speaking, "such a thing did or did not occur." So that the hitting on a good thought may be reckoned as much an accident, as the unexpected meeting with a friend. And then, how many things do occur, that are very impertinent! False humour, ribaldry, and dull conceits! And 'tis very vexatious when all this is passed for wit.

L. THE chief business of wit seems to be in ordinary conversation and scribbling, whereas invention is extended to all affairs and offices in life; from the first minister of state to the lowest mechanick, or the poorest master of a family.

Æ. ROCHESTER has pleasantly observed, that riches and power were very unequally shared among mankind, but that it was quite otherwise as to wit; at least that every one was well satisfied with his own portion:

"Of
naturally falls upon one of the things for us
and not again to be no more all y
point

“Of this none thinks (the due division’s such)

“His own too little, or his friend’s too much.”

And though his lordship (whose share indeed was very great) said this only for his diversion, yet really the division is more equal than is generally believed. One shall hear very good jests and repartees among people of the meanest condition: they have their smart lads, their witty lasses, and their satyrical old men.

L. WHAT passes most currently for wit in this island, is properly but humour, and often of a very low kind. But true humour is when the fancy puts different things together, which have no outward resemblance, nor connection in nature. Thus Butler says of his learned champion,

“He knew

“When butter does refuse to come,

“And love proves cross and humourfome.”

Again, when things in tolerable esteem, are applied to the most vulgar uses:

“For he by geometrick scale

“Could take the size of pots of ale,

“Resolve by fines and tangents freight

“If bread or butter wanted weight.”

IN such a jumble of images, some ridicule naturally falls upon one of the things for its being

being in company with the other. And such a merry burlesque vein may be pretty allowable when it brings no contempt on things or persons that ought to be more respectfully treated: for in that case it is like the hanging nasty rags upon a fine statue. Mr. Hobbes lays down some regulations and remarks with reference to this ticklish affair, which shew the greatness of his genius beyond many that have succeeded him, and which likewise shew the unsuccessfulness of any genius, when it meddles in a decisive manner with things out of its reach. You may compare what he says, in the eighth chapter of his *Leviathan*, with what he had said of the cause of sensation in the first.

“ THE secret thoughts of a man run over
 “ all things, holy, prophane, clean, obscene,
 “ grave, and light, without shame or blame;
 “ which verbal discourse cannot do, farther
 “ than the judgment shall approve of the time,
 “ place, and persons. An anatomist, or a
 “ physician, may speak or write his judgment
 “ of unclean things [natural things] because he
 “ is not to please, but profit: but for another
 “ man to write his extravagant and pleasant
 “ fancies of the same, is as if a man, from be-
 “ ing tumbled into the dirt, should come and
 “ present himself before good company. And
 “ ’tis the want of discretion that makes the
 “ difference.

“ difference. Again, in profest remissness of
 “ mind, and familiar company, a man may
 “ play with the sounds and equivocal signifi-
 “ cation of words; and that many times with en-
 “ counters of extraordinary fancy: but in a
 “ sermon, or in publick, or before persons un-
 “ known, or whom we ought to reverence,
 “ there is no jingling of words that will not be
 “ accounted folly: and the difference is only
 “ in the want of discretion. So that where
 “ wit is wanting, it is not fancy that is want-
 “ ing, but discretion. Judgment therefore
 “ without fancy is wit, but fancy without judg-
 “ ment not.”

Æ. I WAS still mightily pleased with that passage.

L. If many books (as well as conversation) were examined by that standard, they would run a great hazard. I would only differ from Hobbes in one of his conclusions, “ that judgment without fancy is wit.” For it is the exuberance of fancy which produces the thing called wit in general: the office of judgment being to keep that current within its due limits. All poetical compositions (whether in verse or prose, the Adventures of Telemachus, as well as the Iliad, or Æneid) are works of wit and judgment both, but are more properly referred to the class of wit; because of the invention

and

and fancy that prevails in them. A history is the pure work of judgment and memory. But to do Mr. Hobbes justice, if wit were taken according to the signification of the Latin and French terms *Ingenium* and *Esprit*, or according to our English word *Genius*, it were hard to refuse the epithet of wit to a good history, or to any composition that is good in its kind.

Æ. IN comparing poetical works together, some of them are observed to abound most in judgment, others in fancy; as fancy is reckoned to prevail in Homer, and judgment in Virgil. In the French performance 'tis hard to discover whether fancy or judgment prevails most; all is so well adjusted, tempered, and mixed together. I do not mean to derogate from the praise given to Milton's *Paradise Lost*, a performance of a quite different nature.

L. I must own, I have often thought Milton has given too much swing to his imagination.

Æ. I shall not dispute that with you.

L. IN many compositions, humour is what appears more than either judgment or fancy: and often it deserves not the name of humour, but rather of ribaldry. And this observation seems to hold pretty well, that wit in the most usual acceptation of it is an edged tool, and generally hurtful to those who have most of it. 'Tis a sort of involuntary, incontinent, derisive spirit,

spirit, which must burst out either in conversation, or on paper, from a mixt desire of pleasing and of being admired; accompanied with a certain pleasure of disburdening. The same lord Rochester says very truly,

“ And wit was his vain frivolous pretence,
 “ Of pleasing others at his own expence.”

Satyr on Man.

But this desire of pleasing is not very disinterested.

VI. *The PASSIONS.*

THE force and activity of the soul appears much more in the passions than in the bodily senses, which are but passive and languid in comparison of those violent commotions, or even in comparison of the more gentle affections. When the passions break loose, they are like hurricanes and eruptions of fire: and they are fitly called passions, because we suffer under their dominion. But then, as they are bad masters, they are excellent servants; as we use to say of fire and water: and without passions, life would be a very insipid thing. For let us suppose a man possess'd of a fortune sufficient to give him all the gratifications of the senses, and that in the most elegant way imaginable: let him have ragoûts and burgundy, and dogs
 and

and horses, and what else he has a mind for: yet if we suppose him in the bare state of sensuality, without love and friendship; no desire of knowledge, no relish of giving or receiving obligations, neither satisfaction in virtue, nor indignation at vice: such a man would be reckoned by most people to pass his time very dully.

ON the other hand, let us suppose a man heartily animated with one single passion, it will keep him at least awake; and the prospect of satisfying it will be to him instead of the most delicious sensualities, and sometimes instead of the necessities of life.

L. IT is sometimes reckoned, the stronger the passions are, the better, provided they are under due regulations. "Be angry, and sin not." But this I suppose can mean only a vigorous constitution of soul, to love heartily what we ought to love, and to hate heartily what we ought to hate. For there must be an exception as to such passions, or such forms of them as can produce no good effect. For instance, fear and revenge: the latter is diabolical, and the former often very base. Such a fear I mean, as is said to give a body to our imaginations, to disconcert our most valuable faculties; and which may be called an alienation of mind while it lasts: and such a fear also

as makes us recede from any duty that would expose us to the censure of the unthinking world. Such passions we had better wish extinguished.

THE passions, you know, are also called affections of the soul : for though affection is taken particularly for love (which word too has its different significations) yet affection or passion denotes any motion or feeling, whether agreeable or disagreeable. And thus the passions are commonly divided into the concupiscible and the irascible, two old-fashioned words, but which intimate to us that all the various and variable motions of the soul turn upon these two hinges, desire and aversion.

THIS division of our passions, or fetching them from two sources, gives indeed no idea either of virtue or vice ; but only a general notion of pleasure and pain in the soul, without any consideration of merit or demerit : so that there had need to be another division of the passions, into the virtuous and vicious. But because this way of classing them would be insignificant to those, who will not allow the distinction of virtue and vice ; it will be enough to divide them into the social passions, and the selfish, or the disinterested and the interested. 'Tis true, those persons will not allow there is such a thing as disinterestedness neither : but they will:

will at least allow there is such a thing as compassion, tenderness, kindness, (they may chuse their word) and so the passions might be distinguished into the kind and unkind, which I suppose would pass current with all the world: since the greatest advocates for self-love do not deny that men can be friendly, but only affirm that their friendship is founded upon their own interest.

Æ. I think this may be said too, that as desire and aversion (especially when they come the length of passion) imply want, uneasiness, trouble, and violent motion in the soul; so joy is the satisfaction, delight, and acquiescence that ensues on our meeting with our desires, or even on getting free of our aversions. Joy is to the soul what pleasure is to the senses: (and sorrow may be called its pain) with this difference, that true joy and sorrow of the rational soul are still founded upon reason. And in all the passions the will has some more power than in the bodily feelings, which we cannot augment nor lessen: the greatest stoick must feel the gout; the most abstemious recluse cannot put a stop to his tasting, while the glass is at his mouth. Whereas in the passions or feelings of the soul, a man can either cherish them, and consequently raise them higher, or

he

he can make some efforts against them, and we see they die the sooner.

SIMPLE desire, and simple aversion, are justly reckoned blind. And if fancy may be said to enter often into our desires, it enters yet oftner into our aversions: for we can generally give a better reason why we like, than why we dislike. So that many of our aversions are much owing to some disorder in ourselves, or our being out of tune; which appears remarkably in those aversions and disgusts that are personal.

L. I BELIEVE hope and fear issue from desire and aversion, according to the views, or the apprehensions which the mind hath of meeting with things agreeable or vexatious. Hope and fear therefore are supposed to be attended with some reason: the panick fear excepted as before, because it concludes the dreadful thing to be already present. Our hopes seldom impose so far upon us: though they rise very high, and from very narrow foundations in some tempers, and not the worst ones neither. But if we consider hope as a rational expectation of the mind, it will rather come under the list of the virtues than of the passions.

THE natural fear of death is wisely implanted in us, for the preservation of our bodily frame: and neither the fear of death nor of pain is shameful, unless it make us shun what we ought

ought to do, or do what we ought to shun.

Luxury and soft living must necessarily increase fear, and magnify danger: as 'tis told of an honest gentleman, who thought to have joined king Charles I. but could not resolve to lie out of his own bed.

Æ. POOR gentleman!

L. I WAS thinking that as the mind from simple desire and aversion, appetite and abhorrence, proceeds to hope and fear: so when these are accomplished, or come to their period, it would seem to proceed no farther, but to rest on the enjoyment, or in the affliction; though affliction or sorrow is not properly a state of rest.

Æ. JOY, no doubt, is acquiescence and delight. When we are told "that joy is of short continuance," I suppose we are to understand it of the pleasure of the senses and of the imagination: for the soul seems to be capable of infinite joy, both as to duration and extent; and no less capable of sorrow.

L. BUT how hard is it to give the anatomy of the soul, and to reduce all its motions into a regular system! I know not whether our terms or our ideas fail us soonest. How many little bastard-passions are there that go under the name of ill-humour! fretting, disgust, chagrin, contradiction, &c. shall we refer these to

the article of anger or of pride? or are they not rather made up of both?

HOWEVER, we must never blame nature, as if she had put so many sources of trouble and disquiet within us: for we have likewise other sources or funds of satisfaction, if we would cultivate them faithfully; but this we can never do, till we endeavour to change the principle of our desires and actions.

Æ. I CONFESS 'tis the principle, or cause, our passions proceed from, that makes them deserve either praise or blame. Thus grief is shameful, when it proceeds from the loss of money; but honourable, in the loss of a friend.

L. NUMBERLESS observations might be made on the passions, each whereof would require a book, if one was to consider their rise, their progress, their decay, their extinction, their rising again, their giving way to other passions quite opposite, their combinations, their force, their subtilty, their enchantment, &c. All which are but the different turnings of human nature.

Æ. THE duke of Rochefoucault would throw them all into the bottomless pit of self-love.

L. IT will be good to consult the best authors who have wrote of our several powers and propensions, if they write good sense, and
make

make a true report of nature ; whatever their profession be, clergyman or laick : and the sex by no means to be excepted, since we have from their hands some of the finest compositions upon the most delicate and important subjects.

INDEED the passions (like every thing else) are better known by feeling than description. What better can be said of love, than that 'tis love ? 'Tis difficult even to give a list of them. Nor do I find people agreed either as to their number or their classes.

Æ. * Mr. Hobbes has treated of a great many motions of the soul under one head of the passions. And the long train he there mentions, are but modes, and diversifications of five or six primary motions, which he calls the simple passions, and perhaps fitly enough, viz. appetite, desire, love, aversion, hate, joy, and grief. I think he proceeds in his scheme thus :

“ Appetite, with an opinion of attaining, is called hope.

“ The same without such opinion, despair.

*** “ Sudden courage, anger.

“ Constant hope, confidence of ourselves.

*** “ Desire of good to another ; benevolence,

“ good-will, charity. If to man gene-

“ rally, good-nature.”

D H E

* Leviathan, Chap. 6.

HE discusses other passions or tendencies after the same aphoristical manner, and (it would seem) just as they have come into his head; such as ambition, pusillanimity, magnanimity, valour, liberality, miserableness, [churlishness] love, jealousy, . . . curiosity, religion, . . . pannick terror, . . . glory, . . . dejection, . . . laughter, . . . shame, . . . impudence, pity, cruelty, emulation, envy. He speaks of certain tendencies that I do not remember, and I wonder he said nothing of others, since he was giving "the history of man;" for instance, affectation. But 'tis hard for one to know what he should write, or what he should not write: and there is something so like pedantry in all those discussions, that perhaps Mr. Hobbes has been glad to dispatch them off as soon as he could; and it must be owned, he often writes in a very natural way. I cannot, however, subscribe to all his aphorisms or definitions; for instance, that "constant hope is a confidence in ourselves:" for it may proceed as naturally from a confidence in another. And as to religion, he places both the true and the false only in fear: "fear of power invisible feigned by the mind, or imagined from tales publicly allowed, religion; not allowed, superstition: and when the power imagined is truly such as we imagine, true religion."

L. A poor account of true religion !

Æ. WE find by experience that the passions domineer by turns ; and when two, or more of them, are in competition at once, the weakest must certainly yield, unless reason interposeth. But the duke of Rochefoucault observes, that sloth or indolence (though it deserves not the name of a passion) often gets the better of them all, and triumphs equally over our vices and our virtues.

THERE is another of his maxims which I cannot so easily join with, “ that the passions “ are but different degrees of heat and cold in “ the blood.” That I think were a little too mechanical : though we are undeniably under a sort of mechanism, and are drawn like puppets by strings, as Antoninus has express’d it. We may be literally said, upon some occasions, to be transported and inflamed. Nothing is more common, even in the sacred writings, than such expressions.

L. THE degrees of every passion are infinite : a man may easily suppose himself capable of greater sorrow, or greater joy, than ever he has yet felt. And an extreme violence of any one of the passions is more than enough to separate the soul from the body.

VII. COMPLEXION, DISPOSITION,
HUMOUR.

Æ. THE constitution of the body is reckoned to depend much on the fibres, the blood, and the solid parts and the fluids; from the good or bad temperament or habit of all which, we may expect the better or worse health, the longer or shorter life. The complexion implies something more a-kin to the soul, though it seems also to depend on the more or less happy mixture of the elements, and certain chemical ingredients in us.

L. THERE is a strange variety among mankind: but to give the preference to one complexion above the rest, might be thought too forward and partial. Each complexion has its advantages, and each has its defects. The sanguine person would think it hard to be reproached for the hastiness of his temper, which sometimes indeed flies out like gun-powder; but when he cools and comes to himself, he is all kindness and civility. It is most advisable for the complexions not to dispute too much about their several prerogatives: for in all such reckonings, each party comes off with loss.

Æ. AND there is nothing a man disparages in another that he has not a part of himself, and sometimes the largest part.

L. THE

L. THE complexion and disposition seem to differ in this point, that the latter is a more internal thing than the former. We shall find two persons equally sanguine or equally phlegmatick, and yet the one remarkably prouder than the other. Pride is not reckoned a complexional thing, but to lie deeper in the soul: (the same may be said of covetousness) and some souls have a remarkable tendency to some predominant thing, almost from the cradle.

Æ. BUT whatever inclination prevails in the soul for the time being, the wits are set at work to bring it about. Men are both drawn by pleasure, and pursue it: the same person, as it were, going out of himself, for what he cannot find within. 'Tis true, 'tis for his own sake that he goes thus out of himself: but then he often goes on the errands of a fool, or a madman: so that the term self-love might be with as great propriety changed into self-will; and 'tis in this view that the duke of Rochefoucault takes it when he says, it will pursue things not only frivolous, but destructive, merely because it will.

L. THIS quality of the mule must be purely unreasonable, and Butler says excellently:

“ For obstinacy’s ne’er so stiff
“ As when ’tis in a wrong belief.”

But it is not always from pride that this obstinacy arises: for it acts often without any reflection on its own qualifications, or any regard to consequences.

Æ. THERE is another disposition no less hard to account for, nor less hard to conquer; and that is, inconstancy. The soul grows weary; and loaths, and knows not why: the object has lost nothing of its agreeableness, and yet can no longer please! And this happens as suddenly as frequently.

* “New passions new opinions still excite,
“And what we like at noon, we loath at
“night.”

Heaps of verse and prose might be produced on this subject. And it may be said the passions and opinions excite one another, though the passions or inclinations are the greater favourites; and † “we take it more impatiently to have
“our inclinations condemned than our opi-
“nions.” We are also for the most part as forward to shew our opinions, as we are unwilling to shew our inclinations; in which respect these last may not be very ill compared to a dirty shirt.

L. THOUGH it is not possible to find words for all the motions of the soul, yet we may discover

* Dispensary.

† Rochesqueault.

cover what things men are most naturally carried to, when we discover their differences of complexion and disposition. And it were very profitable for us to make those discoveries at home: but we are seldom at leisure for that; nor indeed is the study very agreeable. The patrons of self-love would have fewer proselytes, if people were more inclined to self-examination. But whether we look at home or abroad, the nature of things will continue the same: and we may make this general conclusion as to the difference between the complexion and the disposition, that 'tis the complexion which makes us quicker or slower, warmer or colder, and the like: as 'tis from the disposition, that we are more or less proud, humble, cruel, mild, covetous, honest, and whatever falls under the denomination of vice or virtue.

Æ. THE knowledge of tempers and dispositions seems to be very necessary for a first minister, in order to deal with his particular men, to gratify one with money, another with a ribbon, and so on.

L. SOME are even gratified with a nod or a smile.

Æ. HUMOUR is a word that seems to imply something different both from complexion and disposition, which are reckoned settled things; whereas humour changes like the weather, and

may be called the mother of freaks, whims, frolics, and even of moaping, the reverse of these. Good humour, or good temper, is more properly good disposition; and to be in good humour, and good-humoured, are different things; the worst tempered person being sometimes in good humour. But in all the turns and casts of human nature (whatever source they come from) there is such an endless variety, that every person may be justly called an original.

VIII. LIBERTY.

AFTER what we have observed of the passions, and inclinations, their insinuating power and open violence, and from what is daily to be seen in the world; we might be induced to think there is no such thing as liberty in man, but that he were a piece of clock-work, or an engine actuated by fire, wind, or water.

Æ. SOME have refused liberty even to the Deity, subjecting their Jupiter to fate: and our moderns borrow from old opinions.

OTHERS, thinking liberty the prerogative of the Almighty alone, cannot allow it to mankind, lest their abuse of it might seem to alter the purposes of heaven, or lest too much should be ascribed to creatures in procuring their own happiness.

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happiness. But no such consequences can be apprehended from all the liberty that we suppose to be in weak man: 'tis nothing but such a power as the opening or shutting his eyes, not of seeing without light, a power only to accept or reject what is freely offered him, and which he could by no means furnish to himself; no more than he can make the fruits to grow for the subsistence of his natural life, though few will deny that he can sow and plant.

L. LIBERTY, no doubt, is a pure gift from heaven; and in all creatures it is only a power to use their faculties for the purposes they were given. In this general acceptation of it, the meanest creature that has life has liberty. And we see among beasts and birds great marks of deliberation and choice.

Æ. IN rational creatures, liberty must be supposed not only as a foundation of virtue, but of reason itself: since the nicest engine in the world cannot be said to act rationally, nor so much as to act freely. Mr. Hobbes, indeed, proposes to reconcile liberty and necessity, by the comparison of a river, which is said to run freely when nothing hinders its course. But this is mere playing with words. A river will hardly be called a free agent: and I think it may be affirmed, that those who make self-love the sole spring, or motive, of human actions, allow

no more liberty to a man than to a river. There is only this difference of consciousness between them, the one knows what it is doing, the other not: but both are under a like overbearing unvirtuous necessity.

L. ANOTHER term for liberty is free-will, which imports no more than a freedom of choice. But sometimes people confound the will with the inclinations; and these having so much the upperhand in us, 'tis no wonder if liberty is absolutely denied. But as we do many things from our inclinations, so we do many things against them; but can strictly be said to do nothing against our will.

* 'Tis but a jest that Butler says on swearing. The acting against our inclinations is a pretty good proof of our liberty.

Æ. THE term *Liberum Arbitrium*, supposes the understanding to act without any bias, or rather without any thing that may darken it; in which case it may be said, to act freely and necessarily both: freely, because it is not hindered, as Mr. Hobbes says of the river; and necessarily, because its nature is to see and judge. But there is still a further power of chusing, after all tryal and examination is made. If it

be alledged that this choice itself is determined;

* For he that swears against his will,
Is of his own opinion still.

it may be asked by what? If 'tis by the reasonableness of the thing, then the choice is as it ought to be; but it cannot be said to be necessarily determined, because it might have been (and often is) otherwise; that is, contrary to reason.

L. MAN then seems to have got a power or a spring within himself to determine him: if this spring be called the will, it must be free, since a forced will is no will.

Æ. The unhappy disputes concerning liberty being rather with reference to things moral than natural, it might help to shorten them, if it were referred to every man's breast, "whether
" in any thing he ever did that was wrong, he
" could not have done otherwise? Unless this question be answered in the affirmative, what foundation can there be for remorse, or even for guilt, or for justice in punishing it? All divines admit of moral evil: wherein can it consist but in the abuse of liberty, or the making a wrong choice! St. Augustine searching for the origin of sin, lodges it only in the free-will of the creature: being well assured that blame (which must fall somewhere) cannot fall on the author of all good. The Gnosticks indeed maintained with a bare face, "that God was
" the author of sin:" and 'tis probable, the
absurdity

absurdity of that thought has given rise to the other, "the two eternal principles."

L. THE scripture too always speaks of man as a creature endowed with freedom of choice. Hence so many exhortations, threatnings, expostulations, and exprefs declarations of his liberty, and that his ruin is only of himself. Many texts might be adduced: but I shall only read you a few lines of Milton, who founds the most of that excellent work of his on scripture authority. He supposes the Almighty to declare that man will be deceived by the suggestions of a more crafty revengeful spirit.

— "So will fall
 "He and his faithless progeny: whose fault?
 "Whose but his own? Ingrate, he had of me
 "All he could have; I made him just and
 "right,
 "Sufficient to have stood, though free to fall:
 "Such I created all th' ethereal powers
 "And spirits, both them who stood, and them
 "who fail'd;
 "Freely they stood who stood, and fell who
 "fell.
 "Not free, what proof could they have given
 "sincere
 "Of true allegiance, constant faith or love,
 "Where

• Paradise Lost, book III. l. 5.

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"Where only what they needs must do ap-
"appear'd,

"Not what they would? What praise could
"they receive?

"What pleasure I, from such obedience pay'd?

"When will and reason. (reason also is choice).

"Useless and vain, of freedom both despoil'd,

"Made passive both, had serv'd necessity,

"Not me. They therefore as to right be-
"long'd,

"So were created, nor can justly accuse

"Their maker, or their making, or their fate;

"As if predestination over-rul'd

"Their will dispos'd by absolute decree

"Or high foreknowledge; they themselves de-
"creed

"Their own revolt, not I; if I foreknew,

"Foreknowledge had no influence on their
"fault;

"Which had no less prov'd certain, unfore-
"known,

"So without least impulse or shadow of fate,

"Or aught by me immutably foreseen,

"They trespass, authors to themselves in all

"Both what they judge, and what they chuse;

"I form'd them free, and free they must re-
"main,

"Till

“ Till they enthrall themselves; I else must
“ change

“ Their nature, and revoke the high decree

“ Unchangeable, eternal, which ordain’d

“ Their freedom; they themselves ordain’d
“ their fall.

“ The first fort by their own suggestion fell,

“ Self-tempted, self-deprav’d: man falls de-
“ ceiv’d

“ By the other first. Man therefore shall find
“ grace.”

Æ. HAPPY genius!

L. It would be an idle thing to make any
commentary upon so clear sense. It must only
be remembered, that the liberty of created be-
ings is rather a power of making themselves
miserable, if they will needs do it, than any
power of making themselves happy, though
they have ever so great a mind, without a
higher support, and a compliance with the
conditions upon which happiness is yet before
them.

Æ. THESE two words Fate and Fortune ill
understood, have helped to perplex men in
their disputes upon liberty and other subjects.
Neither of them are words current in sacred
writ: but fate, which is the same thing as
edict, is sometimes taken for the decree of the
supreme

supreme Being, as it relates to the happiness of intelligent creatures; and it is also considered as the settled order of nature, and the connection of causes with their effects. A stone goes to the bottom, whilst a piece of wood floats above: the fire melts metals, hardens the clay, and reduces wood to ashes; and nature is another word for this constitution of things. To use scripture-images, "if a man takes a coal in his bosom, he must be burnt with it; and if he touches pitch, it will stick to him." Such necessary consequences might therefore be called fate, and eternal decrees: to which may be added the pleasures and pains of the mind, from a review of its good or bad actions: remorse is as natural as sickness; and the torture of the mind may become so great, that a man may be said to be in hell.

L. ALL such consequences, and the whole course of nature, are really of the divine establishment; and liberty is so in a particular manner. So many faculties without the power of using them to the right purposes, would be a much sorer evil than what Solomon observed, "of a man to whom God had given riches, but had not given him power to eat thereof."

But the last part of the verse is not to be precisely taken: for the gifts of God are complete and perfect. You know what [*Αναστροφή*]

Prudentius

Prudentius has said on this head of liberty, after he had laid the objection as strong against it as possible. And it seems Homer has had it much at heart, that the abuse of liberty should not be charged against the gods.

“Perverse mankind! whose wills created free,
“Charge all their crimes on absolute decree.”

Is it not so that Mr. Pope has it?

Æ. I THINK so. Some have made strange work with the decrees of God!

L. BUT those opinions are wearing out in this island.

Æ. THE word Nature has also occasioned disputes among men, some having confounded it with the author himself; whereas it is only to be looked upon as his divine art. Some of the stoicks failed much in this point, and Spinoza improved upon it, to the total exclusion of the deity. All that nature implies, is but the birth or production of things, which still supposes a producer or author, “who was (according to the expressions of the Psalmist) before the mountains were brought forth.”

L. FORTUNE is a more insignificant term than either nature or fate: Juvenal says, “’tis only we that make her a goddess.” And indeed when the word is rightly considered, there is nothing at all in it; no more than in chance,

hit,

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hit, accident, and the like, which can produce nothing; as all the different materials for building collected together could not put up the house, without the contriver and the workman.

There is a trifling exception of a pencil Apelles is said to have thrown in his anger, which performed what he wanted to have added to the piece: but 'tis to be remembered the colours were already prepared by the hand, and the pencil thrown by it; so the hand still gave the direction, though out of the common way.

There is a large field for such accidents as that, if we consider the freaks of man, and the present state of things. Instances of successful rashness are very common.

Æ. SOMETIMES our exterior situation, or circumstances in this life, is called Fortune; and some persons being so unexpectedly raised, and others depressed, without much to be ascribed either to their skill or merit; those who have not recourse to Providence are induced to think with Sallust, "that fortune certainly rules in every thing." But there is no loss, though particular words stand, if people are but convinced of an invisible unerring direction and superintendency in the government of the universe, and in the concerns of every individual person. Our Saviour has designed we should be much persuaded of this,
when

when he told us the hairs of our head are all numbered.

L. THE belief of an over-ruling Providence is mighty comfortable; and liberty is very consistent with it: 'tis agreeable to find that gift asserted; for without admitting liberty, men can hardly be brought to condemn themselves. 'Tis only the atheists that formally deny it, others dispute rather about the extent and the consequences of it. But 'tis remarkable, that the same Milton makes those disputes the amusement of some of the fallen angels; and so an amusement, one would think, to be avoided.

“Others apart sat on a hill retir'd,

“In thoughts more elevate, and reason'd high

“Of Providence, foreknowledge, will and fate,

“Fixt fate, free-will, foreknowledge absolute,

“And found no end, in wandering mazes lost.”

IX. REASON.

Æ. HITHERTO we have chiefly considered human nature with reference to the senses and affections, according to that division of body, soul, and spirit; the last of which I will be glad to have your opinion of. For though the soul is often taken for the highest thing that can be supposed in man, and

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is to be considered as an immortal thinking principle, of an inexpressible activity, and of a quite different creation and constitution from unactive lifeless matter; yet according to the plan above-mentioned, there is a superior region in man, called indifferently by the philosophers mind, spirit, or the governing part: and what they call spirit, St. Paul takes in a higher sense still.

L. HERE is my opinion without ceremony. In the body itself mention is made of three regions, the belly, the breast, and the head; which bears some analogy to the senses, the affections, and the understanding. But as there is no fixed standard for most words, sometimes the heart, and sometimes the bowels, is made use of, to signify those sentiments of tenderness and pity, and also the seat of them; the head being generally taken for the seat of the judgment, as well as for the judgment itself.

ACCORDING to these three regions in the body, the pleasures are generally classed, and denominated. Those of sense being the lowest, are sent down to the belly: "whose God is their belly," says St. Paul, and he gives a character of the inhabitants of Crete [*Γαστέρες* *πυλαί*. Tit. i. 12.] from one of themselves. The Chinese god of pleasure is also represented like a dismal creature, all belly. But these

these representations and expressions are only figurative, and not designed to be taken according to the precise letter. The pleasure of the taste itself is far from the belly. The pleasure of the eye has yet less connection with it; so that the epithet of the Cretans seems designed to express their luxury in general, though perhaps they have been particularly remarkable for eating and drinking.

MEAN time the body, which we study to soak in pleasure like a sponge, is of itself but a mere dead husk, and drops off at last: and a man reckons upon it no farther, than as a machine for bringing him pleasure, and would sometimes be content to change it for another body, if he could, and does often wear it out before its natural period.

BUT to come to the highest region in man. The mind, or understanding, is considered as a principle of light or discerning; as the senses and affections are supposed to be blind. The mind sees the order and value of things, their relations and properties; and this either by immediate intuition, like the bodily eye, or by a sort of process, which considers one thing after another; and so is called both reasoning and reason.

THUS reason, or judgment, is taken both as a faculty and as an act. We say "a person of
"judgment,

judgment, or of no judgment;" a judgment given, and the like.

You know reason is also taken for the cause or motive; as "such a law is founded upon such a reason, and such a thing has no reason in it, or no sense in it." The same words are used promiscuously for different things, and 'tis but a dry affair to adjust their significations.

Æ. IT seems one great use of the reasoning faculty is to supply the want of intuition, which is seeing at a glance. For this purpose the mind puts things in a certain order, as figures in cyphering, that we may find out the sum, the remainder, the proportion, or whatever we want to know about them. These three operations of numbering, weighing, and measuring, seem to answer to the several exercises of reason; and so 'tis compared sometimes to a balance, sometimes to a line.

REASON then must fall into the grossest mistakes, when it meddles in things beyond its sphere, or out of its sphere: in this case 'tis like an incompetent judge, and the conclusions must be absurd. * Buchanan's paraphrase on the

* *Quam pene lapsu pes mihi lubrico
Gressum fefellit, dum pede metior
Immensa parvo, dum trutinâ meâ
Expendo stultus, judicium Dei.*

Causas

the seventy-third Psalm is very applicable to this purpose. It mistakes also in things within its sphere, when it is imposed upon by the affections, like a judge that is corrupted. And nothing is truer than that observation, "the understanding is the dupe of the inclinations."

L. BUT the understanding, or reason, however often misled, may still (in some respect) be called the "leading faculty," and supposed to be free of any bias; all light, without any heat. Pure deliberation, assenting, denying, choosing, rejecting, &c. imply the operation of the head only, as if the heart had no interest in the thing: for certainly we judge thus coolly on some occasions. And as liberty was considered but as a power to make use of our faculties in general, so the last step of reason is to make its choice, which it does (in sound unbiass'd minds) according to the nature of things; or, in other words, according to the truth.

AT present, we are supposing reason to be entire, so far as it goes, without considering the narrowness of its limits, nor the clogs that are

upon

*Causas latentes dum sequor, anxius,
Et pertinacis viribus ingeni
Pugno, profundum se chaos ingerit,
Et nocte mentis lumen ad obruit.*

upon it, nor whether these clogs are most owing to the appetites or the passions. All such discussions are endless.

TAKING reason therefore only for the natural light of the mind, we may well enough conclude, that natural truths, or principles, belong to it, as visible objects belong to the eye. Knowledge is but the seeing things as they are, or in the way they are designed to appear to us: for, strictly speaking, we see few things as they really are, no more than we see the sun in the firmament as he is.

Æ. WE may thus have some little idea of faith, reason, and revelation; the last of which (like the drawing of a curtain) gives a discovery of what the natural powers of man, or the present frame of his understanding, could not find out. By revelation men might be informed of the state of things, past, present, and to come; of things relating to the visible world and the invisible; of things in earth, and things in heaven.

WE may likewise see how faith is taken in different senses: one acceptation of it is trust, confidence, dependence; another acceptation is honesty and fair-dealing, “bona fides.” But the acceptation relating most to the present purpose, is that “divine conviction of the understanding,” whereby we cannot refuse our assent.

assent. And though “we see but through a
“glass darkly,” as St. Paul says, (and how few
see like him!) yet the least remove from infi-
delity is a kind of faith: and if there is but an
honest heart to receive it into, it will grow like
“the greatest trees from the least of seeds.”
Nor is a man to be discouraged if he does not
perceive its growth; and even though he should
think he had no faith at all. Such a dark
uncertain state, as it is very afflicting, may
perhaps also be purifying. But to say the
truth, most people are in the contrary state,
rather inclined to think their faith greater than
it is, than less: and such persons would do well
to consider what faith is, and examine their
own by St. Paul’s definition, who calls it “the
“substance of things hoped for, and the evi-
“dence of things not seen.” We ought to
take great care that our faith be not found to
be bare opinion.

THUS we see also that there is a difference
between faith and reason, or that some things are
spiritually discerned, and others naturally. I
only wish it were considered how religion and
society suffer by setting these two gifts at va-
riance. Religion suffers when things are ob-
truded as articles of faith, and an assent re-
quired to them under the highest pains, with-
out satisfying the mind that such articles are
of

of the boasted importance, or even that they are not repugnant to common sense. 'Tis true, religion cannot properly suffer: but society, or the particular members of it, suffer many different ways; persecution and obstinacy mutually exciting each other. All histories, ecclesiastick and civil, are the melancholy registers of mutual oppression, bigotry, and contempt among all parties. And yet all parties must make use of reason, either true or false, when they argue for their faith; otherwise there must be nothing for it but an act of parliament, and a standing army. The protestants are professed admirers of reason, their faith hangs upon it; and the papists, who say "they believe upon the authority of the church," must make use of reason to prove the church is infallible.

L. RELIGION even suffers by such disputes and hatred, in so far as occasion is given to its profest enemies to despise it; and to the negligent part of mankind to be still the more careless about it. I have interrupted you.

Æ. To see things as they are (even the things of nature) there must be another light than the natural. How little do we know about the things we see and handle? only some of their outward properties, colour, hardness, and the like; as Mr. Locke instances in gold,

its yellowness, ductility, and other qualities; without any knowledge of the essence, as 'tis called, or the substratum. Again, how little do we know about ourselves? Can we tell, as Dr. Garth says,

“Why paler looks impetuous rage proclaim,
“And why chill virgins redden into flame? &c.”

And Dr. Burnet, who was as much a free-thinker as a man should be, takes notice how little we know of things that are objects of faith. Shall I read you a few of his elegant expressions?

L. WITH all my heart.

Æ. ——— “These revelations, as most
“in sacred writ, are short and incomplete: as
“being designed for practice more than for
“speculation, or to awaken and excite our
“thoughts, rather than to satisfy them. Accordingly we read in scripture of a Trium
“deity: of God made flesh, in the womb of a
“virgin; barbarously crucified by the Jews:
“descending into hell: visibly ascending into
“heaven: and sitting at the right-hand of God
“the Father, above angels and arch-angels.
“These great things are imperfectly revealed
“to us in this life; which we are to believe so
“far as they are revealed; in hopes these mysteries will be made more intelligible in that
“happy state to come.”——

THAT article of the crucifixion, and the other of the ascension, are indeed two points of fact which reason may be satisfied about, by enquiring into the character of the witnesses, and other things relating to proof. The crucifixion is a piece of history, and a much less surprising event than the ascension. But the mystery is, that such a barbarity should have been permitted against the Son of God: "This is to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks foolishness." And so a new inquiry arises, if Jesus Christ was the person aimed at in the prophecies? To be satisfied about which, the prophecies must be considered, and the Old and New Testament compared together, and both these with the doctrine and the works. In all such things reason may modestly exert itself, and we are guilty of sloth if it be not exerted. But we must be in the dark about many things still: so the doctor subjoins; "In like manner, how little is it we understand concerning the Holy Ghost? That he descended like a dove upon our Saviour: like cloven tongues of fire upon the apostles— These things we know as bare matter of fact, but the method of these operations we do not at all understand. Who can tell us now, what that is which we call "inspiration?" what change is wrought in the brain, and

“ what in the soul ; and how the effect follows ?
“ — These things we see darkly, and hope
“ they will be set in a clearer light, and the
“ doctrines of our religion more fully expounded
“ to us in that future world, &c.” [*Theory of the Earth*]. This is an instance of great honesty in that ingenious man, so frankly to confess his ignorance, when far meaner heads take upon them to explain the deepest mysteries ! As a strange turn appears in others, who will not admit of the possibility of a thing, because they cannot conceive how it is ! Reason would at least tell them thus much, that every thing is possible to the Almighty, which does not imply a contradiction.

L. It must certainly be very ill service done both to religion and society, to make an opposition between faith and reason, as if they were two contraries, like white and black, or fire and water ; whereas they seem to differ more in the degree than in the kind : the natural light itself being from God, as well as the divine : “ there is one glory of the sun, and another glory of the moon.” And then the same thing may be the object of faith and reason both ; for instance, the fall of Adam : it is indeed revealed as a fact that has happened, and is consequently an object of faith : we do not hear that it occurred to the philosophers, (though

(though something like it is implied in the opinion of the pre-existence of the soul) and this ignorance of the fall made their systems so imperfect and clashing. But after getting a hint of that unfortunate history, many men are satisfied of the truth of it by their natural reason; as they are also of the creation of the heavens and the earth. And this may be called a mixture of historical and rational faith, but cannot be said to come up to divine faith, which carries along with it a more forcible conviction, and may be reckoned such a thing as the [Νοερά ἰσχυρῆ] “intellectual sensation of the “Platonists.”

Æ. HOWEVER, the faith of common christians is not to be despised. Our Saviour's disciples believed in him because of the miracles they saw him perform. This does not derogate from the divine operation upon their hearts: but it was very natural for them to think, and reason with themselves, “that no man could “do such works if God was not with him.” But he says himself upon another occasion to St. Peter, “that flesh and blood had not revealed these things to him, &c.”

L. 'TIS no better service done religion and society, to put faith and works at variance together. There is a natural enough agreement between the two, if the scriptures were well

considered : and they may be said to be “ two things God has joined, and which therefore no man ought to separate.” St. James and St. Paul are in perfect harmony with one another ; and with the rest of the apostles, upon this subject. “ Faith without works is dead : ” that is, without the works of charity. The works St. Paul seems most to run down, in his disputes with the Jews, are the works of the law, upon the observance of which they valued themselves to an excess ; as they did also upon their free-will, and natural powers : which perhaps may be a key to some of the darkest of that apostle’s writings. You may consult Smith’s discourses.

Æ. It is remarkable that both the partisans of faith and infidelity have high pretences to reason, and each side accuses the other of pride and laziness. ’Tis certainly as reasonable to assent when the proofs are clear, as to deny when they are not ; and to be in suspense when the probabilities seem to be equal. But, I know not how, ’tis thought a prettier thing to contradict than to agree to RECEIVED OPINIONS, and so ’tis natural for those who set up to make a figure in the world to fall into that way ; as it is as natural too not to be at much pains to enquire into the proofs and presumptions that are adduced : excepting always out of the number

ber of the lazy some laborious old unbelievers, who are as indefatigable as missionaries.

L. THERE is still a worse quality in man than the two former, which is insincerity: but as this character is not levelled at any particular person, it is so very base in itself, that I shall not insist any farther upon it.

Æ. WHAT is best and highest in man, is certainly the most agreeable to be thought on. He has a mind made for the search after truth, the discovery of it, and the delighting in it: and all this may be granted even to the natural man. We have St. Paul's word for it, "that the Gentiles who had not the law, did by nature the things contained in the law." But he tells us also, "the natural man knoweth not the things of God, and even that they are foolishness to him." Upon which account the natural man (if he would be a wise man) ought to be very humble; and though he had come to all the knowledge and virtue of St. Paul himself, to follow his advice, "to take care lest he fall."

IN short, as the natural understanding, or the mind, was considered by some philosophers both as the discoverer of truths, and the director of the affections, (and the horses will be confessed to be very unruly) so the Spirit, in St. Paul's sense, must be looked upon as the di-

rector of the understanding itself, and as it were a deity within us: and those philosophers even looked on man as a temple where some divine genius resided, and have almost made use of St. Paul's expressions, "grieve not the Spirit, &c."

L. WHAT if this should be called enthusiasm, and a high flight?

Æ. IF it should, let St. Paul and the philosophers answer for it. It is indeed a high flight, if men can get into that true spirit to see things as they are, to put the estimate upon them they deserve, to love them according to their dignity, and from the proper motives. This is truly a flight, above self-love; and what human nature, as it is now fettered, cannot possibly attain unto, without superior assistance. But the bare speculation of the thing is no more than one of those truths or principles which natural reason can be convinced of.

L. BUT as to the comparison of faith and reason, when they are considered as two lights of the mind, the principal difference between them seems to be with relation to their objects. "The natural man receiveth not the things of God." This natural man is not denied by the apostle to have the faculty of reason: but for all that, "the things of God are foolishness to him;" and he adds, "neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned."

“cerned.” There must be another faculty therefore in man for knowing the things of God, whatever term be used to express it; and so the spirit of man may be said to receive intelligence from the Spirit of God, concerning such things as his natural understanding is not capable of.

I SHOULD not indeed wish to add to the number of our faculties: since it were the same thing, as to our happiness, whether we had many or but one, if that one could perform all the offices of the rest. So if it be alledged, that what is called “divine illumination,” is nothing but the making new discoveries to the old natural understanding, I should readily enough give up the argument, if it were owned that it was impossible for man to make those discoveries himself: but then I know not what to make of those express words of St. Paul above-mentioned, whose words the clergy at least will grant me are not to go for nothing.

BUT though reason be confined to natural knowledge, its province is still very extensive: it can examine several things concerning revelation itself; for instance, * whether a proposition

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* This was meant of things proposed to our belief by others. And when a man reflects of his own head upon passages of sacred writ, if the meaning is not so obvious, reason is allowed to examine

tion said to be divine (and which really may be so) is consistent with what we know already of the divine nature: it can also search into records, and judge if they are authentick or spurious; here is large scope for exercising reason, and for baffling it.

Æ. THE searching into records would seem the first thing to be done in point of order, though few have time for it: but Providence supplies the loss to the poor and the well-intentioned.

L. WHERE I said it differed from faith rather in the degree than in the kind, I meant not to make their difference consist only in more and less, as one man may have more reason than another; but that they were both a kind of seeing, the one super-natural, the other not.

X. *The MEMORY.*

Æ. THEY who make the soul to consist of three powers (taking the soul in the same sense with the mind, and in a direct opposition to the-body) have classed this power of the memory with the understanding and the will; though it does not come up to the dignity
examine whether such passages are to be taken in a literal sense or a figurative: and if he find it must be the figurative sense, then he is to consider what may be couched under the figure itself.

nity of the other two. "Every body complains
"of his memory, but no body complains of his
"judgment." A bad will is the worst of all.

L. BESIDE the advantage of a good memory, as it serves for making a figure in conversation, it is still valuable upon better reasons; since it may be made a store-house of the most profitable and agreeable things. If it is for the most part but a magazine of trash, the gift itself is still to be esteemed; and a man has his own bad choice to blame, for making such a collection.

Æ. THE memory is not only a register of tales, and names, and fictions, (the materials of common discourse) but may be called a register of every thing that enters into the senses and the imagination. But what shall we think of this strange sieve, which lets some things pass through, and retains others; and often retains the most unprofitable? To forget, is certainly among the defects of our nature: and yet, as things go, it were a kind of happiness to forget the most part of what we hear; and we should be at no loss to forget even several things that we read: though we may blame ourselves more for what we read than what we hear, not having at all times the choice of our company.

L. INDEED I have often thought it a misfortune to have a memory of such a cast, as not to be capable of forgetting any thing, not
so

so much as the poorest scandal ; a memory of that kind may very well be reckoned an unhappy memory.

Æ. BUT what shall we think of this odd treasury, which retains things during a certain time, and then loses them, even before the infirmities of age come on ? “ We say a thing “ has dropt out of our head : ” (where does it drop ?) and it drops in again when we least expect it. What corners do those images lurk in ? and how do they cast up ? What portion of matter, and of what figure, are they united to ? and what canals are they conveyed in ? I hardly expect these questions will be resolved ; and the proposing them is only designed to keep myself in mind of our ignorance, both of the defects, and the remaining excellencies of our nature.

L. THE memory being considered as a register of things, whether perceived or imagined, these things are usually called ideas ; or, in plainer English, images ; and are accounted the materials of science : when they are exact, our knowledge is exact, and not otherwise.

Æ. OUR perception, or reception of ideas, even in the first instance, is but superficial and defective ; and when we recall them from our memory, ’tis but a picture formed in absence of the original.

L. As

L. As to the first entry of ideas into the mind, you know Aristotle has been blamed for affirming, "that nothing is in the understanding which was not before in the senses." But there seems to be no great danger in that opinion, if we do not limit the senses to too small a number. You remember Mr. Locke's account of their entry?

Æ. NOT well.

L. 'TIS to this purpose: "The senses at first let in particular ideas, and furnish the yet empty cabinet: and the mind, by degrees growing familiar with some of them, they are lodged in the memory, and names got to them, &c."

Æ. "OBSCURUM per obscurius." The question is, how this familiarity arises? and how the cabinet comes to be sensible of any thing that is put into it? A scrivener knows nothing of the papers which the careful banker locks up in it? Or a glass, though it may be said to receive the image of a beau, and he really sees somewhat of himself in it; yet it can hardly be said to see any thing of him. It would rather seem the mind had some native light of its own, which is awakened we know not how, and flies out, as it were, through the senses to the things it apprehends or lays hold on.

L. THIS

L. THIS might be the foundation of a dispute like that they say was in Holland, Whether the bait catches the fish, or the fish catches the bait. And truly most disputes are of that sort—"de Lana Caprina." But one would think it might easily be granted that the mind is of an inconceivable activity, and yet may be called passive, in its admittance or reception of what comes into it. Nor does it lay hold and take in at random, but has a distinguishing perception of one thing from another; to say nothing of a farther power still, of judging, accepting, and rejecting.

Æ. THOUGH ideas, or images, would seem applicable only to the sense of seeing; yet all the senses have their respective ideas, or notices, (if the last word be liked better) so that one may be said to have the idea of a sound, as well as of a sight: and on hearing a tune one had heard twenty years before, one knows and remembers that 'tis the very same: and so of the rest of the senses.

XI. SPEECH.

L. *M*R. Locke was an ingenious man.

Æ. HE was really so. Pray what account does he give of speech?

L. I PROTEST I don't know. But 'tis pity [this interpreter of the thoughts should not always

ways interpret fairly, or that the mind and the words should not agree together. But the gift is still to be admired, and its uses cannot be thought of without pleasure.

To say nothing of the common advantages of speech in the commerce of life, how is the mind instructed and calmed by it ! How sweet are the words of a friend !

Æ. EXCELLENT gift ill used ! The concurrence of all the organs, by which speech is formed, with the air that carries it, and gives it a sort of body, would be extraordinary surprising, if the thing (being so common) were not quite overlooked. You may see what Mr. Boerhaave has said in his Institutions we have so oft mentioned, where he also refers to a curious little treatise [*“ Dissertatio de Loquela.”*] printed at Amsterdam in the year 1700.

L. THE abuses of speech are but the natural consequences of an unhappy disposition ; and the tongue is blamed for the vice of the man. But the tongue is only one of the instruments of speech, though a principal one ; and may be compared to a pump that brings up either clean water or foul. “ Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh.”

Æ. WORDS therefore may be called thoughts in vehicle. We find ideas are conveyed to the ear by certain sounds, and to the eye by the
more

more arbitrary dashes of a pen or a stamp. How minds are agreed about the meaning of these sounds and strokes, is not easy to conceive, without having recourse to the instruction of heaven in the first parents. We see how it goes now by imitation: the organs of speech are formed in children by degrees insensibly; and their minds ripen the same way, to find out the meaning of what is said to them. But it is not conceivable how any number of old people meeting together, who had not learned to speak in their infancy, should be able to contrive any language at all: it would be nothing but cries, and signs, and confusion. For, admitting that the strongest, and the loudest person should force the rest to call a thing by the same name he took in his head to express it by, what should become of all the intermediate parts of speech necessary to connect those arbitrary terms together? the invention will appear impracticable on a very little reflection.

L. I HAD a little dispute on this head with a friend, who thought a language might be artificially contrived: but as we could not convince one another, nor were at much pains about it, we agreed that it might be left as a moot point.

Æ. THE use of letters is also reckoned by many, to have been taught mankind from heaven. For, although figures and shapes (like
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the Egyptian hieroglyphicks) might have been fallen upon to express some precepts and instructions, yet this could give no notion of letters, which are rather the marks and figures of sounds than of things: and here is a great conveniency, that so few of them are needed; so that from the various combination of this small number of characters, or letters, arises the infinite number of words that make up the different languages; and more new languages might arise without end.

L. THOSE characters are a happy invention for conveying thoughts from one end of the earth to the other. Thus we are informed of the welfare of a friend in the Indies! and thus we are instructed, as well as delighted! 'Tis needless to enter into the abuses of writing and printing, so often made the conveyances of error and deceit, they proceed (like the abuses of speech) from a bad heart; but the faculties and inventions are still to be valued and admired.

XII. *A REVIEW of the foregoing* ARTICLES.

Æ. FROM what we have observed of man, body, and soul, and all his faculties, it will easily be perceived that of himself he is a mere void, and all that is in him precarious and dependent.

To

To apply this to the body : as it is fashioned we know not how, so it must have life infused into it, to put it out of the condition of so much dead weight, an unactive lump of matter. And as life can be called nothing but the inconceivable knot that holds body and soul together, so neither can death be called any thing but the dissolution of that union ; 'tis but a cessation of life, or the retiring of the soul, which is often in great concern and horror to think of being driven out of its lodging.

“ Animula vagula blandula, &c.”

L. POOR Adrian ! what did his empire signify then ?

Æ. As the body is so dependent upon the soul for its short duration and existence in this world, the soul is no less dependent upon the supreme Being for all its operations and enjoyments, both here and hereafter. David says upon good ground, “ He holdeth our souls in “ life.” For though immortality is natural to the soul “ made after the image of God,” yet it may be conceived capable of extreme anguish without objects to nourish and delight it ; so that a state of that kind were rather to be called death than life, and is so called in sacred writ.

L. NOT only are the objects of our faculties to be reckoned gifts from our Creator, but the
faculties

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faculties themselves are gifts. We see some of them taken away, or lost we know not how, both the external operations, and the internal : and supposing them to be ever so durable, man is still but a void, and so cannot be the object of his own love. Love always supposes an union with, or a desire after some other thing than the subject that loves ; so that, self-love would be found an impropriety, if one had a mind to quarrel with common expressions. For what is it that a man calls self, or himself, but a creature endued with certain appetites, desires, qualities, or whatever they may be called ? And what can he make of himself, without objects adapted and proportioned to his wants ? Again, what can he owe to himself farther than care and benevolence, which every animated creature, in some measure, has a share of ; and in which there is nothing to be blamed or praised ? If it be said, a man owes himself respect ; this is not as he is such a particular person, but as he is one of the human species : and he had best take care not to think too often of his particular qualifications, lest they appear to him greater than they do to others, and make him also overlook his defects.

Æ. WITHOUT all question love is most eminently due to God, or “ He is to be loved “ with our whole heart, strength, and mind.”

And

And this is even reasonable on our own account (no other object being able to satisfy our infinite desires) as well as just, with regard to him. Inferior rational objects are only to be loved with a love that may be called relative, or subordinate, as we have often agreed on, by which justice and order are not violated.

L. WE only condemned self-love, where self is made the center: and what is thus condemned is properly self-interest. Whatever is loved from that principle, is not loved according to justice. For the preferring greater delight to lesser, and endless joys to transient, would indeed argue good judgment; but where is the righteousness of it, and the piety? It is but wisdom for a man's self; which Sir Fr. Bacon calls "a left-handed wisdom." But love makes no bargains, and has no limitations. Moses was willing to be blotted out of the book of life; and St. Paul to be an Anathema for his brethren: it were strange, after two such instances, to deny a disinterested love to the Saviour of the world; or to draw inferences from a false reading of a text of scripture, as if the love of his Father, and even of mankind, was not the prevailing motive when he made the choice of "enduring the cross, and despising the shame." Nor is it any argument against the purity and the force of love, that in a competition

petition of eternal and temporal delights (as in the case of Moses, with the delights of Egypt) the preference is given to the eternal ; since the clearness of the understanding cannot be supposed to exclude the love and obedience of the heart.

Æ. The dignity of man appears conspicuously in the power of loving, and in the object that can only satisfy his love : if it centered in himself, it would be wretchedly directed, and no acquiescence could ensue. The lower appetites are satisfied for a time : the belly being full, demands no more till the digestion is over, and the fibres of the stomach irritated anew. It is not so with the eye and the ear, as Solomon informs us ; nor with the mind neither, for it must be constantly amused with new discoveries and tales : there is a fund of curiosity in man, or a desire of knowing, which must be satisfied one way or other ; so that knowledge may be called the food of the understanding.

L. NATURAL affection, love, and friendship, are satisfied by the solaces and endearments proper to the soul and body ; and were it not for the selfish principle, many of our satisfactions would be much greater than they are. 'Tis true, the broken state of things makes all our enjoyments very uncertain, and we often find ourselves unexpectedly bereaved and desolate.

late. But if the highest faculty in man were exerted, or, which is much the same, if his love were principally directed to the highest object, perfect satisfaction would readily follow; at least man would be in the state of order, and where he should be: if divine consolations were denied or suspended, it would be but for a while, and the resigned soul would have contentment in the divine will, whatever desertion or pain it might suffer. The bearing our natural afflictions is recommended upon the same principle.

It must be owned, this state of mind, in which God is loved for himself, is not at present natural, like our other desires: we naturally love created things, or desire them for our convenience; but the love of the Creator may be called a stranger to us: it cannot dwell with self-love, for either the one or the other must give place.

Æ. Most certainly. Mean time in this review of man, the distinction of body, soul and spirit, may still be had recourse to; or the senses, the affections, and the understanding. This last is called the governing part by Antoninus, who makes little account of the inferior powers, as being in common with the beasts. He makes a kind of dissection of some pleasures (perhaps a little too far) and speaks of them with disparagement. But every sensation,

well as every motion of the soul, is surprizing to think of. Even smelling, which is counted the most frivolous of all the senses, is of more use than we can imagine; and in fact we see it can raise the spirits as it were by magick.

L. 'Tis generally in favour of the senses that the passions are exerted; these are alarmed and rise in arms, when our pleasures are in danger. It belongs to the understanding to regulate the passions or affections; or, in other words, to keep the pleasures in order: for it cannot alter our sensations or feelings. And if it be said that the understanding, which is but passive itself, like the bodily eye, cannot be called the leader of the rest of the faculties; it must be granted, that (strictly speaking) it is rather the light than the guide: for if we consider it in the three operations mentioned by the logicians, ["Ap-
prehensio, Judicium, Discursus,"] 'tis still but one light operating in three different manners. The governing power therefore must be something of life, force, and activity, which sets all the other faculties at work; and though the will is a more vital principle than the understanding and the memory, the spirit may be considered as somewhat superior to the will itself, since the same person may have a very different will at different times. Sometimes the will is manageable, sometimes obstinate; a man will not so
much

much as hearken: What is it that makes him reflect and yield? Sometimes the persuasion is addressed to the understanding, sometimes to the heart; and intreaty commonly prevails more than reasoning. The memory is only applied to as a register.

Æ. SHALL we say then, that there is a first mover within us, a mind, rector, or presiding faculty over the rest? Indeed we may be indifferent what is concluded in such speculations, for it will not alter the state of the things. People frequently do speak of such a leading principle, and of a spirit in man: and then this spirit is as frequently denominated, or receives its character, from any quality that appears most prevailing, not only with regard to the moral dispositions, but even the complexion, temper, genius, and whatever is most observable in the person: thus we say, “a proud spirit, a violent spirit, an active spirit,” and many other kinds of spirits (some better, some worse) that are to be met with in the world.

L. To assert the superiority of the human spirit (or if it shall only be called the human nature) above that of other animals upon this earth, has been the endeavour of many persons, who (I cannot but think) have made their system mere coherent than those who have endeavoured to put men and beasts upon a level.

Some

Some of this last party indeed acknowledge the advantage that mankind have from the frame of the body and its organs, which they pretend makes all the difference. But what texture of the brain is sufficient to perform all the various operations they assign to it, sensation, reflection, wishing, loving, hating? Of what figure are the cells for poetry, and those for mathematicks? And what lodgings of the brain are honesty and knavery to be found in?

Æ. WHATEVER sensations and powers inferior creatures may be endued with, the bodily organs are but the instruments of their operations; and it must be something even within them, that sets those engines a going. The bee and the elephant have little resemblance of each other in their outward figure, and there may be supposed as little in the texture of their brain: but each performs very remarkable things; for which there had need to be recourse to some inward principle actuating their different machines.

L. THE same conclusion holds as to man: whatever is performed in him, bating some actions called vital, such as those of the heart and other inward parts, is properly the action of the soul upon the body, and the change is first made within; the soul is touched before the blood flushes out in the face, to proclaim either bashfulness or anger: and the notion of a contact,

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and

and reciprocal action betwixt the soul and the body, is but a way of speaking; for if it were strictly true, the soul would depend as much on the body, as the body does upon it; or rather, all would be reduced to body, according to Lucretius:

“Tangere enim & tangi sine corpore nulla
“potest res.”

The truer philosophy seems to be “tangitur
“corpus, sentit anima:” The body is touched,
the soul feels.

’Tis pretty evident the soul moves the body, as the hand moves the glove; but that the body moves the soul, is not evident. If they say musick strikes the soul, and raises different passions, and musick is sound, and sound is body; and therefore, &c. it may be granted that bare sensation is excited by the means of bodily things, as all sounds make impression upon the hearing: but in musick you know all ears are not equally affected, some people only hearing the bare sound, without being sensible of the harmony, and so are said to have no ear. Much less is it mere sound that raises any passion in us, but some other thing that we have no name for; as it is not mere words that touch the heart, even in friendly expressions, but the persuasion we have of some friendship designed by them, common compliments affecting us but little.

BUT

BUT in all this, they will say, the superiority of man does not appear, the beasts having sensations and passions as well as he: a dog or a horse is sensible of a kind word and a gentle stroak.

Æ. THAT is very true; but 'tis seldom affirmed that dogs and horses have as high a sense of friendship as mankind. If any were really of that opinion, we should easily know what estimate to put upon their friendship.

L. THAT which is called moral sense, implies both a tenderness of affection, and a relish of justice; or benevolence and honesty. And 'tis remarkable, that this tenderness, or benevolence itself, must be regulated by justice, as appears in that precept, "Not to respect the person of the poor:" for in a claim of two persons, the one in great poverty, the other flowing in riches, there would be a natural byas in the poor man's favour; which would also be increased, if he were found to be the honestest man: and yet both these considerations must be over-ruled, and right take place. The same rule, every body grants, should be followed if a man were one of the parties himself, where the benevolent byas may yet be supposed stronger: but because of this byas, neutral judges are applied to, though it has sometimes happened that mutual refe-

rences have been made by each party to the other, and both interests equally safe.

Æ. THIS shews there is such a thing as disinterestedness, and it seems to be the highest quality in man: an honest heart implies a great deal. Nor is there any weight in the objection, "that this honesty is only from considerations of the next world;" for such an inclination to justice may be found, where the belief of another world is not very strong. And if the peevish objection be pushed farther, "that 'tis for the sake of a character in this world;" this is nothing but an assertion without proof, and the contrary may be asserted with more probability. Every one must judge for himself.

L. WHAT is most valuable in man, is certainly his kind affections and his sense of equity! he has even inferior faculties, which also distinguish him from other animals. I wish every body may make the best use of their faculties that they can; and that it may be remembered they are all but gifts, as well as the objects of them; that man consequently is but a mere void, and must be miserable if he hath not objects to satisfy him; that, in the placing his esteem and his affection, the giver is to be considered above all gifts: these, and many other truths, would naturally present themselves to the mind, if it were composed and free of distraction.

Æ. 'TIS

Æ. 'Tis strange, that so natural reflections come so seldom into the mind. They must certainly be very obvious, because the very mentioning them is often tedious and shocking.

L. THERE are other reasons for that. You know people have their heads taken up for the most part with their business or their amusement: and then they don't love it should be thought they wanted instruction.

Æ. THEY shall never be instructed by me.

L. NOR by me: but there is no reason why two friends may not talk together of whatever they please.

Æ. I KNOW none.



PART II.

A SHORT ACCOUNT OF THE WORLD.

I. *The WORLD taken in different senses.*

ÆMILIUS and LUCINUS.

Æ. **S**OMETIMES by the World is meant the whole creation, visible and invisible; 'tis also called the universe. Sometimes there is a distinction of the natural world, and the moral; and among some persons we find much talk of the polite world.

THE natural world is justly acknowledged to be a beautiful and harmonious system, as implied in the * very names of it. We are obliged

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* Κοσμος, Mundus.

to the astronomers for the accounts they have given of the motions and order of the planets, and to the natural philosophers for their discoveries of the productions of this earth: but a great deal of beauty lies open to the eye of the simplest beholder. The sun and the fields are delightful to the farmer, as well as the philosopher. Every animal and every vegetable have their beauties, both to consider them in whole, and in the parts that make them up; a leaf of the meanest plant is a demonstration of an infinite wisdom.

L. THIS earth of ours is but a small part of the world, notwithstanding all the disputes about it, and often about very useless parcels of it. Dr. Burnet speaks of the whole globe as meanly as if it were a turnip: the great ones (says he*) slice it among them. He shews also the ruins and broken state of it since the flood; to which another excellent theorist † ascribes the same ruins. This latter author reckons it has suffered more by the fall, than the former takes notice of. And not only has the earth suffered in its make and lustre, but all the creatures upon it are said to groan ‡.

Æ. THERE are, however, great excellencies and beauty remaining in this lower world; and

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no

* Theory of the earth.

† Mr. Whiston.

‡ Rom. viii.

no deformity can be found, except in the manners of men.

'TIS this moral world therefore we are chiefly to consider, in order to discover our duty, to shun what we ought to shun, and follow what we ought to follow. I call it the moral world (though there is little morality in it) only to shew that it is with reference to mens manners or actions, that inspired writers exhort us "not to be conformed to the world;" giving us this good reason, "that all that is in the world is the lust of the eye, &c." They exhort us, 'tis true, "not to love the world," meaning the love of the creatures, as well as the love of the fashion; because it is not in their nature to suffice our hearts; and they contribute to nourish in us that principle of self-love, by which we covet every thing without justice and common sense.

II. *The WORLD divided into two cities.*

L. 'TIS a fine passage of St. Augustine, [De civitate Dei.] "Two loves have made two cities; self-love makes the city of the world, which is also called Babylon, even to the contempt of God: the love of God, which is called Jerusalem, makes the city of God, to the contempt of self." He has been very happy in this thought, as in many others;
for

for it lets us into the causes both of strife and concord in this world, and shews the foundation of misery and happiness in the next, as we cultivate the one or the other of those two loves or principles.

Æ. SELF-LOVE will be readily acknowledged to be the cause of strife and confusion in the world, if we consider it but in the least impetuous of its streams, sensuality. But what is meant by sensuality? and why is it less impetuous than pride and covetousness? Sensuality may indeed include the pleasures of all the senses; and so “the lust of the eye,” may be sensuality, as well as “the lust of the flesh:” and the flesh is often taken for all the desires of the natural man, and put in opposition to the Spirit. But ’tis probable, that by “the lust of the flesh,” St. John means what is generally understood by voluptuousness in eating and drinking, and all pleasure and indulgence of the body, abstractly from elegance and parade, which are properly the pursuit of the eye, and are peculiar to the human kind, as well as pride; the beasts contenting themselves with plain sensualities.

COVETOUSNESS supposes both a desire of fine things, and a superfluous abundance of them; pride a desire of distinction and superiority.

SENSUALITY alone, without supposing covetousness and pride in company with it, is

looked upon as an inoffensive thing; and if a man falls into intemperance of any kind, all the harm is said to be done to himself.

L. BUT it rarely happens that sensuality is free of the other two vices. Our fancy suggests to us imaginary wants; and also makes us think nature is not so easily contented as we find upon experience it is. Thus we covet things both as to quality and quantity: and then our pride, which is seldom asleep, wants to have witnesses of our magnificence, and of our elegant taste. 'Tis said "luxury wants many things, and covetousness all things;" but pride is certainly the most insatiable of the three.

Æ. WHAT is condemned under the name of sensuality, is not the sensation of pleasure, for there is no crime in feeling; but in the exorbitant desire of pleasure, and the excess of the indulgence, by which the mind is indisposed for other attainments. Antoninus allows man to indulge his nature as he is an animal, but with this caution, that it make not his nature worse, as he is an animal endowed with reason and designed for virtue.

IN this view, the harsh idea of self-denial would be softened, as contributing to our higher interests, though its proper and solid foundation is only upon justice.

L. BUT why did you call sensuality less impetuous than the two other streams of self-love?

Æ. BECAUSE we see these make more mischief and desolation in the world. Particular persons are indeed carried away by certain pleasures, but the general competition is for riches and honour. Wars are now seldom made for a mistress; and even few duels are fought in that quarrel.

L. VERY true, luxurious people may agree together better than the covetous can be supposed to do. For the natural effect of covetousness is to disunite and alienate men from one another; every individual aiming at nothing less than to engross what belongs to the whole society. Such men, says the prophet, would “add field to field, till there be no place; that they themselves may be placed alone in the midst of the earth.” The covetous man would leave the world to starve, whereas the luxurious, though without designing it, is an instrument in the hand of Providence for supporting many, who would otherwise be destitute; and so luxury in some measure supplies the place of charity. Indeed the luxurious cannot be acquitted of injustice; for it is not fair-dealing that one man should drink as much wine, or any other liquor, as would cherish the hearts of twenty; and that
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the expence of adorning his single person, might keep a greater number from going naked.

Æ. OF all the three branches of self-love, covetousness has something in it so peculiarly grasping and appropriating, that a covetous and a selfish person are almost convertible terms. What is most remarkable, is, that this grasping selfish temper sometimes produces a sort of illegitimate self-denial, and renders the poor miser hard-hearted and uncompassionate to himself. You know how Mr. lives.

L. THERE have been instances of this disease of the mind in all ages, ingenious men have exercised their wit upon it long ago; but such diseases seldom yield either to raillery or argument.

Æ. IN this case money is the object of the love, not because "it answereth all things," but because it is money; and so this love of money can hardly be reduced to self-love, because the desire seems wholly to terminate upon the metal.

L. IT must be granted, however, that covetousness is for the most part attended with luxury and pride, or it may be said as properly to attend upon them; for 'tis very natural for the profuse and the ambitious to desire much money, and to take many ways of getting it. Those extremes in Catiline's character ["Alieni appetens,

“tens, sui profusus,”] are often united. Prodigality makes some atonement for covetousness in the world: but when this last vice is predominant, 'tis the most contemned of any, and is indeed the least restrained by shame, and creeps the lowest.

Æ. BUT at the same time that the love of money is despised, the possession of it generally draws respect. Salust was sensible of this in one of his discourses to Cæsar, where he proposes, as a great step to reformation in the commonwealth, to take away the respect given to money, “pecuniæ decus;” concluding *, “that the paying such honour to it, proves the “contempt of all virtues.” But how to bring about that point of reformation, is not easy to conceive.

L. NOT easy indeed. The shortest way to wealth would be plain stealing and robbing: but these being too hazardous, cunning people have recourse to the safer arts of tricking and deceit: and hence all those infidelities in trusts and contracts, those disappointments in trade and politicks; and sometimes this love of money produces disappointments yet more delicate and vexatious.

Æ. Is

* *Ubi divitiæ claræ habentur, ibi omnia bona vitia sunt; fides, probitas, pudor, &c.*

Orat. 11. de Rep. Ordinanda.

Æ. Is not pride, the third branch or stream of self-love, the most raging and impetuous of all?

L. No doubt: it makes cities and kingdoms desolate, and the earth a field of blood.

Æ. THIS spirit also discovers itself most universally. Mr. Pascal says, “vanity has taken so firm a hold on the heart of man, that a porter or a turnspit can talk big of himself, and is for having his admirers: philosophers do but refine upon the same ambition.”

WE see therefore that pride, which may be called the eldest daughter of self-love, has still a more ample dominion than either covetousness or sensuality: it enters into the privatest houses, it breaks the closest ties: covetousness divides friends, but pride divides nearer friends.

L. THE difference between pride and vanity is seen in the different appearances of men; and sometimes by their appearances we may know what they have most at heart. A man that delights in fine clothes, shews them upon his back: so that vanity consists in outward shew and ostentation in general, and a man's vanity appears in the finery of his servants, and all his parade without doors and within. Pride is a sturdier kind of thing, and lies deeper in the heart: thus, says the duke of Rochefoucault, “pride always saves its interest, even when it renounces vanity.”

Æ. SOME-

Æ. SOMETIMES pride aims at dominion over others, sometimes barely at their applause; and 'tis strange to see what some people will endure for this light thing. Self-love, or rather pride, is said to "live upon nothing," and to find its account in austerities and voluntary mortifications, from that desire of applause; though pride seldom takes that way of shewing itself in this island.

• INDEED the excessive desire of esteem, without doing something for it, argues small experience of the world; for it is seldom so good-natured as to give praise for doing nothing.

L. THE desire of esteem, and the fancy that we are esteemed, are very different things: the former may be without the latter, but the latter is never without the former.

Æ. As the fancy that we are esteemed when we are not, arises from self-conceit, so the same turn of mind makes us eager to shew ourselves upon all occasions: we run into every company, and affect to shine in every conversation. But sometimes we think to shew ourselves more superior by a profound silence, and then we are the proudest.

L. YOU are a little severe. But whatever way our pride discovers itself to others, it must be a torture to the soul that is possess'd with it, and an inlet to many disturbances, of which it may be called

called the parent. The proud man is the aptest to fall into jealousy, which he would have to be thought a just concern for a delicate part of his property; not perceiving that it is rather pride than either justice or love that tortures him. Could jealousy be stript of pride, it would neither be so racking nor so ugly.

Æ. BUT what do you think of envy?

L. 'Tis a more shameful ulcer of the soul than jealousy, and more visibly the effect of pride; and the more unaccountable, that it grieves at the good of another, when we ourselves lose nothing by it. This, 'tis true, is the idea of pure envy; but generally there is in it a mixture of other passions, which render it somewhat more excusable, such as anger or grief arising from competition or disappointment: however, there is nothing a man labours more to conceal, than that he has any envy at all.

Æ. I BELIEVE we are at no less pains to conceal our hypocrisy, though it is a more voluntary thing, and all over art and design rather than infirmity; and having a more extensive view than envy, it runs more through our whole life and actions.

L. WE are got into a sad field.

Æ. THERE are other effects of pride more undisputed, to wit, hatred and revenge; the pulpit declares against these: and the stage, though

though it does not always speak so dishonourably of them as they deserve, yet it shews many of their bad consequences. Nor does the stage fail to expose ill humour, not so much indeed because it is the effect of pride, as upon account of the ridicule that is found in it: vanity is also exposed upon the same account. And this shews us another part of our constitution called Shame, which some resolve wholly into pride: but there is a right and a wrong in every thing. We see from fine spirits of old, the distinction * betwixt two kinds of shame and honour, which some moderns struggle hard to get free of, and take help from some old hands. And they forget another distinction, betwixt the sense of shame and the excessive fear of being ridiculed. We see how people are laughed out of their virtue, and sometimes out of their life: they drink for fear of being thought abstemious, and they fight for fear their courage should be called in question; as my lord Rochester honestly acknowledges.

L. THIS puts me in mind of a contrary supposition of the Characteristicks, which does not shew so much knowledge of the world. “ I
“ can

* *Stultorum incurata pudor malus ulcera celat.*

Again,

_____ *falsus honor juvat, quem?*

Hor.

And Plautus tells us, *Plerique homines quos cum nihil refert, pudet, &c.*

“ can very well suppose (says that author, I. 96.)
 “ men may be frightened out of their wits: but
 “ I have no apprehension they should be laughed
 “ out of them. I can hardly imagine that in
 “ a pleasant way they should ever be talked
 “ out of their love for society, or reasoned out
 “ of humanity and common sense.” Now an
 appeal may be made to the world, if the reverse
 of this be true. Indeed men cannot well be
 said to be reasoned out of humanity and com-
 mon sense, but they are certainly talked and
 laughed out of both. We have a more natural
 account from Quevedo, [in his Vision of Hell,]
 where (speaking of those in the right-hand way)
 he says, “ some of them stopt their ears and
 “ went on without minding our raillery: others
 “ we put out of countenance, and they came
 “ over to us.”

Æ. 'Tis certainly the fear of being put out
 of countenance, and suffering confusion, that
 keeps mankind (especially those who affect most
 politeness) in such a subjection to one another,
 notwithstanding their contempt of one another.
 This is the foundation of many troublesome
 modes and points of decency, invented by no
 body knows who, and yet observed with a rigo-
 rous exactness.

L. 'Tis indeed very remarkable that many
 who set up for an universal independency and
 exemption

exemption from all rules, should be governed at so easy a rate.

Æ. It tends much to preserve some quiet and good order in the world: and 'tis really a satisfaction to observe, that vain extravagant man is so easily governed, that a straw is sufficient to bind him.

L. A LITTLE experience of the world, and careful observation of what passes within ourselves (where indeed we should properly begin) joined to the information of some of the best books and the best company, will let us see what the world is, and how we ought to behave in it.

III. *The mixt* STATE *of things.*

Æ. HAD not the doctrine of the fall some footing among the heathens?

L. It had: but not being so thoroughly received and understood by them, the accounts that many of them gave of the world and of human nature were so much the more defective. Some who have enquired into the sentiments of remotest antiquity, inform us there was a pretty general belief of a former state, wherein justice and innocence prevailed, which they called "the golden age," without any disorder in the elements; perfect health and perpetual spring. They spoke also of a revolt, which reduced

reduced things into the present confusion and weakness; and that all would be renewed and brought again into the primitive beauty and perfection.

A FEW indeed among the ancients did argue for the present state of things, as if it were the best state they could possibly be in; and so they concluded "there was no evil nor defect in the universe, but that every thing contri-
buted to the perfection of the whole."

E. THE last part of the conclusion may be true in some sense. But what could they make of sickness and death? 'tis hardly natural to say they are things indifferent, much less that they are really good. Every body knows this doctrine of fatality landed in atheism, and how Spinoza improved the notion of the universe to exclude the maker and governor of it; a design Antoninus is never suspected of. The Characteristicks, who have taken much of their scheme from that emperor, are at great pains to persuade the world that 'tis they who do the greatest justice to God in banishing evil from the creation; affirming, "that to suppose it to
"have entered into his works, the government
"of the world is arraigned, and the Deity
"made void."

L. It must be left to the public judgment, who are the best apologists for the Deity (if any
apologies

apologies are needed) they who speak in the common way, and acknowledge there is evil both natural and moral; or they who acknowledge neither? If the inference were certain, to wit, that there is no God if there be any evil, the last part of the proposition would be contradicted by few. And truly the arguers against evil expose themselves much to the scorn of another set of people, who are as adverse to revealed religion as they themselves can be. There is one thing remarkable, the old stoicks did not deny there was such a thing as pain, but only maintained that pain was no evil: so if their followers say no further, the dispute is only about words.

Æ. WE are told by Moses that moral evil entered first: man abused his liberty, and fell into disobedience. The fault is specified. Whatever allegory may be in that history, there must be truth also in the letter. Now the outward state of man being still to be suited to the inward, his body to his spirit; this spirit is condemned to inhabit a frail, heavy body, very unlike to what it seems to have been in the first state, and stript of several advantages which the bodies of many animals have at present. Moreover, the earth is said to have been cursed, by which a considerable change may be supposed in its beauty as well as its fertility;

tility; but this alteration is also wisely adapted to the condition of man now become mortal and proud, who must work hard both for his life and his humiliation.

L. ST. Augustin has preserved to us a passage of * Cicero, which shews at least the present state of man in lively colours: 'tis to this purpose, "that nature has brought man into the world rather as a step-mother than a mother, his body naked, frail, and infirm; his mind anxious, timorous, and soft; prone to lusts: but that nevertheless there is a divine fire of genius and spirit, though in a manner buried." After which quotation he adds, "Cicero saw the thing, but knew not the cause; for he was ignorant why the heavy yoke was laid on the children of Adam." The same father had said in his confessions, which some reckon the most useful of all his works, † "that man carries his mortality about with him as a testimony that God resisteth the proud!"

Æ. THE
* In Libro 3. de Republica. Tullius hominem dicit non ut a matre sed a noverca natura editum in vitam, corpore & nudo: & fragili & infirmo; animo autem anxio ad molestias, humili ad timores, molli ad labores, prono ad libidines: in quo tamen inesset, tanquam obrutus, quidam divinus ignis ingenti atque mentis.—

Rem vidit, causam nesciuit: latebat enim eum cum esset grave jugum super filios Adam. Lib. 4. contra Jul. Pelag.

† Confess. Lib. 1. cap. 1.

Æ. THE best authors are far from bestowing flattery upon man. You know what Dr. Burnet * says in particular.

L. I REMEMBER some of his words. But as to this heavy infirm machine of a body, though it is very soon to be void of all sensation, and reduced to a state of great disgrace, yet St. Paul informs us "it is raised in honour;" and in another place he says, "Jesus Christ shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body."

Æ. As we are informed that man's pride brought such disgrace upon him, so we are informed by the same sacred history (though in few words) that he was tempted and seduced by a spirit of more cunning. 'Tis much easier therefore to account for the sin of Adam, than
for

* "We must not by any means admit or imagine that all nature, and this great universe, was made only for the sake of man, the meanest of all intelligent creatures that we know of.—Surely if we made the least reflection upon ourselves with impartiality, we should be ashamed of such an arrogant thought.—Man that comes into the world at the pleasure of another, and goes out by a hundred accidents.—A knock on the head makes him a fool, stupid as the beasts of the field; and a little excess of passion or melancholy makes him worse, mad and frantick. In his best senses he is shallow, and of little understanding; and in nothing more blind and ignorant than in things sacred and divine." *Theor.* 1. B. C. xi.

for that which happened first. Only St. Jude speaks of the angels "who kept not their first station," and a prophet mentions Lucifer's affecting an equality with the Most High: by which pride is generally believed to be the first sin. But the difficulty still remains how it could ever have entered. Ingenious men have given their conjectures, but it seems to be one of those "secret things which belong to God."

WE know how things stand at present with regard to man, all his faculties, the earth he treads on, and the elements that serve him, and often master him. It were an endless, as well as a melancholy task, to enumerate all the infirmities and diseases of the human body alone; some of these so very painful and loathsome, that nature shrinks at the very thought of them. If we are told that pain is confined to that sense alone which is called feeling; 'tis very true that racking pain or torture, and indeed all those uneasy sensations which commonly go under the name of pain, are confined to that sense; the nerves being stretched out of their natural position, or whatever be the cause: but the rest of the senses have their uneasy sensations too; the smell, the taste, the eye and the ear, are grated and offended, or in general rendered very uneasy, whatever term the uneasiness is expressed by. A delicate person would be shocked

to find himself led into an hospital, or to have a list of diseases laid before him; all representations of pain and nastiness are disagreeable, two things (however) the body in its present state is very liable to. And the general tendency of all bodies, animate and inanimate, to corruption and dissolution, is very conspicuous.

L. IF the disorders of the mind were inquired into, they would be found in no smaller number; and the discovery no less unpleasant. The disorders of the imagination are the most harmless, but often exceeding melancholy to behold; as any body will acknowledge, who has ever seen a madman. Even the common distempers of the fancy in those that are not reckoned quite out of their senses (we may say in their best senses) are not the marks of an original state. And it were pretty well, if all that could be said of a person, were, that he is a little fanciful: dark, sullen, peevish, are less agreeable epithets; unjust and cruel less still.

BUT 'tis best not to dwell upon evils, and what is shocking and afflicting; if we turn our eye to the other side, we shall find many fine things still left, and also be forced to acknowledge, that the disagreeable things mixed with them are the effects of wisdom and goodness in the supreme Governor, whose purposes of
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doing good remain invariable, and “whose
“mercies are over all his works.”

Æ. INFALLIBLY so. The contrivance of the divine artificer appears in the frame of the meanest animal, nay of the meanest vegetable, which is made up too of its fibres and canals, and woven and joined together with order and beauty. How agreeable does this still life appear, from the cedar to the hyssop! how gay are the flowers! how sweet, how refreshing! This single subject would be a large province for declaiming, to any who had that talent. Nor is the wisdom less conspicuous in the care taken for the propagation of all these inanimate beauties, as so many philosophers and divines have observed, whose works are in every body's hands: Cicero, Ray, Derham, and many more.

BUT as the idea of goodness is more endearing than that of wisdom, so every thing that has life and feeling does actually feel the effects of the former attribute of the Deity; and rational creatures both feel, and can reflect with pleasure and love. It would seem to be this capacity in man that made Ovid call him “a more holy
“creature than the rest.”

L. I KNOW not what Ovid has meant by holiness. But these two words, Righteousness and Holiness, are very near a kin: most actions that are called impure, are only such because
they

they are unjust, and it were easy to give examples. I am still glad to suppose there is some righteousness remaining even after the fall. Nor will this clash with St. Peter, in the character he gives of the new earth "wherein dwelleth "righteousness;" for though it is to dwell there openly and in triumph, a little of it may lurk here under a cloud. There is yet some honesty and friendship in the world, which is a very useful consideration in a dark fit of the spleen.

Æ. THERE are really so many good things remaining after the fall, that one would sometimes think there had been no curse. Nor must we take that word for an execration, since it is chiefly to be taken for a change to an inferior from a superior state. We cannot indeed know how great the change is (and 'tis much for our ease) the scripture being so short in the description of the former state. To consider only the body: though it is called both frail and vile, yet still it has its attractions, and whatever is shocking about it, is well disposed of, out of sight; to say nothing of the usefulness of those things that may be counted the vilest, as the gall itself. Then, with relation to the spirit which inhabits this body, as there is a congruity that such a spirit should be so lodged, or imprisoned, let it be considered what dis-

orders would be committed, if this vehicle were not so gross and heavy as it is: what would greater degrees of strength and agility have produced but more mischief. How good is it for the public quiet that we are subjected to hunger and thirst, cold, weariness, and all the rest! And if we are designed for a higher state after this, such defects and vexations seem also designed to keep us from doating upon this goal: for, as Sir Thomas More used to say, “to aim at honours here, is setting a coat of arms over a prison-gate.”

L. THERE are so many smiling things still in the world, and really pleasant and good, that many would wish to live in it for ever; even when their share of comforts appears to be very small, and when they confess this to be a state of tryal and discipline, as the state before the fall was a state of tryal alone. Mr. Locke calls this life a Probationership: this supposition would be of great use, both for regulating our own conduct, and vindicating the author of nature, when the humour arises of criticizing his works.

Æ. BUT moral evil (say they) is harder to digest.

L. WITHOUT doubt; and it is certainly a more melancholy thing to think of: but there is a great difference betwixt some moral evils and

and others, betwixt a flash of anger (for instance) and deliberate malice. Those little humours, and whims, and oppositions of temper, so common in the world, do contribute to the mutual discipline of its inhabitants, beside what they must all suffer from the disorders of the elements and the infirmity of their own bodies. Indeed when instances of cruelty and fraud are objected, this is a greater blot upon the divine workmanship; and a severer discipline still: but who could ever say he was forced to be a villain?

“Did fate, or we, when great Atrides dy’d,

“Urge the bold traitor to the regicide?

The good emperor, ’tis true, speaks of * necessary rascals, yet any body may take the liberty to say, the world would be better without them. A government, indeed, may find some advantage from spies and informers, and other servants: but those necessary men are only so, at times, and the ministry could fall on a more agreeable way of employing the money. Many things therefore called necessary are only convenient in certain situations and cases, as one poison is made use of for driving out another.

Æ. We have but one of three opinions to follow, That things could not possibly have been in a more perfect state than they are at present;

G 3

• Mr. Collier’s translation.

present; or to believe what the scripture says of a fall: or, lastly, to suppose that man was created with all the corruptions of soul and body that we find in us, and the earth and all other things about it to have been always as they are at present.

L. THE first opinion will have few followers that know any thing of the world, and are acquainted with complaints and groans: 'tis much if the most unthinking beau that is carried in a chair can believe it. The third opinion (though not blasphemous) does not seem honourable for the Deity, whose works can scarce be supposed to have been made imperfect originally; though if that were true, it would make no alteration upon the duty of rational creatures, who should still do the best they can, and struggle with their infirmities and bad tendencies, which way soever they have come. The second opinion therefore seems most rational, that evil has entered, though we cannot comprehend how.

IV. *Remains of VIRTUE.*

L. 'TIS agreeable to leave the gloom, and to consider what remains after such a melancholy shipwreck. We did not indeed speak much of the fall, nor can it be represented by mortals. If such an event had been capable

capable of description, Milton's imagination had bidden fair for it. Pascal's reasoning to evince the fact, * "from the contrarieties of human nature," is very fine.

Æ. ALL he writes is so.

L. BUT to come to what remains after the sad overthrow, external nature is generally granted to abound with good things; no body denies the beauties of the spring, summer, and harvest; the winter itself has its beauties. The great dispute is concerning the moral state, and two sorts of authors are at war with one another upon this point. The controversy was pretty ancient, as Pascal observes, between the Stoicks and Epicureans, and "other clashing sects of philosophers." Among the moderns the duke of Rochefoucault is thought too rigid in his sentiments upon virtue: but he only reckons the thing a greater rarity than the pretences to it. Monsieur Bayle is indeed severer, and seems to resolve it wholly into complexion and education; upon which, a delicate affair (the womens chastity) has been brought upon the carpet. Bayle may be put at the head of the moderns, who strike against virtue in general; and my lord Shaftesbury (because of his quality) may get the command of the other party, who reckon the ballance of the passions may be so easily

G 4

* Art. III. and elsewhere.

easily kept, and all the virtues to be of our own growth.

Æ. It may be granted to the severe men, that whatever is the bare result of complexion is no virtue; 'tis but a mechanical sort of thing, nor can it be called vice neither, as being but a tendency of nature to its relief or pleasure, without any reflection of the mind upon the moral good or evil. One may have naturally a greater thirst than another, and drink more to satisfy it, and yet be as sober as the other. There are very different constitutions in both sexes, and it was an injury done the women to place their chief virtue in the point of chastity, as if it were their greatest difficulty and trouble; whereas men have much more to struggle with of that kind, and indulge themselves without much blame from the world. The sex are at another loss in that way of reckoning, they are tempted to believe this single virtue may give them a dispensation from observing all the rest. The men therefore have themselves to blame, in making their system of virtue so imperfect, which seems to have arisen from their jealousy and pride.

L. SOME of Bayle's followers have kept no measures with the sex at all, and would seem to have forgot the difference betwixt being capable of joye and being lewd. He at least keeps the

appear-

appearances of civility, and is much more a master in the art of sneering *. But in short, when rude hands attempt to draw the picture of both sexes, it looks as if prostitutes had sat to the one, and cowards and sharpers to the other.

I have exhibited G 5 A. THE

* This comedy deserves not to be forgot. Monf. Bayle was accused before the divines of Rotterdam for advancing unsound doctrine in his "Pensees diverses." In his continuation of those Thoughts he answers Monf. Jurieu's accusations, and I believe quotes him fairly. Jurieu's words are, "He pretends that the virtues of christians do not proceed from a principle of religion, but only from fear, the love of worldly honour, and other worldly principles. A scandalous proposition! which destroys all virtues, as if there were no true christians! See the causes he gives of the chastity of women. He treats that matter after an impure and scandalous manner, pretending that women are not chaste through virtue and religion."

Bayle answers, "Of all that my accuser has done, this is what confirms me the most that he is like the unjust judge who feared neither God nor men: for if he had had any respect for the public, and any concern for reputation, would he have dared to suppress the exceptions I always made? Did not I positively except the truly faithful and the true religion? I renew my declaration in these terms, *I have declared already, and declare once more, that I except from the general rule a good number of persons who are guided by the true spirit of the christian religion, and whom God preserves from the contagion almost universal.*"

I know not if the poor clergyman made any reply: but it was difficult to argue with one who had such a talent, and not to come off with loss. Bayle goes

on

Æ. THE restraints of pride and shame are evident enough; but why may not virtue have its attractions as well as vice? nor is it properly vice, but pleasure, that has the charm; as in the story of Hercules. Sir Thomas More is of opinion, that virtue is attractive, and I will read you his account of the sentiments of the Utopians. "They think not felicity to
 "rest in all pleasure, but only in that pleasure
 "that is good and honest, and that hereto, as
 "to

on in his grave ridicule, appealing to his readers if he treats the article of womens chastity after an impure and scandalous manner. "Are not they comprehended in *that good number of persons* guided by true christianity?—Thus what I have said does not concern the predestinate and regenerate women; it only concerns the women comprehended in the absolute decree of reprobation, who, according to the theology of the synod of Dort, are incapable of doing any thing for the love of God, and live and die in the slavery of sin. — All that my adversary can allow them, unless he will contradict the decisions of that synod, is that the servile fear of hell may restrain them. — But is it not a greater glory to the sex, to ascribe their chastity either to the complexion, or the ideas of honour and reputation, rather than the fear of punishment? Nor ought my accuser to forget the severe and rude manner of his preaching several times upon that subject, and the indignation a number of women conceived at him."

From the French edition, p. 571.

This is a specimen of a sly writer, frequently imitated with less dexterity.

“ to perfect blessedness, our nature is allured
 “ and drawn even of virtue, whereto only they
 “ that be of the contrary opinion do attribute
 “ felicity. For they define virtue to be a life
 “ ordered according to nature, and that we be
 “ hereunto ordained of God.—His Utopians
 “ set up much for harmless pleasures, and a
 “ merry life: but (he adds) in all things this
 “ counsel they use, that a less pleasure hinder
 “ not a bigger; and the pleasure be no cause
 “ of displeasure, which they think to follow of
 “ necessity, if the pleasure be dishonest, &c.”

Here are different ideas of pleasant and honest,
 and conscience and remorse supposed: They
 had already contemned the foolish pleasures of
 the imagination (gewgaws and common honours)
 and preferred the pleasures of the mind to those
 of the body; saying, “ the chief part of them
 “ doth come of the exercise of virtue, and con-
 “ science of good life, &c.”

By this account of human nature, which may
 be admitted to be pretty just, before bad exam-
 ple and habits have added a second corruption
 to it; we see the opposition is not betwixt vir-
 tue and pleasure, but betwixt honest and dis-
 honest pleasure: nor is the opposition betwixt
 the pleasures of the body and those of the mind,
 no pleasures being dishonest that are natural;
 but that which spoils all, is the bad princi-
 ple.

ple from which the actions and intentions proceed.

L. WHAT do you think of those that call virtue a thing so much of our own growth?

Æ. I DIFFER very much from them. But suppose it were yielded, the consequences would not be so dangerous, if it were considered that whatever we have that is good is free gift, and that of ourselves we cannot think a good thought, no more than we can keep ourselves in life and health. The only question is, Whether we are not born with some tendencies to virtue as well as to vice? I ventured to say above, that there is still some honesty and some friendship in the world, which some of the advocates for self-love do not deny, maintaining only that 'tis all for our own ends: but I would beg leave to put the following questions:

MAY not a judge give a just sentence without any view to applause, or any fear of censure? He may be supposed to be in such circumstances, that his name shall never be heard of; and his belief of a future state can likewise be supposed to be very little, or nothing. May not a merchant give up a fair account, when he might give up a wrong one without all possibility of discovery? We can suppose the same of all trustees, and whose belief may be sometimes of the same size with the judge's. So
much

much for honesty in dealing: Then may not a man eat and drink moderately and unexpensively, from a better motive than "the fear of being sick," or for saving his money? And, to suppose a greater temptation, may he not abstain from violating the tenderest right of another, when he might encroach with all the safety imaginable to his own person? It were hard if the same favourable supposition could not be made for the sex, as if the fear of discovery were their only restraint. Have not they the same sense of justice, and a much greater sense of modesty, implanted in their nature? But to talk of ourselves, if a man had two women in his power, and equally charming, but the one free, and the other not; it were a strange perverseness to go deliberately to his neighbour's property, merely for the sake of encroaching. It was Cæsar's opinion, "that if right was to be violated, it was only to be for the sake of a crown:" which shews a natural tendency to justice when there is no temptation to the contrary; and I shall easily grant that men are overcome with very small temptations. But it is enough in the present inquiry, if it can be said that they would naturally go the straight road, if there was nothing to allure and seduce them. Even when we are deceived 'tis under some specious appearance or other; "decipi-

"mur

“*mur specie recti.*”——So that if we should allow that a man might be so perverse as to wrong his neighbour in the point already mentioned, we may suppose him to have been previously deluded by false ideas of glory and gallantry; he has imagined it a pretty thing to break through all laws, 'tis a sort of conquest too, and he can talk of favours he has obtained, and of more than he has obtained.

L. It seems when the springs of actions are laid open, it will be found that 'tis vanity, or the love of glory, which determines men, rather than the love of pure vice, or the doing ill for ill's sake. If it be said, that men in their honest actions are neither determined by ill nor good, but by mere chance; this word has nothing in it that can make it to be the motive of any action whatsoever. And when we see men acting in the same uniform way, as we have supposed in the case of your honest accountant, it may be fairly concluded, that the natural love of honesty, which also implies an abhorrence of roguery, is the determining principle, though it may not be much reflected on by the person himself.

Æ. As to friendship, it will perhaps be alledged, there are so many endearing things in it, that we are ready to do good offices to our friends, because we are fond of their persons;

so that in this affection there can be no virtue: a man would not cheat his friend, no more than he would cheat his son, because he loves him, &c.

It must be confessed, that where there is true friendship there is surety enough for fair dealing, and all the good that can be done besides; love is the strongest of all ties. But if an honest man should have to do with known cheats (a thing that may readily happen) will he not find himself obliged to give them fair play? 'Tis true, my lord Rochester says, * "You will be undone," and one may really be at a loss: but this lively piece of poetry (every body knows) is not to be set up as a standard of virtue, and at the bottom it is rather a banter upon vice.

Æ. I BELIEVE 'tis difficult to determine whether men are more capable of honesty or of friendship: both are comprehended in virtue, and both seem to be natural. But men differ from one another very much in their tempers and dispositions; some are strictly honest to all, but very limited in their affection. If the benignity be universal, it will draw honesty along with it: but the contrary cannot be affirmed. However, virtue in general may so far be said to be innate, or of our own growth, (let the word

* Satire on Man.

word pass) that all the instances of it are pleasant to hear of; friendship and all other sentiments of humanity, justice and all that falls under the idea of honour; some of which sentiments are upon occasions actually exerted in minds corrupt enough, good offices are honestly done; and perhaps none are born so very corrupt, as not to wish they could do better. The understanding sees very often what is right: if the will follows it but seldom, there are at least intervals of regret, and a man is angrier with himself than with all the world.

L. HAD not the author of our nature implanted in us some tendency to virtue, we might have had ground to complain of our unhappy constitution and of his severity (greater than that of the Egyptian task-masters) in requiring so much, and furnishing so little. * Milton says,

“yet once more he shall stand
“On even ground against his mortal foe:”

Which had not been the case, if all our natural byasses had been intirely to the wrong side. But the moral sense extends both to the understanding and the heart, though every body knows which of the two proceeds with the most warmth: the one barely approves or disapproves, the other loves or abhors. When they

they act in concert, and under the right direction, then all is right.

BUT that vain man may not imagine himself to be something, he will do well to consider the weakness and disorder of all his faculties. A very little self-examination would soon undeceive us. If we have sometimes a pleasure in doing good, and the kind affections stir in us, we too often find what may be called "unkind affections;" we are affected with anger and resentment, and feel a sort of joy in prosecuting those unhappy motions. Man's heart is compared to a seed-plot, where very opposite things spring up together, and the worst plants need no cultivation; as the best and tenderest are brought up with difficulty, and soon choaked.

Æ. SOMETIMES this soil is almost incapable of producing any thing either good or bad: stupid sloth extinguishes all. We are all fire or all ice by turns. This is some little account of our heart. As to the understanding, the shortness of its reach agrees with the slowness of its apprehension; and how often are we but dazzled and deceived, when we think we see best! The fall has produced very contrary effects upon us, we are fanciful, stupid, giddy, timorous, stubborn, impatient, &c. In short, if we would "dwell at home, (as Persius says) we should find "our household furniture very poor and scanty."

§ 2. L. BUT

L. BUT after all, we have something given us to cultivate and improve. Mr. Locke does not deny the “vis infinita,” you know: ’tis on the title-page of his book of education; and in his essay on human understanding, he does not deny neither, “* That there are natural tendencies imprinted on the minds of men.”—He says indeed, (§. 4.) “Another reason that makes me doubt of any innate practical principle, is, that I think there cannot any one moral rule be proposed, whereof a man may not justly demand a reason.”—And he adds, “should that most unshaken rule of morality, and foundation of all social virtue, That one should do as he would be done unto, be proposed to one who had never heard it before, but yet is of capacity to understand the meaning; might he not without any absurdity ask a reason why? And were not he that proposed it bound to make out the truth and reasonableness of it to him?”

Æ. IT would be strange, I think, if a man of capacity to understand the meaning of that rule could really want a reason for observing it. It must be supposed he has some notion of right and wrong, or he can never see the obligation of any moral rule, let it be put in any shape or terms whatsoever. If he has any notion then

or sense of equity, his friend the proposer can have some access to his mind, and will be able to make out the reasonableness of that rule to him in some other form of words more adapted to the slowness of his apprehension; for the defect must be only there. The principle is innate, only a particular proposition may not chance to be assented to on the first hearing; or there may be no innate idea of a moral proposition, any more than of a mathematical one, before the first hearing, and even not 'till certain steps are made for getting at the bottom of it. But as to that sacred rule of doing as we would be done unto, 'tis highly probable, that having been given by the Saviour of the world, and spoken to the simplest multitude, every man will see the reasonableness of it at a glance, and also wish (if he is not wholly abandoned) to be able to put it in practice.

V. *Helps to* RELIGION.

L. I Suppose, though all virtues are comprehended in religion, yet there are some of them that must properly be called divine and spiritual, and consequently not of our own growth, or natural to us since the fall.

Æ. No doubt: and upon this seems to be founded the distinction of the virtues of nature, and those of grace or religion.

AGAIN,

AGAIN, the virtues of religion itself are all comprehended in charity or the love of God, without which they would signify nothing.

L. BUT this divine love seems to be quite lost since the sin of Adam, faith which is previous to that virtue being now extinguished. Before we can love we must believe, since (according to the old maxim), "there is no discovery of a thing unknown." All the faith natural men can pretend to, is worked up by their reason, * "the things of God appearing foolishness to them." We may see God indeed in his works, for "the heavens declare his glory," and there may be an impression of his almighty power upon our minds some other way than by our own reasoning or making inferences from the things that strike our senses: but this is only what they call believing "a posteriori," and we could give no demonstration of the existence of God to others who doubt of it, but that either they must believe it, or they must believe a contradiction; as Dr. Clarke very well argues in his discourses upon Mr. Boyle's establishment; the substance of which is this.

"EITHER there has always existed some independent being, the author of all others, or else there has been an infinite succession of dependent beings produced one from another."

* 1 Cor. xi. 14—16.

If

“ If this supposition were true, there would be
 “ nothing self-existent : and then what should
 “ have determined such a succession of beings
 “ from all eternity ? Necessity is already ex-
 “ cluded, because there is nothing supposed ne-
 “ cessarily existing : chance is but an insignifi-
 “ cant word, and can produce nothing. So of
 “ two cases equally possible, to wit, whether
 “ any thing or nothing should have existed, the
 “ one is determined rather than the other, by
 “ pure nothing, which is a palpable contradic-
 “ tion. And therefore some unchangeable and
 “ independent being must have existed from all
 “ eternity.”

THIS reasoning (which does better in the
 doctor's own words) is still but reasoning, and
 an ignorant countryman may have as strong an
 impression of an eternal author of all things ;
 but the impression is still faint in comparison of
 true faith, which may be called a spiritual sen-
 sation ; as St. Paul speaks of things that are
 “ spiritually discerned :” he also calls faith the
 “ evidence of things not seen.”

Æ. How weak the belief of invisible things
 is, at present, may be easily gathered from the
 practice of the world, even of those who make
 a profession of believing. We are much more
 determined by the love of things on this con-
 temptible earth, which we are so soon to leave,
 and

and the fear of what a few of our fellow-mortals will say of us, than by all the encouragements and threatnings of the gospel. Our hopes and fears are confined to this life. We are so far from believing an immortal life to come, that we hardly believe we shall die; notwithstanding we have carried many of our acquaintance to the grave! and yet upon the least fit of sickness we are in fear of death, but hardly fear any thing after it; and hardly wish for any thing after it! Sometimes, 'tis true, there is a confused sort of fear of things invisible, but it rarely operates so far, as the fear of natural death, or of bodily pain, or common censure.

L. BEING thus stupid, and without sense of future and invisible things, faith is the first thing we have need of in religion: but as it is itself a part of religion, and contains several articles, we have need to cultivate our natural faculties, to employ our reason, and exert our activity (so far as it can go) in proper enquiries and researches, in order to obtain this lively faith.

Æ. BUT is there not also a necessity of praying, in order to obtain our wants of all kinds?

L. No doubt: for though our pride is unwilling to acknowledge our wants, yet prayer is among the first helps to religion, and a part of it also. Then every body knows that prayer signifies nothing without sincerity; by which I

mean

mean an upright intention of observing whatever we shall believe our duty, and to do the best we can in our uncertainty about it. As prayer therefore is supposed previous to faith, sincerity is previous to prayer; or the first step of all is "to wish to do well."

Æ. I KNOW not what thoughts would occur to us, and what we would do in a meer natural state, without the advantage of some instruction. Mr. Wollaston has given a scheme of the Religion of Nature very handsomely, and towards the end of it, confesses "he wants a guide:" but then he had Plato and Cicero, and the Rabbins, to be guides to him, as they had others before them: so that unless a man was writing who had seen no books, and had received no verbal instruction, we can hardly tell what his self-taught opinions would have been; perhaps of very small consequence. It would seem enough to allow to man a power within himself of discerning things after they are presented to him in the ordinary way, or a capacity of being instructed, which irrational creatures have not. And if the usual means of instruction should be denied, (as in the case of a man brought up, by some strange accident, among wild beasts) we can set no limits to the source of light, the "eternal reason," which may communicate itself in such circumstances; and

and very easily supply the loss of all ordinary means whatsoever. But these enquiries are of no great use.

L. SOME would say you were a quaker, and an assertor of "the light within."

Æ. I AM pretty easy. I have heard others say that truth is split, and each party had got a bit of it. But to return to the helps of religion: sincerity and common sense being supposed, a person that finds himself so indigent and out of order, will naturally have recourse to prayer, either with words or without them. Finding that he is far from being self-sufficient, he will readily ask the assistance of the Almighty; for it is here likewise supposed that he has some belief of the supreme Being, and a confidence in his goodness, faith implying both these.

AGAIN, supposing our imperfect believer to have been born in a christian country, and to have read the bible, he will see more positive marks of the divine goodness, which will incline him to praise and thanksgiving, as well as to prayer: fear would seem to be the source of the latter, as love is of the former. Even the writings of some philosophers, (Plato's in particular) shew us the properest kind of prayer, which is, "to refer to the Deity to chuse what is best for us." His dialogue, named the "second Alcibiades," is well known, and upon that

that model Juvenal and Persius * have formed two admirable poems. Epictetus † makes praise the chief character and business of a rational creature. Indeed, true prayer and true praise are much of the same nature, and each of them is accompanied with love of the object to which the solemn addresses are made.

L. No doubt, the eminence and purity of that love is the end of all religion, as appears from many clear passages in the Old and New Testament. For though faith and prayer, and other duties, are called parts of religion, yet since they lead to that charity, which is “the end of the commandment,” the distinction betwixt the end and the means is very obvious. And among the means themselves, there is a distinction betwixt those things that are to be done, and those that are to be avoided. But there are still things of an inferior class, which are only to be called helps to religion, and therefore not properly parts of it, as any body may see.

Æ. If the love of God be the point, or stage to which we must arrive, self-love seems to be the stage from which we must set out; those two loves, as St. Augustin tells us, having made two cities. They are certainly two states of
H mind

* Juv. Sat. X. Pers. Sat. II.
Lib. I. Ch. 16.

† Arrian.

mind diametrically opposite, (the one also contemning the other) or two contrary principles, by which we are determined: but as they are not for the most part in their utmost force, but the one sometimes weaker than the other, and sometimes stronger, so we may be said to be inhabitants of both cities, and to go from the one to the other by turns: which of the two we are oftenest found in, is easy to discover.

L. THE removing of hindrances is much a-kin with the helps to religion, and both these are so numerous, that we cannot enter into the detail: every body talks of bad company, and the example of the world, as being very pernicious.

EVERY body likewise speaks of greater and lesser duties, and of religion, or the tye that binds us to all duties, as the word imports. If some contemn this tye, or profess to contemn it, the number of such professors is very small, and 'tis but in some random expressions over a bottle, or else from a singular affectation of being impudent. The professors on the other side are vastly more numerous.

Æ. I BELIEVE this may be farther observed, that among the several parties into which the christian world is now divided, most people are mightily pleased with their own choice, which (God knows) is very accidental: but the won-

der

der is not so great, that they should like their own opinions, as that they should hate the persons, who differ from them; and this sometimes, when there is no interest to interfere, to make the quarrel look a little solid.

L. BUT most people having just as much religion as to make them hate one another, and to go to their particular houses of devotion, the wonder ceases that they load each other with names of contempt, viz. superstition, enthusiasm, bigotry: there are, no doubt, such characters in the world, but to whose share they should fall heaviest, would not be easy to know, without more labour than people commonly are at before they censure. A reasonable diffidence therefore of ourselves, and a due respect for others, may be reckoned among the chief helps to religion, though they are properly two states of the mind which produce one another; and the esteem we bear our neighbours contributes to make us love them, which is a great part of our duty accomplished, and without which the other part is impracticable: for “he that loveth
“not his brother whom he hath seen, how can
“he love God whom he hath not seen?”

Æ. IT were to be wished, that they who own the sacred authority of the scriptures, would apply themselves more to the study of these books, wherein they will find a great variety of
H 2 things;

things; some for speculation, I mean the exercise of the understanding, but more for practice, which is by far the most important. Perhaps curiosity will sometimes take it ill to be stopt short and put to a nonplus: but impatience becomes a reader ill, who has once acknowledged a writing to be divine. His inattention argues disrespect of a different kind, and it cannot well be denied that folly accompanies both the one and the other.

VI. *The EQUALITY of men by nature.*

Æ. **T**IS a current maxim, that "all men
"are born free, equal and independent."
"dent."

L. THE equality is more easily made out than the other two: for all men are born helpless, and many ways in subjection. If by freedom is meant the liberty of the mind, there would seem to be little ground for dispute about that; no man having any power over his neighbour's thoughts, farther than he can persuade him either by reason or sophistry: for in compliances from fear or profit, the opinion stands much as it was.

Æ. THE natural equality therefore should be granted, both as to the mind and the body; all creatures of the same kind are in that respect equal. There are indeed differences of complexion,

plexion, genius, disposition, and temper, all which may be called natural, as appearing very early, and continuing very late; but these differences are only in the particular constitution of souls and bodies, or in the degrees of certain qualities, every man having less or more of the same quality; as for instance, pride, compassion, hatred, joy, curiosity, penetration, &c. for of every quality or power relating to the affections, the understanding, or the five senses, every man has somewhat.

EVERY man has something in him of the mathematician, the mechanick, the lawyer, the statesman, the mountebank; and so of all other trades or professions. A man, no doubt, may mistake his genius, and enter upon a wrong trade; but still he may know some little thing of his business, though as little as you please. * Mr. Pascal observes, “There is a wide difference between a genius for the mathematics, and a genius for business or policy.” The French word is *Finesse*, which is not always taken in a bad sense. He shews at some length the different principles on which those professions are founded; and drawing to a conclusion, he says “† But then ’tis certain,

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“between

* XXXI. † Mr. Kennet has taken a good deal of liberty generally in his translation: the French is, “*Mais les esprits faux ne sont jamais ni fins ni geometres.*”

“between both, that a false genius will neither
 “make a geometry professor, nor a privy
 “counsellor.”

L. NATURAL differences are no less remarkable in things relating to the heart, than in things relating to the genius: you shall meet with one man whom you would not trust with a half-penny, another whom you could frankly and safely trust with all you have. 'Tis true, bad education and example are often to blame; and even good natures, “bene-nata,” are corrupted: but still there are natural differences; and if it should be asked, “Whence do they
 “come? or what makes one man differ from
 “another?” No answer can be given, but that in fact it may be said, “one man has got two
 “talents, and another ten.” St. Paul's question is very much to be remembered, “What hast
 “thou, O man, that thou hast not received?” But I believe people are not so much inclined to think that what they have received is not freely given, as that their gifts are greater than in reality they are.

Æ. THE natural equality of mankind appears most of all in certain unavoidable states and appointments of the great law-giver. “It
 “is appointed for all men once to die, and
 “after this the judgment.” The first part we see. The midwives know how equal men are

at their birth, and the grave-makers at their burial. And in all the passages between, or the states intervening, the equality is not disputed. If any man arrives at the weaknesses of old age, he must pass through the raw state of an infant, the silliness of a child, the rashness of youth; in short, the common follies and miseries adhering to all the periods of life.

L. OUTWARD vexation and trouble is another point of equality, not only affecting the several periods of life, but all the situations and circumstances which men can be placed in.—

“* Great travail is created for every man—
“from him that weareth purple and a crown,
“to him that is clothed with a linen frock.”

Æ. But besides the troubles annexed to the different circumstances of fortune, every man has a particular state of his own, which few are or can be acquainted with. And there are some little things that may be called “the troubles of the day:” the French call them “les occasions journalieres;” and upon these daily or hourly incidents the quiet of our life is observed very much to depend. Those that are in the highest stations will be the most sensible of such nameless difficulties.

L. THERE is one thing to shew the natural equality among men, which may help also to

H 4

sweeten

* Ecclus. xl.

sweeten some uneasy reflections upon life; and that is, the natural promptness of contracting friendship. (I believe we observed it before.) We shall find men engaged in the closest ties of good-will and fidelity, from the purest accidents imaginable, a stage-coach, or a track-scout. 'Tis true, as St. Paul said to the Athenians, "God made all nations of one blood;" which shews a common relation among men, as well as an equality: but how this relation is minded, every body knows. The very words Relation and Blood are confined to certain narrow degrees of kindred, into which some persons are admitted with great reluctancy, or truly because they cannot be disowned.

Æ. AND among those who admit each other into that distinction, the friendship is seldom very warm: so that we often find it the most hearty, when it has risen the most accidentally. I say, without blood, without any combination of interest, any design of overturning governments, or of quietly making rich under them, or any private view whatsoever, we shall see friendships contracted, which can only end with death; if they end then.

VII. *Accidental* CHARACTERS.

L. THERE are differences among men by nature, which may be called “natural characters;” as the differences occasioned by fortune may be called “accidental characters.” Though all power is from God, yet to us it appears a great accident that one man should have been a king, another an archbishop, another a colonel of horse, and so of other offices and employments.

Æ. WHICHSOEVER way power comes into a man’s hands, ’tis natural for him to endeavour to keep it, and even to increase it; as the desire of it is pretty natural to all men. These are new instances of their equality; and many other instances of it may appear in their accidental situations.

L. POWER and dominion seem to have been appropriated before any property could be fixed in goods and money. The natural power of parents is not to be called appropriation, because the safety of the young depends upon the care of the old; and this is a dominion founded in love. But if we could suppose a company of any grown-up people to have met together by some uncommon chance, unless they agree that one or more of themselves shall have the rule, there is great likelihood of war to ensue

among them. If every one should suppose himself as fit to govern as his neighbour, and had an equal stock of courage to back his pretensions, whose hands would the government fall into? But we see even among pyrates there is command and subjection, and great need for it. How far cunning or force, or a mixture of both, are used in the forming of governments, is needless to mention: nor how they go on afterwards (for some time) pretty regularly like a piece of clock-work. In both instances there is more to be ascribed to Providence than is commonly imagined. You know Philip de Comines ascribes a good deal to it.

Æ. EYEN Horace acknowledges, that the dominion of this world is from the powers above:

“Dis te minorem quod geris imperas,

“Romane.” —

L. IT were a difficult task to enquire into all the different forms of government, and much more to adjust the prerogatives and privileges of the governors and the governed. 'Tis enough that every body is satisfied of the necessity of government, and that, whatever the form be, it must be absolute; though this last point is not so much taken notice of, because of the disagreeableness of the sound. One design of government,

ment, no doubt, is to secure property, but then the governors will call for such a quota as they shall find expedient: for no body has yet said that eight shillings in the pound may not be demanded as well as four. All the question is, where this great trust shall be lodged? And here an opportunity might be taken of extolling the British constitution, but that 'tis needless; most people being agreed that 'tis a very good one. All panegyricks upon an administration are yet more to be avoided, since they are liable to be suspected either of flattery, or a design of reproaching with safety.

Æ. PRIVATE property being secured by the government, there arises a mighty equality among the subjects as to that point in a free country; every man being allowed to get as much money as he can, provided he keep within the bounds of the laws.

L. WHY do you call it private property?

Æ. BECAUSE the governors must determine in the first place what is necessary for the support of the government. But though the subjects are equally allowed to get all the money they can, there is a great inequality in the hits of fortune, which creates distinctions without number. Hence nobility and gentry of several classes and denominations: hence officers of the church, the state, the army, the excise, and the rest.

rest. But still every man has his chance for preferment, and most men are still climbing, and still many breaking their necks.

L. But men venture for money as well as for preferment; and no wonder, since money answers all things, and that a good deal of it would purchase an empire; as it actually happened at Rome, where the empire was put to sale by the soldiers, and bought by a substantial citizen.

E. MEN venture a great deal also to shun poverty, or rather the contempt of it:

“Per mare pauperiem fugiens, per saxa,
“per ignes.”

By the way, the change of the Roman taste is remarkable between the first ages of the commonwealth and the age in which Horace makes his observation. And Livy makes a boast in his preface, “that there was no people
“among whom poverty was held in so much
“honour, and for so long a time.” This poverty does not mean beggary, but food and raiment, with which these old heathens were content.

L. PROPERTY being an exclusive right to use and dispose of the goods one has acquired, or is master of for the time; it might be thought that when great estates are got, they would be

kept for ever: but it seems in the course of things there is a natural tendency to equality or a level, as heaps artificially piled up, fall almost by their own weight. If men were determined by covetousness alone, they would have a fairer chance for keeping their goods, and transmitting them to their representatives; but having vanity and other inclinations also at heart, the far greater part of their wealth must be for others, who assist them in those gratifications: and thus when the estates are tolerably good, there is an opportunity for shop-keepers and taylors, and a world of other trades, to make something for themselves, till the profits arising from the several bubbles produce a new one, that is, a new family, to make a figure, and to be served like the old ones.

Æ. It seems the word Bubble has two significations, and both agreeing to the subject.

L. THERE is an universal circulation: ranks must be still shifting about, new meteors appearing, and forgetting their old acquaintance, and even their blood relations. But in the humour of taking care of relations, people differ very much: some are willing at least to see their friends, and to do for them what they can. Others are of a different humour, and conclude that those who are already under the hatches, should be kept under.

Æ. BUT

Æ. BUT fortune often takes care of those whom nature forgets. Some who are born to nothing, and sometimes (one may say) of nobody, make a mighty appearance. Instances of the present time would be disobliging: I shall only mention two, neither very modern nor very ancient, Sextus Quintus, and Castruccio prince of Lucca; the latter a foundling, and the former a keeper of hogs. Their friends indeed could do no better for them: the Pope used to jest upon his family, and call himself “the descendant of an illustrious house,” because the light came through the roof for want of tiling. But fortune takes care of many who have not such mettle as those two had: One would often wonder how some are raised so unexpectedly, while others are as unexpectedly depressed! And this unequal procedure of fortune has made her sometimes be called a goddess, and sometimes (especially by those she neglects) a blind gypsy.

L. BUT to talk of the matter soberly, it would seem there is a secret direction in the affairs of very private persons, either to make them beneficial to others, or for their own particular discipline; second causes being still allowed to work. If some are said to be raised up to be scourges to others, it certainly may be called a particular misfortune to themselves.

However,

However, the abuses of power and distinction are not of so bad consequence, as the want of them would be in the present disposition of men. Mr. Pascal has a pretty illustration * of this subject, which Mr. Kennet translates with some humour.

Æ. BUT the odds of four footmen to one, is a real distinction of power as well as of figure; 'tis a sort of life-guard to a great man. 'Tis even remarkable how far a bare name will go, without much attendance, or much money, to secure a man from insults, and to keep those who have a dependence upon him in some order among themselves. So that name and rank have a magical kind of power in the world, which, as things now stand, is of no small benefit.

L. MONSIEUR Domat, who has very good reflections on the nature of society, and the distinction

* How wisely has it been ordained, to distinguish men rather by the exterior shew, than by the interior endowments! Here is another person and I disputing the way. Who shall have the preference in this case? Why, the better man of the two. But I am as good a man as he: so that if no expedient be found, he must beat me, or I must beat him. Well, but all this while he has four footmen at his back, and I have but one. This is a visible advantage: we need only tell noses to discover it. 'Tis my part therefore to yield; and I am a block-head if I contest the point. See here an easy method of peace, the great safeguard and supreme happiness of this world. XXIX.

distinction of ranks, gives us a view of the different orders of persons who compose the state or commonwealth, as they are ranked in his polite nation *. They stand thus :

AFTER the general distinction of the clergy and laity, in which the clergy has the preference, the first order among the laicks is that of the officers of the army ; the second, the council of the prince ; the third, the administration of justice ; the fourth, the finances ; the fifth, the sciences and liberal arts ; the sixth, trade ; the seventh, handy-crafts ; the eighth and last order, husbandry and the care of flocks. He seems to make an apology for putting agriculture in the last place, and makes a sufficient encomium upon it ; yet he † adds, “ But as this labour is
“ very painful, and employs the greatest part of
“ men, and removes them farther than any
“ other from ranks and precedency, those who
“ exercise it are placed in the last rank.”

THIS way of classing men, we see, is pretty arbitrary : Domat says “ *on place,*” as if he had said “ custom has so determined ;” and that is all.

Æ. INDEED in all nations there is scarce any other rule of living than as custom determines ; people seldom enquiring any farther than “ whether a thing is done, or is not done ?” But to

* Le droit publique, Liv. I. Tit. IX. Sect. 3.

† Place above-cited, X.

to say nothing of the hardships of putting men in the last rank, because they have the most toil, which affects only those who work at the plough and other parts of husbandry, and many other trades have as hard labour too; if agriculture were to be considered in the view of taking a lease of a piece of ground, the farmer may be looked upon as a party-contractor with the proprietor, and sometimes he may be the richest man of the two, and may do as little work as his landlord: in this case his employment will scarce be reckoned derogatory. And if there is any honour in being independent, the farmer is more upon that lay than the followers of the sciences and liberal arts. Illustrations upon this head would not be very agreeable neither. But some gentlemens sons would probably make more of their patrimony by laying it out upon a good farm, than in several trades they take to; and if it once become fashionable, it would have a double advantage.

L. SOME have made a division of mankind into the good people, that is, the people of fashion, and the mob. If this division has no great foundation in nature, it has a good deal in the appearance; for it is very easy to discern who is of the mob by one's clothes. But Mr. Cowley, (if I remember well) makes a distinction between the great vulgar, and the small: and

and he has Seneca's authority * upon his side. With these two and some others, 'tis the qualities of the mind, and not the clothes, that raises persons from the character of the vulgar; but this reckoning would be a little dangerous.

THE Canaille, or rabble, is another term for the great body of the inferior people: 'tis much the same with the mob or the mobile, which denotes inconstancy and giddiness; and in this character also many of the rich and fashionable might be included. But the mob signifies principally the croud got together, sometimes for bare curiosity, sometimes to make disturbance, and of which king William used to say, "the mob is not always in the wrong." Indeed the common people may be said to see pretty exactly within certain limits, though they cannot be said to see far. The Canaille is mostly applied to the dregs, or the worthledest of all.

Æ. 'Tis pity that people are so ready to look with contempt upon others of an inferior rank, which I suspect they will do still; but they would do well to reflect upon the equality by nature: though this may be attended with some other reflections a little uneasy; for if they once begin, (supposing pride to keep a while

* *Vulgus autem tam chlamydatos, quam coronam vocat: non enim colorem vestium, quibus prætexta corpora sunt, adspicio, &c. De Vita beata.*

while out of the way) they will probably regret the senseless fashion of the world, which has separated them from the great body of mankind, and so has deprived them of the familiarity of some persons who would have made excellent friends, had it not been for the coarseness of their clothes. Marriage suffers by this confinement as well as friendship, and the choice in that state is still more confined through particular views of money or alliance. 'Tis pity the appearances of good humour, (though sometimes they are but appearances) and the reports of a good education are so much neglected. I believe I have been upon this head before.

L. You have so. I wish the world may not take you for a leveller.

Æ. You know I am pretty cautious in declaring my sentiments to the world. And truly any body will easily see, that though all ranks by some miracle were reduced, the equality would not continue half a day. And for the renouncing of property, it will be reasonable to wait till one sees "the apostles, at whose feet the goods are to be laid."

L. WE have as yet talked of the different characters among mankind, chiefly with regard to their fortunes, and 'tis these indeed which make their natural characters appear more remarkably;

markably; so that the same may be called natural and accidental both.

WITH reference to religion: every body knows 'tis accident, for the most part, that makes us of one religion, rather than another. 'Tis either the religion of our parents, or the religion of the times; and our parents seem to have been determined the same way that we are. This is with reference to forms and systems. Those defects and blemishes in religion, called Superstition, Enthusiasm, and the like, are owing to the particular temper of persons, and not to the system they espouse: for we shall find some of the same profession very warm, and others very indifferent.

THERE is hardly a pamphlet comes out, that does not take notice of those two characters. Both the superstitious and the enthusiasts, I believe, have a design of pleasing the Almighty, and the enthusiasts imagine they please him better than they do: the superstitious have more of fear than pride, and so they are rigid observers of little things, without which they think there is no salvation. Both characters may meet in the same person, but 'tis the prevailing one that gives the denomination. Enthusiasm is apt to despise all observances, superstition to magnify and multiply them.

Æ. THE

Æ. THE disease of enthusiasm has more or less dangerous effects, both for society and the persons themselves, according to the tempers it seizes. If a man, whose pride is not excessive, should fancy himself inspired, or cloathed with some extraordinary commission from heaven, the government may be pretty safe from his attempts: but if one should think himself God's peculiar favourite, and that his commission was given him on account of his singular merit, or even though his fancy should not carry him to the extremity of inspiration, if he but thinks himself a peculiar favourite, it will be enough to make him set up for temporal dominion, and fight, (if he have courage) like John of Leyden.

BIGOTRY and zeal may be called the offspring of superstition and enthusiasm.

CARELESSNESS in religion, is much the same as the having no religion: it proceeds partly from stupidity, and partly from the love of pleasure. The contempt of religion is chiefly from pride, or the love of independency. Hence, 'tis easy to trace the sources of atheism and deism.

L. IF the atheists are sincere in their profession, they must be very dull. The deists may be suspected of affecting more unbelief than they have: nor can they be altogether freed of the character of dulness. But then their antipathy
at

at the clergy, whose post they envy either for its ease or its grandeur, added to the pain they have to enquire any farther, makes them take up with very weak arguments against revealed religion. Sometimes they put on respectful airs, and call it in irony "their most holy religion," pretending to differ from those scepticks, who think * "the holy records were compiled by an "interested party, in behalf of the richest corporation or monopoly that could be erected."

Æ. THAT is Shaftesbury. But these are poor doings.

L. BUT they are sufficient to make a young gentleman swear "'tis all a trick, the priests "contrived the bible." But I can never believe the priests would have contrived it so well. If one should ask the lad what priests did contrive it? the Popish priests, or the Protestant? he will be a little at a stand, when 'tis told him the books are older than popery itself. Again, if he reflects that some of those books are called the Old Testament, and others of them the New; he will find the Old was in the keeping of the Jews long before christianity was heard of. It would perhaps be some loss, if the deists were hindered from writing against christianity; for their arguments are sometimes of more use

* Characteristicks III. 236. There is a great fertility of insinuations in that whole chapter.

to help a weak faith, than some arguments that are brought in its behalf. But in return for this privilege of writing, they ought to do it in a fair honest way.

Æ. VANITY and ill-humour being known to be the springs of most of the doings of men, there needs little to be said concerning the characters of most other professions. As every man has got a particular stamp from nature, so every trade or profession has its particular air or appearance: the military men have their airs, the clergymen theirs, the courtiers theirs, and so on. There is also the air of a rake, and the air of a deist: but this rank of men are best discovered by their conversation and their writings.

L. IT may be some help towards keeping one's self in good humour, to consider the equality of mankind, both as to their nature and their procedure, and to give allowance also for accidents: if all desire esteem, it can be no surprize that they take the way to obtain it that appears to them the fittest. And if a man happens to be remarkably saucy, perhaps he might have been less so in a different post, or had he not been spoiled with flattery.

Æ. ALLOWANCES indeed ought to be given. And the consideration of natural equality will likewise help people to some humanity, and make them wish at least that every body were
easy

easy in their different stations. In this view there will be some care taken of the meanest servant.

L. ONE thing must indeed be granted, that if this life be designed as a state of tryal and discipline, the inequality of fortunes and humours answers that end very well.

Æ. 'TIS very remarkable too, that the same principle of self-love, which divides men from one another, and produces such a variety of fanciful distinctions, should yet in some measure unite them again, their necessities making them subservient to one another; and, which is still more remarkable, the inferior ranks often serving their superiors chearfully, and without the least disdain. Domat has very good observations upon this head, in his Treatise of the Law, shewing how out of self-love, which is the poison of society, God brings remedies for its subsistence. And there seems to be the like impression on the minds of the generality of mankind, very much to the honour of the divine wisdom, “that
“ God draws order out of confusion.”

L. THERE is farther a certain mildness to be observed in the conduct of Providence, “ Sapientia disponit omnia suaviter:” by which society not only hangs together, but the great body of it, upon whom the drudgery of labour

is thrown, has an equivalent of sounder sleep, and (generally speaking) more contentment.

Æ. THAT divine truth is of an extent that reaches to the whole creation: “à fine ad finem” “pertingit fortiter.”

VIII. CONVERSATION.

L. THE thing generally understood by conversation, is that grand amusement of talking, when people meet together, either by chance or design, to pass the time; or, as the French say, to murder it. Drinking or gaming does that pretty effectually: the former making the conversation very tumultuous, as the latter confines it to narrow bounds.

Æ. THE persons who have most time on their hands, are they whose indulgent parents, or their own particular good luck, have left them rents to live on, without the necessity of working either without doors or within.

THE labourers in the field, and tradesmen (handy-crafts, mechanicks, artificers) generally work the most part of the day; they eat their meals with a good appetite, they speak little, and sleep sound.

MEN of public employment, such as officers of state, judges, lawyers, clergymen, &c. have more or less time for conversation, according to

the nature of their employments and their diligence in them.

L. It were neither kind nor civil in this argument, to forget the women; for they can speak too. But to say the truth, idleness, and speaking for speaking sake, is not their general character: they are more active, more foreseeing, and better managers than we. If a foolish education sometimes spoils them (as whom does it not spoil?) the fault should be laid where it ought.

BUT since there is such an equality in both sexes as to the operations of self-love, that the same principles only seem to act in a softer or rougher skin; the same motives to conversation, and the same errors in it must prevail in both.

Æ. THE first project, before vanity begins to stir, is to make life easy; and this is founded on self-insufficiency, as it may be called: but supposing people once met together; 'tis natural enough to endeavour to shine a little, and to be glad to be in such companies, where one shines most. “*Est quod gaudeas te in ista loca venisse, &c.*”

L. It were too severe, however, to affirm that a man never opens his mouth but out of vanity, and that he never goes into company, but with the view of leaving a respectful impression of himself. Such reflections would lead

to melancholy. They serve but to imbitter life, or at best to make it tasteless. Nor are they true in fact; for a great deal of that talk, or superfluity of words, which seems to proceed from vanity, is often but meer habit or infirmity. And just so in the case of detraction, which though it seems to spring from ill-nature and vanity both, yet is rather a senseless custom than any thing else: indeed the duke of Rochefoucault says, “ ’tis more from vanity than ill-nature that we are slanderers;” which is a milder construction than he generally makes of actions: but I humbly think he might have been a little milder still.

Æ. THERE are certainly other inducements to conversation than vanity and ill-nature. There is curiosity, amusement, and friendship. The mind naturally desires knowledge, though there was no pleasure in shewing it to others. That curiosity, which is the bare itch of hearing a new thing, is much the same with amusement. But friendship may concur with both, or it may be alone the inducement of going into company; there being a pleasure in the very sight of faces, where no great information is to be expected.

L. To turn this affair to some account, there must be a good deal of familiarity, and some little philosophy. I believe we observed it be-

fore, that Horace lays down a very good plan of conversation, wherein he tells what his friends and he talked of, and what they did not talk of. One cannot think of It too often.

“ Sermo oritur, non de villis domibusve
“ alienis ;

“ Nec male necne lepos saltet : sed quod
“ magis ad nos

“ Pertinet, & nescire malum est, agitamus :
“ utrumne

“ Divitiis homines, an sint virtute beati ?

“ Quidve ad amicitias, usus, rectumne tra-
“ hat nos ?

“ Et quæ natura, boni, summumque quid
“ ejus ? &c.”

AGAIN,

“ Brundisium Numici melius via ducat an

“ Appi :

“ Quem damnosa Venus, quem præceps

“ alea nudat ;

“ Gloria quem supra vires & vestit & ungit,

“ &c.”

Æ. HERE is a good deal of scandal and many frivolous things cut off, and useful things insisted on : but they would be too philosophical for most conversations. One must often hear stories of a cock and a bull, and talk of them

too, with an air of contentment, when one cannot make better of it. 'Tis in familiar conversation, and chiefly between two, that free sentiments can be exchanged upon grave subjects. In promiscuous company, such discourse must be avoided, lest it should look like cant, and give a disgust.

BUT care must be taken in familiar chat, not to fall into detraction, to which it must be confessed there is a natural tendency, especially when two heads are got together. This whispering puts one in mind of the hissing of serpents, and for the most part some body is stung. But in this there is much of habit, as was said before; though it is a very unlucky habit, and often produces very bad effects.

L. AMONG the several abuses of speech mentioned in the government of the tongue, there is none the author desires people more to beware of, than that of detraction; giving this reason for it, that few seem to be sensible of its guilt. He says, "many who would startle at an oath, whose stomachs as well as consciences recoil at an obscenity, do yet slide glibly into a detraction, &c." The good author probably has had the sex in his eye, when he mentioned "the recoiling at an obscenity:" but upon the matter, what is it but obscenity, that is so currently talked under the

peculiar term of scandal? The talking of bastards has a great resemblance of obscenity. What are the scandals about court, or in the nearest village, which will do just as well for discourse, but obscenity? And yet this is a great subject of conversation among much commended women!

E. AMONG gentlemen, 'tis of use to have some knowledge of history, the common news running soon out; whereas history can last a while, and can be as little suspected of vanity as any subject a man can talk of: for it chiefly requires the memory, which few are ready to value themselves upon, and it gives opportunity to others in the company to tell what they remember too; and even those who have read very little, can keep their countenance, by putting in a word, or asking a question. But to dwell too much upon history, will not be diverting, and therefore allowance must be given to something that is more familiar, and tending a little to mirth; with this caution always, that it be at no body's expence, either in the company or out of it.

L. HERE a question might arise concerning jesting, whether it be consistent with the rules of christianity? Some are apt to conclude it is not, from the words of St. Paul to the * Ephesians:

* V. 3, 4.

fians: "But fornication, and all uncleanness,
 "let it not be once named among you, as be-
 "cometh saints: neither filthiness nor foolish
 "talking, nor jesting, which are not conve-
 "nient: but rather giving of thanks, &c."

'Tis hard to understand the precise sense of the two last things to be avoided, at this distance of time; though the christians in those days have been at no loss to know it: but among us foolish talking is an undefined expression, and if nothing were to be admitted into discourse but what is wise, there would be little talking at all. As to jesting, people are not agreed even about the translation of the word *ὑπερηφανία*; it may mean either scurrility, or quaintness, or buffoonery. Castellio translates it Facetia, but facetiousness has not a hard meaning in English, nor do I know who can justly condemn it: I am sure very grave persons, and who have a great regard for christianity, sometimes use it. On the other hand, who can take upon them to give formal allowances, when they are not absolutely sure but it may contradict the meaning of an apostle? For St. Paul, after he had exhorted the Ephesians to abstain from bad actions and bad discourse, tells them how they ought to employ their time, to wit, in giving of thanks; which agrees with the directions of St. James, "Is any of you afflicted? let him

“pray; is any chearful? let him sing psalms.” But every body knows these directions are not for common conversation, wherein too great gravity is to be avoided, as well as too great liberty. How hard is it to keep the midway! ’Tis vanity to pretend to it: all we are to endeavour, is to keep as near it as we can.

Æ. I THINK instead of inconvenient, (ver. 4.) our translators might have put unbecoming, or impertinent, which seems to agree better with the Greek word. All I would infer is, that there is such a thing as decency, as well as religion: and though we cannot now so well judge of what becometh saints, yet we may know what is becoming or unbecoming to be said in honest company. And therefore all trash, scandal, and detraction, will be carefully shunned, where the taste is not already vitiated by ill habit: for it must be owned, that some things have a relish, or smack, beyond others; as scandal, in comparison of common prate: and even in these ’tis well known how much precious time is wasted.

L. WASTED indeed!

Æ. BUT as to jesting, when it has no worse tendency than to keep the company in good humour, or from falling asleep, some grave enough persons have not declared against it: and there may be as little vanity in that sort of discourse,

discourse, as in any other. There is an advantage too, that to tell any merry thing said by any other person, is all one to the company, as if the jest were the repeater's own; and in this he only shews a little of his memory, which generally succeeds better than when he endeavours to shew his wit; as we find little tales are more taking than quirks, and raillery, and other things that are called smart.

L. THERE is one thing that may justify a harmless jest, and it is the natural disposition men have to laugh; which other creatures have not, nor the faculty itself. Monkeys can grin, but it hardly comes up to laughter. I shall not however affirm, that it is one of the distinguishing characters of a rational creature, since it often arises without reason, the fancy being only tickled, and an involuntary, convulsive motion produced, little better than coughing or sneezing.

Æ. SOLOMON says of laughter, "that it is "madness". We must allow, that besides his inspired character, he was in a situation to know the value of things better than most men, and had left nothing untried. It might therefore be concluded from his words, that laughing should have no place in this valley of tears. But it seems more probable that the wise king spoke only against excesses, and that he would not have refused a little innocent laughter to

poor heavy mankind, no more than taking the air to revive their spirits.

I SHALL not set up to be a casuist; but we see in fact, that one of the greatest plots in life is to laugh: even drinking would go heavily down without it, though men are not wholly indifferent about the liquor neither; yet to laugh, seems more to be the end of their meeting, than to drink.

L. BUT however allowable laughter may be, it had need to be put under regulations; and as to these, prudence and good manners must judge, "pro re natâ."

Æ. THE most allowable as well as agreeable kind of laughing, is that which proceeds from chearful good-humour: the person that laughs is pleased, and no body offended; the satisfaction even runs through the whole company. On the other hand, the laughter that proceeds from contempt, argues a disturbance of soul, and gives a quite different air to the countenance: 'tis really an effect of the spleen, nature taking that way to relieve itself, though there is something involuntary in it too; the fancy being touched uneasily, not tickled.

L. A VERY disagreeable kind also of laughing to the beholders, is that which is affected, wherein the fancy is not touched at all, and the sides are only shaken artificially, or rather
aukwardly;

awkwardly; as well as the face is put in a foolish set, without any charm or life: such is the laughter of those who study to please, attendants upon levees, pages, chamber-maids, and many others.

Æ. THAT which makes boys and girls, and generally young people, more ready to laugh than the older, seems to proceed from the temperature of the body, as well as the state of the mind; since we see all young creatures are merry and sportive. Care must be taken however, both in young and old, that this mirth degenerate not into insolence and derision; young women arriving sooner at their wit and mettle, are apt to laugh at young men, and are great observers in general of what is heavy and blundering, or any way ridiculous either as to persons or things. Sometimes children are corrected, but who shall correct the older? Mean time 'tis remarkable, that the excess of laughter is generally succeeded with lowness of spirits, uneasiness, and pain in the breast and sides; concerning which mechanism, the anatomists may be consulted.

L. It were to make too great a panegyrick upon laughing, even the best sort of it that can be imagined, to say that it gives the greatest pleasure in conversation; for people are truly better pleased when the understanding is well informed,

informed, than when the imagination is tickled: and then a kind word is more delightful than the greatest discoveries of speculation. The understanding and the heart are very different regions. Indeed in common conversation a laugh is the best fruit we can propose to reap: but to be convinced there is no great excellency in it, we have but to consider that 'tis only frivolous things that make us laugh most; a word out of joint, an odd gesture, and the like. And which is still more unphilosophical, we sometimes fall a laughing alone, on the remembrance of some of those out-of-the-way things we have seen or heard. Nay, a thing will tickle the foolish fancy, that was never seen nor heard before.

Æ. WHAT shall we make of that readiness to laugh, when one slips a foot and tumbles over? We are even afraid he is hurt, and yet cannot refrain from laughing! In very small instances we may discover plain evidences of our disorder.

L. WHAT do you think of smiling?

Æ. SMILING may be called laughter in its infancy, and sometimes it is most agreeable when it goes no farther. The difference between a natural smile, and an artificial, is easily perceived; for though the same muscles seem to be employed in both, yet there is a sweetness
and

and vivacity wanting in the artificial smile, which one needs not go to the drawing-room to be convinced of, but may discover it upon all occasions.

L. THE tedious drawing-room !

Æ. IT seems sneering is meant both of scornful laughing and scornful speaking, and is far from being a pleasant thing. There is a severity in it, as it exposes a weak side, or a ridicule, a thing that no body is reckoned to be free of. 'Tis a standing maxim, that every man has his whim and his ridicule. There is likewise national ridicule as well as personal ; and there is the ridicule of every profession : but it belongs rather to the play-house, than private conversation, to lay open these infirmities. 'Tis true, the stage is seldom successful in the cure : but it is at least of some use to let people see the follies of their neighbours, and if they will not look at home, the stage cannot help it. But as new questions arise at every turn, it may be asked who shall correct the stage when it goes wrong itself ? I know no cure for dulness ; but plain immorality is a staring thing ; and the wisdom of the legislature must take notice of that, the best way it can.

L. As history is among the proper materials for conversation, so the more particular the better : such as memoirs and lives, if they be well done ;

done; because the nature of man, and the springs of actions are there best discovered. Travels afford good materials too, as the different customs of nations, their climates, and what they produce.

E. WHAT shall become of romances?

L. IN some cases I am very unwilling to give a precise answer; so I must ask again, who would part with Virgil and Milton? Was not *Telemaque* writ by the bishop of Cambray? Who would even part with *Hudibras*, and several other performances? The old voluminous romances are well out of fashion.

E. SOME novels are even but dull.

L. AS to the attention that should be given to frivolous discourse, 'tis enough if one appears to give attention to it; he may take some liberty of thinking with himself of what he has a mind, and a nod now and then will be enough. There should be some appearance of attention, or else it would be very mortifying: like what is told of the prince of Lucca, who hearing a tedious discourse one day, of which he took little notice, and the speaker, who began to perceive it, making an apology for having spoke so much, answered; "You need make no apology, for I hardly know what you were talking of." This was a little severe, but perhaps the prince had reason.

E. BUT

Æ. BUT 'tis much easier to know how to hear others, than what to say ourselves. The government of the thoughts is previous to the government of the tongue. How shall the wheel of the imagination that is continually in motion, be either stopped or regulated? But since the tongue must talk of what is rumbling in the head, it were to be wished, that every one should empty his head of the high opinion of himself, and the contempt of others. I think cardinal de Retz says, "A man ought to be much upon his guard against the pleasure he is apt to take in raillery; for upon many occasions it cost the prince of Condé dear." It seems, contempt and derision are very ill to digest: when 'tis to one's face, 'tis hard to shun a quarrel; and when it is behind the back, it usually comes round again, to the disturbance of both parties: so that jesting is often inconvenient, according to our translation.

L. COMPLAINING is also a poor thing; and when groundless, very unjust. But as affectation is ready to enter into every thing, these complaints are put on, to procure sympathy and a little esteem, as being the due of a patient sufferer. It is not prudent however to be still complaining, especially of unkind usage, because people may be apt to think there is not much in it, or that 'tis taking the first word.

Æ. 'TIS

Æ. 'Tis really strange, how affectation runs through our whole behaviour! We are every thing by turns. We affect to be weak, and we affect to be strong; we affect to be poor, and we affect to be rich; we affect to be temperate, and we affect to be debauched: the desire of esteem still working in us, and producing itself, as seems most likely to turn to the present account.

IX. BOOKS.

L. **H**ERE is another amusement, which those that are at leisure have more at their hand, than those that are harrassed with hard labour, or with business. 'Tis true, a book may be for more use than bare amusement; but that depends upon the qualities of the performance, some books being good for very little.

Æ. IF a man were to consider for what end life is given him, "*quidnam victuri gignimur,*" he would readily enquire after the books that could direct him best. But in this he is apt to meet with very different advices. If he be already sworn to a party, he must be directed by his masters; and if he is only to follow the starts of his own fancy, he can hardly have a worse guide. If again he is to ask counsel from every party, he must be much divided about what he shall

shall chuse. Here is one fixt point however, as to books of religion, all parties of christendom acknowledge one book, which is called the Bible, as the standard of all belief and practice: and though it is called but one book, yet it is a collection of many, and has a variety of subjects, which I need not enumerate. There is also a variety in the style, according to the character of the writers. That irony does not signify much, * that in the composition there is nothing miraculous or self-convincing. A miraculous style is a new phrase: but the style of the scriptures is by most people acknowledged to be natural, and by some even to be † sublime. Conviction must also come another way than from the words of a book: a self-convincing style is another curiosity.

L. BUT the deepest objections are against the authority of those sacred books: I should have called them insinuations rather than objections, for generally they are nothing else; and where any arguments have been really formed against any particular book or single prophecy, they have been answered by very good hands, and the impartial reader will judge whose arguments are the strongest. But for those

* Characteristicks III. 236. † Longinus not only instances Moses, but in a MS. in the Vatican he makes mention of Paul of Tarsus, as an author of great excellency.

those who acknowledge the scriptures both to be authentick and divine, and who may want to know the best rules of living in order to be happy in the next world, and even in this; such Persons, I believe, will find in that neglected collection of writings, what will be useful for both these ends, and an agreeableness of style very distinguishing. I could name several books wherein plainness or simplicity has been studied; but the authors have not been able to hinder the art from appearing.

Æ. WHEN a person happens to have such a value for the bible, he will of consequence make it a good part of his study; and will approve of other books on religion, as they shall appear to agree to that standard. Let him dip in commentaries and sermons, and wherever he thinks his weak faith may be best assisted. And though he may chance to think some of those religious books a little heavy, he should not reject them all in a lump: for that which he may suppose to be the effect of his delicate taste, may be in reality but the weakness of his appetite. Nor let him think that dulness is confined to the labours of the pulpit, and works of divinity; since not only the workmen for the stage, who must labour for their bread, but even fine gentlemen who might live at their ease, and yet labour for esteem, do often pro-
duce

duce works of great heaviness. It is also to be considered in behalf of the clergy, that they are so limited to a few topicks, and these often insisted on, that their fancy has little scope to exert itself, in comparison of the authors whose aim is ridicule, and sometimes ribaldry, (things that rarely do well in a sermon;) and so they whose profession is seriousness, must be at a considerable loss, and therefore ought to have the allowances that justice requires.

L. AFTER books that treat expressly of religion, those of morality have the next place. Perhaps Mr. Cowley, when he recommended to Dr. Sprat to publish nothing in his compositions that might be offensive either to religion or good manners, has by good manners chiefly meant decency; because morality has a higher meaning, and is a part of religion: and 'tis remarkable, that there was nothing found in the works of that fine gentleman, which a worthy divine could have any scruple to publish.

Æ. MORALS and divinity are by no means to be separated. And as to those writings that are properly called books of morality, 'tis among the old philosophers they are principally to be sought after. Not to say but some of those great men have also left many instructions concerning religion, and discoveries of the divine nature; as a small acquaintance with Plato
and

and some others will testify. Though Socrates wrote nothing himself (in which he resembles the great instructor of mankind) yet we have his sentiments and his manner of life recorded by those who were familiar with him, and at the same time the finest hands in the world. Epictetus wrote none neither, but we have that loss supplied by Simplicius and Arrian. Nor are the poets to be overlooked among those ancient writers, morality being their aim too in another dress. It would seem, the earliest authors have wrote best. Horace recommends those who were counted ancients in his time, as being worthy to be read day and night.

As to modern authors, a man is to make the best use of them he can, without disparaging or over-valuing them. All searches are painful, and much rubbish must be turned over before coming at the best books, and before coming at what is excellent in several books that are not despicable. This I mean of some books where instruction is openly intended : where it is intended more covertly, the authors have a better excuse to plead for the rubbish that must be turned over. And the reader's intention being often amusement, he will still find his account less or more, even in that view. All then, it seems, must be looked into, even the
common

common performances of the time. Wit is always wit, and dulness always dulness.

L. IT seems you have a mind to keep the ballance between the moderns and the ancients.

Æ. 'TIS true: but I have some bias to the ancients. But, "Non nostrum est tantas componere lites."

L. THERE is one point in which a reader has a considerable advantage of an author; any dulness he has is apparent, whereas the reader's is best known to himself, unless he set up (against his stars) as a critick, and give his opinion "mal à propos." It may happen also, that what has been writ in good humour, shall be read in bad humour; which is another disadvantage of an author. And there is still something expected that is new, which is a hard demand upon one hand, and a foolish pretence on the other. Such authors (who are to blame in their turn) should mind honest Chaucer;

"For out of old fields, as men saith,

"Cometh all this new corn, from year to

"year;

"And out of old books, in good saith,

"Cometh all this new science that men lear."

Æ. PRETENDING is very silly. When a book is brought into another language, 'tis a translation of the words; and when the thoughts
of

of one book are brought into another book, this is but a translation still.

L. THERE can be no better description given of some books upon all subjects, than Ovid gives of the Chaos, for five or six lines together;—"rudis indigestaque moles, &c."

BUT a reader cannot always free himself either of want of penetration or want of attention; so that authors have a harder fate than is imagined.

Æ. WRITING is indeed a ticklish sort of affair: for the same advances by which one grows into a familiarity with the world, are apt to make him forget the respect he owes it; and on the other hand, to bring him into contempt with it.

L. SINCE amusement is the great design of conversation, no wonder it is the design of reading: and why not of writing? I think Horace calls it "playing with paper." Yet sometimes he seems to have been weary of writing upon ludicrous subjects *, and to have bid farewell to it, because of some bad consequences.

Æ. BUT Horace might have writ what he pleased, and have been pretty sure of approbation: others ought to risk but moderately. Nor

* ——— *Valeat res ludicra, si me
Palma negata macrum, donata reducit opimum.*

Nor can there be a greater mistake than to think of pleasing people of quite opposite tastes, the sincere and the scornful, the wise and the foolish. But there is a certain incontinence of fancy, which often proves too hard-mouthed for the judgment, as the Tale of a Tub honestly acknowledges. 'Tis pity Mr. Hobbes's * cautions upon this head were not more observed than they are. A witty man happens to let some flings at religion and the scripture, for both which he has a real value; and his words are treasured up by shallow heads, and retailed against his intention. But what help? They have a mind to shine by the repeating, as the author could not shun it in the writing.

L. IN a country of liberty, whatever is published will be read; and it were hard to take away this privilege, though it were practicable. As to that of publishing, it must be left to the discretion of the legislature: and whatever difficulty there might be in restraining the liberty of the press, there would be much more in restraining the private use of pen, ink, and paper; and therefore one would think it were not unworthy of the care of the government to appoint a moderate salary for some who have a little scholarship and common sense, to enable them to translate the most approved books, whether

* Human Faculties, Art. V. towards the end.

ancient or modern. This would keep them from a certain theft, and transmit to us the sentiments of those standard-performances entire and unmixt.

Æ. I WISH that were done.

L. THERE are two kinds of books almost exploded a while ago, the voluminous romances and school-divinity. It was pity some of the school-men had not employed their talents upon more solid things, for they have been great men, and had a sense of religion; but their metaphysical subtilties made their writings of little use to the world, and served principally to nourish dispute and contradiction. The writers of large romances had some very good ideas of virtue; but all was lost in tedious narratives: and sometimes they gave too favourable ideas of vice, as revenge in particular. Our novels deal most in scandal.

Æ. CONSIDERING the great variety of humours, 'tis no wonder there is the same as to books. But when a man reflects on the variety in the former, it will hinder him from prescribing or recommending entertainments in the latter, concluding that people are generally best pleased with their own choice. You will see, I have here chiefly in view the books designed for amusement. Harmless raillery is universally acceptable. Gibing is pretty passable, and 'tis the

the more honest when it discovers itself in the very title of the performance; for instance, the Praise of Folly, a Tale of a Tub, and the like. If a dash of unlucky humour happens to mingle, 'tis what an author cannot always help. Sneering is seldom taking, because of the air of insincerity that attends it: there is somewhat more agreeable even in writings of profest remissness, to use Mr. Hobbes's expression. I shall not say positively that all books are to be read, but every body will agree that many of them may be read with very little attention.— I am sorry I cannot see you again for some days, being obliged to go a little into the country.

L. PRAY return as soon as you can.

Æ. You know how uncertain all things are: but I will endeavour to see you in a few days.

THIS reflection we have from an ancient person, who knew the world very well; and it shows how much we stand in awe of the opinion of men. The whence comes it that we are so very much afraid of what others will say of us, even when we have a very mean opinion of their judgment? **W**hat are but imaginary fancies, and still more when we do not hear them; nevertheless some would chuse to undergo the severest whipping, if no body was to see it, rather than undergo the

WORLD.

the more honest when it discovers itself in the
the more of the performance; for instance, the
of Tully, a tale of a man, and the like.
It is a dash of unbelief; what happens to him?
the, it is what an author cannot always help.
DISCOURSES
ON
DECENCY.

DISCOURSE I.

*Decency is the least of all laws, and the most
observed.*

THIS reflection we have from an eminent person, who knew the world very well; and it shews how much we stand in awe of the opinion of men. But whence comes it, that we are so very much afraid of what others will say of us, even when we have a very mean opinion of their judgment? Words are but imaginary lashes, and still more when we do not hear them; nevertheless some would chuse to undergo the severest whipping, (if no body was to see it) rather than undergo

the lash of censure. And this dread of censure goes yet farther: we are afraid of what others will think of us, as well as of what they will say.

AND here 'tis all one, whether decency has any real foundation in nature, or if it arises only from the fancies of men; since it is the fear of reproach that chiefly makes us avoid indecent things, or what passes for such in the eye of the world: though it cannot be fairly denied that there is a real, as well as an imaginary decency; as there is real, as well as imaginary honour: and though the reality of both is denied by a few persons, 'tis a great question if they are in earnest.

IT must be granted that decency, whether imaginary or real, reaches no farther than the outside and circumstances of an action, without rendering it either morally good or bad, virtuous or vicious. Decent is one thing, and lawful another. 'Tis unbecoming to eat alone, when a man can have company, though no body reckons it unlawful: in some other actions no witnesses are to be admitted, for very good reasons. And the Cynicks, who held all manner of decorum in such contempt, only discovered their own pride, and ignorance of human nature, the dignity of which must needs put our actions under different regulations from those of inferior animals.

IF any should ask, How we make out this dignity of human nature? it might be answered, that the power which decency has in the world, is at least a strong presumption of some respect, justly due to the sentiments of our own species; for we are not afraid of what dogs and horses will think of us. And we may judge of this power of decency by its being such a restraint upon pleasure, sometimes in the most voluptuous.

DECENCY then owes its force to some tacit consent, and conviction of the dignity of mankind. What may be called real decency, has its foundation in the natural congruity of things; and what may be called imaginary, depends only upon custom. If any has a mind to call it customary decency, as being a softer term, I shall easily go into it.

IT seems to be this last sort of decency, which the duke de Rochefoucault calls “the least of all laws;” by which term he would seem to have an eye to the great obligations of religion and humanity, the laws of the land being tolerably well observed, for fear of temporal punishment. And some things belonging to religion are pretty well observed too, either to compound the matter with our consciences, or to get the name of religious persons, or at least to be called observers of good order.

THERE

THERE is even some reason for observing customary decency, or the modes of the world, in things that are harmless, of inferior classes; because an affectation of singularity must be pride or folly, or both. If a man, for instance, living in a country where they wear hats, should wear a turban, how impertinent would this be? In things that are not unlawful, nor too inconvenient, a compliance ought to be given, both on our neighbours account and our own. Why should we offend others, or expose ourselves to laughter for nothing at all? Indeed if the thing required by this decency appears unlawful, (about which a man's own conscience must be satisfied) he is to stand as firm as he can: and if the thing is too inconvenient (which must be determined by his prudence) a compliance in this case would be want of sense, as in the former it would be want of religion. Although a man is to wear a hat, he is not obliged to have a new one every week; nor to put lace about it, unless such hats were as much the fashion as once were shoulder-knots. But as some things are evidently fantastical as well as superfluous, it would seem deference enough to custom to comply with it, only in things of the latter sort; and a good mixture of folly will be found even in these. There is no help, one must be a little foolish in a foolish world.

IT were much easier to lay down general rules, than to point out all the exceptions and limitations that are to be made upon them. "The world abounds in good maxims, but the difficulty lies in the application." We see imaginary decency often interferes both with religion and prudence, and often gets the better of both: but the greatest wonder is, that even pleasure sometimes submits to it.

THE matter seems plainly to stand thus: we are at more pains to please the world, than either to please ourselves or the ALMIGHTY. The foundation of all which is, the vain fear of getting a mean character among the few persons that know us, or among those that chance to hear of us.

'Tis true, there is a desire of praise, as well as an aversion to reproach; but since they both produce the same good behaviour, and may proceed from the same vanity, 'tis a matter indifferent which of them be considered as the foundation of decency, that great disturber of quiet and pleasure: as in another view it may be called the great security of our most valuable possessions.

CIVILITY and politeness are comprehended in this notion of decency we have been talking of, which is but a sort of tenderness for our own character: but there may be a civility really proceeding

proceeding from a fear of making others uneasy, which may be called a branch of humanity, and is capable of continual advances in true friendship.

SOME hints given by Cicero, who had the practice of decency much at heart, may be of good use to fix some notion of the thing itself. Speaking of the difference between the words *Oportet* and *Decet*, he says to this purpose * :
 " To be necessary, is understood of the indisputable part of a duty, or the perfection of it, which is to be observed to all men without distinction : and thus we say It must.
 " To be decent, or when we only say, 'Tis fit, or proper, implies no more than the suitability of the thing to the time or the person ; which, though it is to be understood most frequently of actions, is to be understood also of words, and descends even to looks and gestures. The failing in any of these things is indecent."

THIS great man always distinguishes carefully between things of a perpetual obligation, and such as only depend upon times, places,

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and

* *Oportere enim perfectionem declarat officii quo & semper utendum est, & omnibus. Decere, quasi aptum esse consentaneumque tempori & personæ: quod cum in factis sæpiissime, tum in dictis valet, in vultu denique & gestu, & incessu, contraque autem dedecere. De Oratore.*

and characters; and he is so willing there should be nothing wrong even in the smallest matters, that he has not forgot to mention the air and gait.

HE had but little occasion to say any thing about dress, and some other points of decency that perplex the world now, such things being at that time under more stated regulations.

IT would appear sometimes as if the apostles themselves had not looked on decency as a thing altogether unworthy of their care; for St. Paul speaks of "honest things in the sight of men." 'Tis true, the two words which are translated into honest and decent, and by some persons ridiculed, are used promiscuously by that apostle; but they would seem in some places to denote somewhat of a lower order than the duties of religion and morality. Perhaps they may be considered as being opposite to shameful, when it does not imply moral turpitude, but only some impropriety shocking to the eye; as when he says, "it is a shame for a man to have long hair," and that nature even teaches the same. No doubt this instance has appeared stronger at that time than it does now: but we need observe no more about it, than that there are some natural congruities and incongruities, neither to be called virtues nor vices, which persons of good taste must

must be more sensible of than others; and 'tis generally reckoned, the ancients had a better taste than the moderns.

INDEED any body that knows the world but very little, will see how many difficulties must arise from the fantastical customs of men, and their clashing opinions concerning decency, now that plainness and simplicity of manners are banished the world. Some new thing happens every day, or almost every hour, to put one's discretion to the trial; for 'tis impossible to have rules for every thing laid down to ourselves beforehand. We find Cicero, for instance, advising to treat people according to their ranks and offices, which is certainly a good rule in the general. But how are we to treat those persons whose rank is not fixed, nor their office known? If their fortunes are made, that is, if they have got some money (the quantity of which is not fixed neither) it is not usual to enquire any farther, but to treat them according to the value they put upon themselves; and we find they make their way into the greatest assemblies, of what kind soever. But as this indulgence may be a good expedient to make such persons easy, it must naturally make others uneasy at the same time, who look upon the ill-placed respect as if it were so much robbed from themselves.

FOR as decency respects not only a man's own character, but the character of those he must hold commerce with in the world; the difficulty of observing it with reference to others, is often greater than with reference to one's self alone. For though the world will meddle to judge of a man's fulfilling his character purely as to what he owes himself and his station, yet in dealing with others, he must both satisfy those that are not concerned and those that are; the last of whom will be so much harder to please, that they are parties as well as judges.

IN short, there are so many little things to be observed under the notion of decency, that, as matters now stand, it is become a very troublesome affair. In the instance of personal respect, there seems to be a contradiction between the rules given by Cicero and St. James, which might be such a strait upon christians, as to make them free themselves from very much of the burden. The apostle forbids the respect of persons in very plain words, (Jam. ii. 1.) and gives a very plain example of unjust preference and partiality. 'Tis true, the natural tendency of this would not be to overturn all civility, it would rather make it more equal and extensive: for another apostle bids us "honour all men," (1 Pet. ii. 17.) But the face of christianity is so much altered since those times, that in several things

things relating to politeness and customary decency, I am afraid we must follow Cicero rather than the apostles; since it would be an ill-suited thing, and contrary to true decency, to join the forms of primitive christianity with the spirit that now prevails, which may be called a modern heathenism. I shall leave this point without any further explication.

THE first thing that occurred concerning decency, was the power it has in the actions of men, without regard to its foundation in nature: but it seems there is a real congruity in things, altogether independent on fancy or on custom; and the violation of this congruity, or order of nature, is in some cases not only indecent, but abominable. If any body should ask a proof of this assertion, I know not how it could be proved by any thing clearer than itself. An appeal may be made to any man in his senses, whether he is not persuaded there is right and wrong in general? If any should deny such a distinction, he would cease to be a member of human society; and all correspondence must be given up with him: as if one should deny there is any difference between light and darkness, or bid us prove that we see and hear, we must take leave and part. Even those who would pull up the fence of worldly decency, would introduce very wretched doings.

ings: but they will make very few profelytes, while the desire of pleasing is so rooted in the heart of man.

MOST people are not only convinced of the distinction of right and wrong in things of highest consequence, but they allow it to take place even in trifles. There are certain demonstrations of civility, which are more or less shocking to the eye: but as such things are properly the dancing-master's care, so an error as to them is not to be called incivility, but awkwardness. An honest farmer may be a very civil person, though he knows not how to make a leg: and his clownish behaviour is even more agreeable than finical airs and speeches.

SUCH things are indeed but arbitrary signs of civility, and purely depending upon custom; though still there is a better and a worse manner of performing them. And it were strange if the mind of a rational creature, made for truth and benevolence, were not shocked with things of an immoral kind, as well as the eye is uneasy to see such frivolous incongruities.

THE very word *Bienfiance* supposes there is a natural fitness or agreement, or something that every body understands by the words proper, becoming, fit, seemly, and twenty more to the same purpose; which may have taken their rise from some sensible ideas, as that of
people's

people's cloaths sitting well or hanging well about them; the taylor being here the great law-giver. And hence decent pride has come to be a current expression, for 'tis certain that one person's pride has a more becoming air than another's.

To say that all this proceeds purely from custom and education, is to begin at the wrong end: for these are founded upon decency, and not decency upon them. Imaginary decency will allow custom a large enough province, but real decency will allow it no province at all. It stands upon its own foundation. And when instances are brought from the miserable behaviour of the Hottentots, and such rude tribes, to overthrow decency in all its acceptations; the objection can have little weight against the general sense of mankind in all ages. These poor people are certainly ill educated, and so are many of the polite world in a different respect. Education is commonly but a servile imitation of others; the rule that parents propose in bringing up their children, being to make them mere apes, as they have no better standard of life themselves: and so the world goes on. But the mistake is in supposing that education constitutes the beauty of things, whereas it only helps us to see it; as a musick master may be said to help the ear to perceive the harmony,

mony, at the same time that he teaches the hand to play. And here indeed we see the force of custom very remarkably: the external practice is not only facilitated, but the internal relish is improved also. The frequent hearing good musick, and the seeing good painting, improves the taste in both; and the contrary tends evidently to corrupt it.

NOR can this influence of custom be denied in matters of virtue, and even in speculations. As some little things in dress and outward behaviour are called either decent or nasty, just as they happen to be fashionable or unfashionable; many persons have hardly a better rule either for their opinions or their practice. But as philosophy cannot pretend to account for those impressions, all the use that ought to be made of the observation, is to guard against bad examples, and to think as freely and deliberately as possible. I have not designed in any of these little by-reflections concerning the dignity of man, and the order of things, to carry the notion of decency any higher than was given of it at first; that is, only as it affects the circumstances of our actions, without making us innocent or guilty in the sight of heaven. 'Tis very true, that every thing that is sinful is indecent, the lesser being comprehended in the greater, but every thing that is indecent is not

not sinful; and many things which the world would reckon indecent, are far from being so in reality. But the vexation that arises upon censure, or the fear of incurring it, works so strongly upon that fund of shame within mankind, that they hardly do or omit any thing without putting the question (as it were) to themselves, What will be said of it? And it is well that this restraint is in the world.

THERE is indeed a true shame, as well as a false: or rather, it takes its denomination from the things we are ashamed of. If they are contrary to real decency, the shame is just; either when we feel it or fear it: if they are only contrary to fantastical decency, the shame is foolish. But the confusion and dejection of mind may be the same, as people are sometimes really frightened at a shadow. The *mauvaise Honte* of the French often means bashfulness, which is much owing to the complexion; the blood being more easily put in agitation in some persons than others; and the appearance it makes in the countenance is far from being unbecoming in the sex, and in young men.

THAT the passion of shame is peculiar to mankind, is generally agreed on; as also that it is often the result of pride, another quality peculiar to our species. Fear and fierceness belong to other animals, but they are hardly
touched

touched with shame, or capable of reflecting on the consequences of their actions: all their motions are sudden, and they go directly to their aim. If in their anger they seem to deliberate before they attack, it must be from some apprehension of getting the worst: but in following their appetites, they have neither reflection nor remorse. In which respect mankind, are not so happy, who have their pleasure to gratify, and their character to support at the same time; and when the one or the other must give way, decency pleads for the character, and is sometimes hearkened to, and sometimes not.

THE greater the pride is, this decency has the greater dominion. We find every body complaining of the tyranny of custom, which is, in other words, the tyranny of decency. But it gets a new dominion from the elevation of persons, or their rank in the world: for though the meanest person has his pride and his decencies to observe, yet they are far more numerous and troublesome to those in higher stations, who, having for the most part little else to do, contrive many fanciful things, and subject themselves and others to the observance of them. And as the world is the school where these painful rules are learned, the thing chiefly recommended is the acquaintance of people of fashion; and the advice is by no means to be despised:

but

but it should be remembred, that the world is also the school of vanity, wherein self-love is more nourished than either virtue or true decency, which may be called its offspring; so that we should look out for persons of virtue and good taste, in order to form our manners, as well as to make our few days pass with the less chagrin.

OUR quiet must certainly have some other foundation than the decency of the world, or we shall have no true quiet at all. We may well hug ourselves a little in the concealment of our actions and motives, and reckon it clear gain what is thus hid from the eyes of men; but still many discoveries will be made against us, notwithstanding our slavish hypocrisy, so long as we have no better principle than the desire of men's esteem, or the fear of their reproach. Any body may consider how poor a thing a life must be that is spent in grimaces and airs, tho' religion were out of the question. Even our observance of punctilio's ought to be from the heart, that is, from an honest intention not to shock our friends and acquaintance. And upon that account chiefly the trespasses against decency of all kinds are to be avoided: singularity is very offensive, as being a tacit reprimand of the behaviour of others; who fail not in their turn to call those singularities ridiculous, and they

they may really appear so through their unusualness.

'Tis always to be remembred, that we are to consult the world no farther than as to our outward behaviour: nor does it pretend to teach us the rules of virtue, but only how to shun ridicule, a thing on the other hand we ought not to be too much afraid of, lest we make a sacrifice of our virtue, our convenience and all. There is the more reason for this caution, that the world is made up of so many different tastes, that 'tis simply impossible to please all: this man shall complain, that you use too much ceremony with him; if you use less of it with another, he shall think you brutal; and perhaps the former complainer would not have been so easy, if any part of it had been omitted. This is but one instance: it is impossible to mention all the trespasses and regulations in the affair of decency, and the mistakes people fall into by their injudicious endeavours to please; very often mistaking the objects of their civility and complaisance, as well as the right proportion of the thing. If a man should be surly to his own family, and his nearest friends, and obliging and frank with those he only makes an afternoon's visit to; this were no argument either of his good sense or his good humour, but would look like a vain desire of applause from those he has
little

little to do with: and if a woman should fall into the same affectation, it would be nothing to her praise. Husbands and wives have certainly a title to good looks and good words, as well as strangers.

THE world will be a good enough school to form our behaviour in many little things, to tame our natural wildness, to smoothe our roughness, and even to qualify our civility, that it may not dwindle into formal ceremony, or too soft complaisance; all which must bring ridicule upon us, and 'tis the proper business of this school-mistress (for so the world may be likewise called) to prevent that mortification.

THE severity of the school-mistress will hardly be complained of, when we consider the allowances that are given to gratify the strongest inclinations of the heart. A man is not found fault with for striving to get as much money as he can, or aspiring after the highest employments and honours in the commonwealth; he is rather blamed, if he omits any opportunity of raising himself, or neglects any pleasure. All the instruction the world gives, is to keep free of certain blunders in our conduct, and weak appearances, which affect the outward character, without any regard to vice or virtue. The neglect of that instruction does expose us to the severity of the world, which in different
respect

respects may be called tyrannical and gentle; and the highest prudence is to know when to make it our guide, and when to despise its maxims.

DISCOURSE II.

Plerique homines quos cum nihil refert pudet,

Ubi pudendum est, ibi illos deserit pudor.

AS creatures of the same species have commonly a pleasure in herding and flocking together; the like pleasure is found among mankind, with the desire of mutual approbation added to it. Solitude and self-approbation will not always support us, nor will company and our own approbation do it separately; we must often have the approbation of others, in order to reconcile us to ourselves. 'Tis true, there is one sort of pride, which will very much lessen the desire of approbation; that is, when a person is thoroughly possess'd with an opinion of his own excellency. But this pitch of extravagance is very rare: inferior degrees of it will be enough to slacken the toilsome pursuit of applause; nay, if one is hot in the pursuit of any other thing, he will mind the judgment of the publick so much the less, and applaud himself, as the miser does when the people hiss him.

BUT

BUT as any inclination is seldom so strong as to make one renounce all views of popular applause, so the too eager pursuit of that uncertainty, is called vanity rather than pride: vanity denoting the emptiness of the thing, as well as the frivolous temper of the person. And thus some have made a distinction between pride and vanity, giving us an idea of two different sorts of men, those who content themselves with their own approbation, and those who are uneasy without the approbation of others. But perhaps the first temper is not only very rare, but impossible in nature, and so the difference is only in the greater and lesser degrees of self-sufficiency, or in the way that pride discovers itself in different persons. Those that are fond of outward show, or of making an appearance, are called vain; those that value themselves upon their inward endowments, proud: but both parties value themselves, and both parties may be called vain, as both are really proud; some proud of their native ornaments, others of borrowed ones: and the very proudest can hardly be supposed free from the desire of esteem from others. They are indeed freer from ostentation, and their desire of esteem is more concealed; but pure independent self-sufficiency is not a natural state of mind; and if the notion should enter the thoughts of any created

created being, it must argue the greatest disorder of the understanding that is conceivable.

By self-conceit is meant a much inferior disorder, implying only an opinion of one's own merit not well enough founded; and this state of mind is only chargeable with more or less folly. But the simple desire of approbation is neither chargeable with folly nor vice: for 'tis as natural to desire the approbation of others as their friendship, though friendship is the most delightful possession, and commonly draws the other after it: we always esteem those we love, though we do not always love those we esteem.

THERE are other kinds of pride which belong not so naturally to the present subject, such as the desire of power or dominion over the persons of others, and the desire of subduing their judgment. The latter of these is most found in spiritual matters, though a desire of temporal power may sometimes be at the bottom. The desire of a little triumph in conversation is less extravagant, but more common, and arises almost upon every subject whether grave or frivolous. But this observation may be made, that according to the several kinds of pride in man, in conjunction with their several tempers and humours, some are more inclined to company, others to solitude. The pursuers of fame must expose themselves to publick view, cost what

what it will; the less ostentive are more disposed to solitude. Those again who are remarkably afraid of contempt, will for that very reason prefer solitude, thinking they make a good bargain "to renounce all the good that others might say of them, upon condition they would say no ill." (Rochefoucault.)

THIS maxim (by the way) might infer some middle state between approbation and reproach, which is not so conceivable; unless the saying nothing should proceed from an absolute suspense of the mind: but this is not usual, most minds being forward enough to pronounce sentence one way or other, and most actions and motives being pretty evidently either worthy of praise or blame.

THERE is likewise a certain distinction betwixt approbation and applause, the former being understood to be given by good judges, and the latter by the multitude. Applause will never be desired where there is wisdom, and the desire of approbation is only pride when it is courted for itself, without desiring a virtuous disposition. And again, though the fondness for reputation may be an argument of pride, the neglect of it will be no argument of humility, but of an abandoned character, or being without shame. But man is not only under different directions or impulses from his pride, but also
from

from his opposite inclinations; these also varying according to different circumstances of age or fortune: so that our motions must be very uncertain and irregular, and sometimes our opinions are excited by our inclinations, and sometimes our inclinations by our opinions.

THESE reflections, and many more that will easily occur, may be of some use to discover the foundation of decency, as well as to shew wherein it consists. If some things are naturally becoming, men must be pleased to see them observed; and the doer is pleased doubly, by his adhering to nature, and his pleasing others. There is good-humour and complaisance, as well as vanity, in mankind. But this very complaisance had need of regulations, that it go not to an excess; and, as things now stand, a little pride must often come to the support of weak virtue. If it shall be called only the support of a character, it may be granted that the aim often goes no farther: but then the character may be reckoned at least among the out-works for the defence of virtue.

RELIGION and good-manners seem to express all the obligations men are under. Natural affection and humanity, no doubt, are obligations too; but they are included in religion, as all the duties are that concern our neighbour. But by good-manners people generally

nerally understand morality, or moral virtue, which is reckoned inferior to religion, and yet is a higher thing than what is called good breeding or decency; "which, though the least of all laws, is more observed than any."

OUR obligations standing in this order, it may be thought strange that the lowest should be so much minded, and the highest so little! All other laws have a sanction to enforce their observance, decency has not so much as the name of a law, and the sanction of it is only censure; and yet the fear of incurring this imaginary pain is sometimes greater than the fear of hell. Many persons, I know, would take it very ill to have their belief of a future state called in question; but let them examine themselves, and see how far their belief affects their conduct, and whether their fears are not more awakened as to the temporal confusion than the eternal, and all the exquisite torments they believe are joined with it.

THIS fear of shame and disgrace contributes not a little even to the observance of temporal laws: it sometimes goes farther than the fear of death. And where the opinion of the world makes a crime extraordinarily disgraceful, it is very rarely committed; as theft among men of fashion. If the opinion of the world should happen to change, the taking a bribe would be

as little heard of among some ranks, as the picking a pocket.

BUT as neither opinion nor custom can alter the nature of things, there will still be a party (however small) that will approve and blame according to reason; and so decency will be allowed all the privileges it can justly pretend to, and no more.

COULD a man be contented with the approbation of this small party, he would find himself considerably at ease: good judges are not only just, but mild, so far as the thing will bear, and are not severe upon every little trespass or punctilio. The multitude indeed (by whom are meant the eager followers of custom) are very indulgent in some matters of consequence, but sometimes they cannot forgive the least trifle. Again, the great body of the people, as they are almost without the sphere of decency established by custom, which does not dazzle them; so they see better in matters of real decency, and abhor those crimes which the higher ranks overlook.

IF this distinction should be quarrelled, as if it were making two different multitudes, or two classes of the mob; it may be answered, the distinction is not new, and only shews that “the difference between fine clothes and coarse can add no weight to the judgment of the wearers,

“ [Seneca.]”

“ [Seneca.]” And certainly ’tis a great point gained towards a man’s quiet, when he knows who are his proper judges, and is indifferent about the opinion of others. This (if one could get at it) is not going too far in Stoicism. Nobody would chuse to be on the rack to their lives end; and a creature that pretends to reason, had need also to consider what life is designed for, as well as what the best means are to make it easy.

Now upon a very little reflection a man will find, that he has not been made to be a mountebank, but to act a more solid part; to do what good he can, and to endeavour heartily to acquire a delight in all virtues, in proportion to their value. And delight, every body knows, makes a facility in practice.

BUT this is still to be remembred, that tho’ the delight in virtue is said to be acquirable; yet the sense of it, or the faculty of relishing it, is brought with us into the world; as we bring the faculty of reason itself, which ripens by degrees, and all our powers are improved or weakened by good or bad management, to say nothing of the foundation that is laid in this state of trial for our future happiness or unhappiness.

’Tis true, decency and virtue have different provinces; and the former may be said to lie only within the verge of this dream of life,

wherein our fellow-passengers may indeed set up tribunals to judge of our behaviour, but we know all the harm these judges can do us.

As we discover our pride therefore, by affecting an universal esteem, and our cowardice by the subjection we put ourselves under; so in both instances we discover our folly, the thing in the world we would wish to discover least. We can put a plausible face on some of our weaknesses, and imagine other people will shew the like favour; our fear we can term prudence, our covetousness good management, and so of other failings: but folly is laughed at and hissed by every body; and when our own good opinion forsakes us, 'tis natural to conclude, that we are ridiculed by others: nay, sometimes thro' the disorder of our judgment we think we are more ridiculed than we are, or that certain practices and omissions will draw more contempt upon us than possibly they can; and so we fall into the very thing we would avoid, by our apprehension of falling into it.

THUS mankind, by mistaking their judges and their duties, are still upon the rack and in constant slavery; unless we should except a very few emperors; to whom no rules are prescribed but their own will. But though we do not know all that passes in their breasts, we may presume they have some fear of censure like
other

other mortals. Nor, if we turn our eyes to the opposite and lowest rank, can we affirm that they have got over all human regards: 'tis probable that even sturdy beggars are afraid of some reproach among their own gang.

WHATEVER be of that, we are pretty sure the greatest rakes among gentlemen have some qualms about their reputation; and though they talk and write against decency, as if they wished it were out of the world, and probably they do bear it a grudge, yet they cannot shake off its yoke, and are as much hypocrites (in another way) as those who pretend to have a value for it; both parties paying it a sort of homage, whether they will or not.

DECENCY, it seems, will triumph over all ranks and characters, and will be a constant discipline to mankind. But our pride and ignorance make it a greater discipline than otherwise it would be. For if virtue be agreeable to a taste that is not wholly vitiated, decency will be agreeable too: it is not inconsistent with virtue, but rather is inseparable from it, as the shadow from the body.

VIRTUOUS persons therefore will observe decency from the principles of virtue (the love of order, and true civility) as the vicious will observe it from self-interest: and so it may be looked upon as a great instrument for preserving

some peace and good order in the world; few persons being so thorowly virtuous as to need no restraints, and few so thorowly abandoned as neither to be capable of remorse nor shame.

PERHAPS it would be expected after these little speculations concerning decency, that some instances should be given of the trespasses against it. But as it would be but a disagreeable task, any person of tolerable sense will easily know such trespasses when he sees them; and 'tis no advantage to have the head filled with unlucky images. All trespasses against virtue are certainly trespasses against decency, though the contrary position does not always hold: but several things that are only looked on (by some) as breaches of decency, are really breaches of virtue and even of religion. "If any man among you seemeth to be religious, and bridleth not his tongue, but deceiveth his own heart, this man's religion is vain," (St. James.) But not to make the world worse than it is, a great deal of the humour of detraction proceeds not so much either from pride or malignity, as from a meer habit of idle talking; till at last the head becomes a register of trash and scandal, and the itch of repeating increases with the itch of hearing. If this apology should not be kindly received, I should be content to know another source of the errors in
conver-

conversation than either vanity or ill-humour, or downright folly; and there is sometimes a combination of all the three.

THE instances of indecency, in common conversation (which would make a very large book) are not the only trespasses. We trespass against decency in most things we do for our pleasure, and even for the support of our character: tho' in things of this latter class 'tis custom under the name of decency that misleads us; for if we are but told, "that such a thing is done or "not done," we enquire no farther. But as we are not to torture ourselves with the fear of being ill spoken of, we must even shun too great a squeamishness, or the fear of doing ill. Where religion and virtue are silent, common sense must determine the best way it can.

THE Sex have their particular decencies, both natural and artificial, which they observe with great exactness. Decent pride is appropriated to them: and though it is but a poetical expression, both sexes being under equal obligations as to virtue, and under equal restraints as to vice, yet the women have a right to value themselves a little upon their native charms, and the outward advantages of fortune, that men (who have more ill nature than they, and as much vanity of another kind) may not look upon them as too easy a conquest. Good sense

and some religion (to which women are more inclinable than men) will help to keep this self-esteem of theirs within due bounds, that they may not forget their loveliest, and even brightest character, good-humour; nor appear without the ornament of a meek and quiet spirit. For it must not be forgot, that there is a difference between decent pride and decency itself, and it seems to be this: decency is a certain gracefulness in actions; decent pride is a regard to reputation, with some mixture of self-esteem not too observable: and it were good upon some occasions that even men had a little more of this quality, till a better principle takes place. If self-interest could be wholly separated from the regard to reputation, it would immediately be of the number of the pure virtues; and if a man had any view of being useful to the world, the more reputation he has, the more he is useful.

PRIDE would get very little footing in the midst of applause and approbation, if a man knew himself well, and what he is in soul and body at his best. He would soon acknowledge the truth of that ancient expression, "Pride was not made for man." The same knowledge would inform him, that applause is a dangerous thing for a mind so easily puffed up. And as the knowledge of ourselves, and the know-

knowledge of the world, are subservient to each other, so by this latter knowledge we find out the difficulty and the emptiness of that airy conquest; and by seeing the ridicule that others fall into, we are somewhat on our guard to shun it; the fear of shame being as natural to us, as the fear of pain: and shame is truly a pain of the mind, as every one that has felt it will acknowledge.

THOSE who alledge that shame is only artificially worked up in human nature, may as well alledge, that any other sensation is so worked up: the fear of it indeed may be artificially excited in us, as the fear of several things may be excited the same way: we may be afraid where no fear is, as well as ashamed where no shame is; and we may be insensible both as to fear and shame, when we have most reason to be sensible of both, as the old Comedian has told us.

ONE might easily be led into a dissertation upon shame (especially from the words of the text) designing only to make a few reflections upon decency; such a connexion there is between the two; and the different sorts of ridicule, or the variety of ridiculous characters, are ready also to come into the mind: but as such characters are without number, and are all trespasses against decency, many of them are repre-

sented every day in books of wit and humour, and even in books of divinity; so that the world may be well instructed in the ways of shunning derision. And indeed all the authors have reason for touching upon that string, since the fear of shame is so prevalent with men: 'tis a thing that stirs very early, for even nurses endeavour to shame their young ones into good behaviour and decency, before reason is awakened in them; and it often has a good effect, beyond the threats of whipping.

THIS sense of shame is often a promising disposition towards virtue, and is a very agreeable delicacy of spirit. Impudence is stupidity, 'tis the want of one kind of sense, or of something implanted by the Author of nature in rational creatures. We see how carefully those decencies are observed, that relate to the body, as if there was a respect due even to it, and men were conscious of some advantage in their outward form: no nation goes upon all four. The body is not only covered, but adorned. 'Tis true, this may infer a consciousness of defect, and some natural disadvantages, which must be granted; but it is the part of reason to supply and rectify all disadvantages, so far as it can. We even observe numberless decencies naturally, without art and instruction, from a sense of what is beautiful as well as of what is unseemly.

unseemly. If we hear sometimes of poor doings, and great degeneracy in human nature, it needs give no more surprize than when we see a good tree ill-trained, or a piece of ground over-run with weeds. It happens on the other hand too often, that external decencies are minded with an extraordinary carefulness, when there are horrid trespasses committed against virtue.

A FEW hints or items well remembred, will save a multitude of illustrations, that might be made upon this subject of decency. What follows is not proposed to have the authority of maxims, but is offered only to the consideration of some persons who have not much leisure to read large treatises; and upon a very little attention, a variety of reflections will spring in their own minds in a short time.

THERE must be a fund to work upon, in concurrence with good instruction.

MAN naturally loves virtue and decency: and when he is deceived, it is under an appearance of something that is good.

WE are often led by meer imitation, and often ruined by it.

DECENT, with most people, is but another word for customary. Hence the interfering of decency and virtue.

DECENCY

DECENCY in opinions is more properly truth: in inclinations and actions, 'tis virtue and goodness. But the common province of decency goes no farther than the circumstances of actions, or the manner of doing them.

WE often fall into extravagances and follies, thinking to avoid what is reckoned indecent, and the contempt that follows upon it; but more frequently we fall into these inconveniencies from the humour of distinction and superiority.

THE indecencies of conversation arise from vanity, ill-humour, and a bastard kind of good-humour. This false complaisance appears much in the custom of detraction: it goes on against the absent, because 'tis supposed to be agreeable to the present, who become the absent the next moment, and suffer in their turn.

PROFESSED indecency of any kind is insolence. Vanity is commonly the first inducement to foolish talking. Thus smutty jests oftener shew the ostentation of wit than the inclination to lewdness; and impious expressions are no sure argument of unbelief.

AN excess of talking of any kind is seldom free from the same vanity.

MOROSENESS is the effect of pride, as if the company was not worthy of our mixing with it. The indecency lies in the sullen air.

INDE-

INDECENCIES in apparel are as much shunned as any. Herein custom triumphs eminently: 'tis the chief point of uniformity among all ranks and parties.

IN all other articles of expence, that which is nearest the middle must be decency; the precise point not being discoverable: the extremes of high and low are either called extravagant or fordid.

WE see of what use this inexplicable thing, decency, is for regulating all our different motions: it keeps our pride itself in some order, though it be called its daughter; and if it does not restrain our inclinations and averfions, it often hinders them from breaking out. It lulls our spirits asleep, and by turns rouses them. In short, decency may be now reckoned of such service in the commonwealth, that without it the judicatures, both in church and state, would have much more to do than they have; to say nothing of the tranquillity it helps to preserve in private families.

AN

A N
E S S A Y
O N
S E L F - L O V E.

*Modus ergo diligendi præcipiendus est homini; id est,
Quomodo se diligit, aut profit sibi: quin autem se
diligit, aut profit sibi, dubitare, dementis est.*

I N T R O D U C T I O N.

THE disputes upon this subject have
been very much increased (as it still
happens) by the different acceptations
of the terms, which ought regularly to have
been adjusted before entering upon the merits or
demerits of the thing. Some men have ex-
alted self-love so high, as to make it the source
of the greatest duties, while others have looked
upon it as the sink of all wickedness! And
sometimes its greatest advocates, when they are
pressed with difficulties, declare plainly they
meant

meant no other thing but self-preservation; which, if duly regulated, no body can have a good reason to condemn.

FROM this obscurity and contradiction, have arisen new disputes concerning human nature; some making very unfavourable reports of it, and others affirming it to be without fault. The former party assert, "That a man is not capable of the least act of common honesty, or common friendship, without a deliberate prospect of his own interest as the prevailing motive." And thus the selfish principle, which may be compared to the dead fly in the apothecary's ointment, is set up as the only wisdom or true rule of all actions and designs! This is also a false account of religion, if we suppose man to have a higher end than himself, or consider religion as the duty we owe another being, and a being of such perfections as are only to be found in the Deity.

THE latter party maintain the principle of disinterestedness sufficiently: but as they deny the infirmity and corruption of human nature, their doctrine labours under insuperable difficulties.

THESE two parties are diametrically opposite to each other in their schemes and opinions, agreeing only in their aversion to revealed religion, which indeed would be an useless thing

if either of the schemes was true: a creature so highly exalted, and able to govern itself, needed no other assistance; and a creature so very low, and deprived of all liberty, must be incapable of any degree of virtue.

THERE is a third sort of men, who admit the difference between right and wrong, and shew likewise a great respect for the christian religion; I ought to say farther, that I believe them to be sincere: but at the same time they are so violent advocates for self-love, or the interested principle, as to speak of the pure disinterested love of God in very unbecoming terms.

SINCE any controversy that may arise in this Essay, is chiefly with those who own christianity, I shall say little in behalf either of its proofs or its doctrine, both which have stood firm against the attacks of more subtle spirits than we have at present; my principal design being, in a rational way, to shew the best and the worst of self-love, and in what sense it is to be understood, before it can be set up either as the principle of vice or virtue.

Sect. I. SELF-LOVE commonly taken in a bad sense; the duke of Rochefoucault's account of it.

CUSTOM, which determines the signification of words, has generally put a bad meaning upon self-love; so that a self-lover is reckoned the same with an interested unjust person, whose interest or pleasure (in whatever form it appears to him) will be his constant aim, without any regard to the rules of equity.

WHEN St. Paul says, "in the last days men shall be * lovers of their own selves," no body doubts but that he speaks of a very remarkable degeneracy. There self-love is put at the head of a great train of vices, as if it was the parent of them all: lovers of their own selves, covetous (or lovers of money) boasters, proud, &c. We find also in St. Augustin's † confessions, an account of a very extravagant perverse state of mind, wherein self-love or self-complacency is carried so far, that the person minds the pleasing of no body but himself; and values himself upon those gifts he receives freely from God, despising others who he thinks are not so privileged, and envying such as are. Hence the idea of spiritual pride.

CON-

* Φιλαυτοί, 2 Tim. iii. 2.

† Lib. x. cap. 39.

CONFORMABLE to these acceptations of self-love, the French and other nations generally understand by it pride, and all other ill qualities of the mind; but pride most frequently. Selfishness is every where a vile character.

AMONG the easiest acceptations of self-love is such a self-complacency or self conceit, as is represented by the fable of Narcissus, and which is only considered as a folly: but it is accompanied for the most part with arrogance, and a desire of engrossing all things. And thus self-love has become a current term for pride, (as was said before) or another word for corrupt nature in all its tendencies: at the same time 'tis a foster word, and so has been introduced by polite persons, when they had not a mind to shock delicate ears.

THERE is a masterly description of self-love, supposed to be done by the duke of Rochefoucault, as it now works in the heart of man: 'tis a small book, and very much known. He begins thus, * "Self-love is the love of one's self, and of all things for the sake of one's self." After which definition, he proceeds to mention the effects. "It makes men idolaters of themselves, and would make them the tyrants of others, if fortune gave them an opportunity." This supposes the total subversion of our

* See the Additions, No. II.

our duty, both to God and man: we not only act as if we were independent of the Almighty, but we set up ourselves to be worshipped in his stead; and are not only careless and unmindful of our neighbour's interest, but make a sacrifice of it, and him to our own. Such is the modesty of self-love!

MEAN time, the first part of the definition, "self-love is the love of one's self," gives us but little discovery; and the second part of it is not quite so proper: for the love of things for our own sake, implies only a desire of them, as being serviceable to us, the love terminating upon ourselves. And thus some have blundered, who confound self-love with the love of pleasure, or any thing the heart is set upon. And sometimes * pleasure, and interest, and happiness, are all jumbled together, and made convertible terms for self-love; which is a greater confusion still. But this criticism has nothing to do with the duke of Rochefoucault's account of self-love, who seems only to have intended to give a representation of that principle in its various shapes and bad consequences. Accordingly, he next considers it in "its impetuoseness, its subtilty, its refinements;" and adds, "that it is often invisible to itself: that it hatches and nourishes an infinite number of inclinations."

* Additions, No. I.

" tions and averfions, fome of which are fo
 " very monftrous, that it cannot believe them
 " to be its own brood." He fays, " it is made
 " up of contradictions, and can act the moft
 " contrary parts; proud and fawning. It
 " changes its purfuits of glory, riches, and
 " pleasure, according to our complexion, and
 " the changes of our age and our condition:
 " but it is equal to it, to have many purfuits,
 " or but one; for it can divide itfelf into many,
 " or contract itfelf into one, as it has a mind."
 He gives a view of its inconfancy, both as it
 proceeds from " the infufficiency of things
 " which please us, and our own natural change-
 " ablenefs." He fhews its extreme pofitive-
 nefs, " which makes a man do the moft fan-
 " taffical things, and even fuch as are hurtful
 " to himfelf, for no other reafon but merely
 " that he may gratify his own will." And this
 gives the idea of pofitive blind felf-will; in-
 ftances of which are very frequent in life. He
 concludes, " that felf-love is found among all
 " ranks, and in all conditions: it lives every
 " where, it lives upon every thing; nay, it
 " lives upon nothing! It finds its account even
 " in the moft rigid austerities, hoping (it feems)
 " to get the reputation of fanctity in exchange.
 " This," (fays he) " is a lively representation
 " of felf-love, the continual agitation whereof
 " may

“ may be compared to the restless ebbing and
“ flowing of the sea.” The prophet Isaiah
ch. lvii- 20. makes use of the same image;
“ the wicked are like the troubled sea, when
“ it cannot rest, whose waters cast up mire
“ and dirt.”

FROM that description of self-love, (abridged
as it is) we may form an idea of it, as of a
bottomless gulph, out of which issue those three
rivers of pride, covetousness, and sensuality;
as there is nothing that proceeds out of the cor-
rupt heart of man, but may be reduced to one
or other of those impure streams, or, as Mr.
Pascal calls them, “ those rivers of fire. All
“ that is in the world is the lust of the flesh,
“ the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life.”

SECT. II. *The change made on SELF-LOVE, by
the fall.*

AS the fall of Adam is concluded by all
christians, (from the authority of sacred
writ) to have made a strange alteration upon
all the powers and faculties of human nature;
so Mr. Pascal gives different accounts of self-
love before the fall, and after it. He says,
(Sect. xxx.) “ Man was at first created with
“ two kinds of love; the one for God, the
“ other for himself: but with this condition,
“ that

“that the love for God should be infinite;
“that is, without any other end but God alone;
“and that the love for himself should be finite,
“and leading to God as the end, [*rapporant*
“*à Dieu.*] Man in that state not only loved
“himself without sin, but he could not law-
“fully have ceased to love himself. When
“sin entered into man, he lost the first of those
“loves; and the love of himself, having re-
“mained alone in that great soul of his, which
“was capable of infinite love, this self-love
“spread itself, and overflowed the vast space
“which the love of God had forsaken: and
“thus he loved himself alone, and all things
“for himself; or, in other words, he loved
“himself infinitely.”

THIS supposition of the fall makes the injustice of self-love certainly no less than it was before, and the folly of it infinitely greater. If man was to love himself when he was uncorrupted and intire, only with such an inferior and subordinate kind of love as Mr. Pascal represents, shall he love himself now in his corruption and misery, with such a supreme and ultimate love, as if he were the Deity itself? This is a thing that even some of the deists exclaim against, as the highest extravagance; and it is shocking to common sense, though christianity were out of the question.

WE see Mr. Pascal does not pretend to account for the fall of man, but only tells by way of history, "That when sin entered, his condition was so very much changed, that he is now overspread, as with a loathsome disease." (No. iii.) But what idea can we have of sin? 'Tis but a negative thing: We can only consider it as an apostacy, or some perverse state of mind, which has brought such miseries upon man, and all things about him. And what is this apostacy, but some defection in our own favour, the source of which seems to have been pride? And pride is but self-esteem, forgetting the original from whence all good things are derived, and so transgressing every day as at first: but it may now (according to the common phrase) see its sin in its punishment: we ourselves, and whatever we may be said to have commerce with, being reduced to such extreme infirmity and disorder! The charity also of the great Author may appear in changing the state of things from what they were, that so man might have wherewithal to be undeceived, both from within himself, and from the defects of the inferior creation.

Sect.

SECT. III. *What may be called lawful in SELF-LOVE, from some of its improper acceptations.*

THAT art or address, which the divine wisdom has implanted in every living creature for its own good, is often called self-preservation, and sometimes self-love; though it is thus common to all animals, and is no more than an impulse or determination towards their own safety. Every animal is dear to itself, without thinking of it; and at the approach of any danger, we find a sudden effort used for self-defence; as when we are falling, we naturally throw out our arms. The want of this care and address would be stupidity.

THE same divine wisdom, which is also called nature, has added to the impulse of self-preservation, another impulse in every living creature towards its ease or its delights. And though in rational creatures we hear much of a desire of happiness, and they actually have it; yet it operates often without reflection, or any deliberate project and design. If this desire be called natural good-will to ourselves, self-affection, or even self-love, there is no harm in any of the terms, if we but allow of a principle of good-will towards other creatures upon their proper account, as well as upon our own; that is, if we allow of a desire of good to them, as

well as of good to ourselves. In both cases the benevolence, or desire of good operates first; reason serving to direct us in the choice of proper objects, and the means of happiness.

IN rational creatures, (when they act rationally) the desire of happiness is the same with the desire of perfection. Here is meant the highest happiness. When a man discovers the dignity of his nature, he immediately wishes to arrive at all the excellency he is capable of: and his good-will to himself, far from being extinguished, is put under new regulations.

THE question at present is not, how we come to discover our dignity, whether by our own natural light, or a supernatural? All the design is to shew, that the desire of happiness in general, was before that discovery, and continues after it, independent of reason; the due exercise of which would indeed inform us, that our happiness must be founded in the disinterested pursuit of truth and justice.

Sect. IV. *The DESIRES of MAN, considered more particularly.*

WE may therefore consider in man, these several kinds of desire. 1. A desire of simple existence. 2. A desire of ease or indolence. 3. A more positive desire of pleasure, either for the body or the mind; and, 4. A de-

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fire

fire of perfection or true happiness, which is only to be found in the love of the sovereign Beauty and goodness. The three first desires are natural, and can only be called criminal, in so far as injustice or vice enters into them: the fourth must have been natural to man in his original state, though it is not so natural in the present; and therefore now appears to be rather a divine desire, than a natural: so rare and so languid is the desire of perfection! Nor, supposing it to be in the strongest degree, would it be virtuous; unless it were animated by the love of truth and justice.

It must be remembered, that the idea of love implies more than simple desire: it supposes some acquaintance and notion of the object, which it esteems, and with which it desires to be united: 'tis a secret attraction, and the pleasure or charm is derived from the object. Whereas desire is here supposed to be only blind appetite, in which the understanding has no share, and the value of the object is not considered. It must be remembered too, that even love, the more it is struck with the beauty of the object, will still act with less reflection on itself, and still have its own interest less in view. This may be applied to love in general, which is often called blind, as well as desire: but where the object is supposed worthy of the affection,

affection, blind is too harsh an epithet; since no more can be meant, but that the heart is captivated, and, only if it be unreasonably so, is the love to be called blind or blinded.

BESIDES the several desires above-mentioned, nature has farther implanted in us, a desire of the approbation of others, our own not being sufficient to support us; which seems to be founded on a tacit respect, that all mankind have for one another, or a conviction of the dignity of human nature. With all which desires there is a self-complacency, almost constantly supposed to attend us, and to have been wisely given to reconcile us to our low state, and to support us against the contempt of others. But the self-complacency, here supposed to be without fault, is a quite different thing from that which was spoke of in the foregoing sections, as implying either folly or arrogance, or both: and the desire of approbation is an additional tie upon men to observe the rules of humanity, and all good order.

Now as the gratification of all our lawful desires (lawfully pursued) may be called our true interest, so this interest cannot properly be called self-love; because a very great degree of that principle may be found in the pursuit of things altogether destructive. If it shall be said, "That it is not a right self-love that makes

“men pursue such destructive things,” it may be said just as well, “That it is not a right pride, or a right covetousness, that makes men pursue them:” which would not be a very significant way of speaking.

Sect. V. The two Principles of ACTION, or the opposite sources of VIRTUE and VICE.

IN rational creatures there are but two principles, or two sources, to which all deliberate actions are reducible, viz. Self-interest and Disinterestedness. If we seek for the moral good or ill of an action, the virtue or vice of it, we must have recourse to one of these two principles. What a man does merely for his own ends, has no share of virtue in it: on the contrary, the sole motive of interest, rather stains an action that is otherwise materially good. To use a plain instance, if I do a man a good office, to receive in return either a good office from him, or a good character from the world, no body will reckon this a virtue. We may therefore conclude, “That the virtue or worth of an action is only to be rated by its disinterestedness.”

It is not indeed in our power to put things always to that touch-stone, and we may be imposed upon by false appearances: but we know well

well in the general, whence the worth is derived, and fail not to pronounce things both worthy and worthless, when no interest of our own can possibly determine us. Friendship has been accounted a sacred thing all the world over: whence can it have that character, but from the disinterestedness conceived to be in it? And however interested the common friendships of the world may be, yet every man in his particular professions thereof disclaims any view to interest; being sensible that a friendship founded upon that bottom, is but mere traffick and merchandise.

THIS shews the general sense of mankind, as to the speculation of the thing, from which we may conclude the reality of it; and it is not easy to conceive how that can be good, which every body is ashamed to own. Even Horace, who was no extraordinary divine, seems to intimate to us, that we ought to examine ourselves upon the motives of our friendship, that we may discover * whether we are

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engaged

* *Quidve ad amicitias, usus, rectumne, trahat nos.*

After this essay was written, (and 'tis now some years) I had the satisfaction to find the same passage cited by the bishop of Cambray, and also some of Cicero's expressions to support the doctrine of disinterested love. He makes use of more testimonies from the heathens: for truth is always truth. The reader may see the first volume of his spiritual works: Discourse XLII.

engaged by profit or a better principle. And he had reason: for the desire of any thing merely for its usefulness to us, implies that we have no more regard for it (to use the words of another * poet) than for the desk we write upon.

IF virtuous actions thus derive their value from their disinterestedness, the baseness of vicious actions must be from their interestedness, for contraries cannot come from the same principle, no more than sweet and bitter waters from the same fountain.

VICE †, and sin, and wickedness, are but different words for the same thing: they certainly imply some great corruption and injustice, two other words or qualities, the source of which we can find no where, but in self-regards or interestedness. Salust says, *Nemo gratuito malus est*, No man is wicked for nothing. When we are unjust, it is still some way or other in our own favour. The scripture says of Ahab, "That he sold himself to work wickedness." So in many instances of corruption, men may be said to sell themselves, even when the abominations are not so heinous: but there is still some interest or bait presupposed, to induce them to make the wretched bargain.

* Butler.

† No. III.

SECT. VI. *The Corruption of SELF-LOVE farther considered, with respect to all VIRTUES, and FRIENDSHIP in particular.*

THOUGH I was against the making a jumble of self-love with true interest, so as to make each of the terms stand indifferently for the other; yet self-love and self-interest may be convertible without any confusion: that is, when a person is said to act from self-love, he may be as well said to act from self-interest, or from the principle of interest; the view of his own advantage (whether he act prudently or no) being his principal, and often his sole motive. And this leading motive, or interest-
edness, is frequently enough express'd by the short word SELF; as, such a thing has a great deal of SELF in it, and the like. But to pass to what is more material.

If self-love be not the same with corruption, in things relating to virtue, at least it may be reckoned the cause of the corruption. Men often talk both of corruption and integrity, but can neither define the one nor the other: and 'tis no wonder, since 'tis as hard to give a definition of sweetness and bitterness, or such things as strike the outward senses. But we see in fact, that a man led by his own interest will ruin every thing committed to his trust, when

he can do it with impunity, and will even venture on the highest punishment and infamy when the temptation is great. This made Mr. Pascal say, (Sect. xxiv.) *Le moi est haïssable*: “Self is a hateful thing, both because it is unjust in making itself the center of all things, and oppressive to others, in designing to subject them to itself: for every selfish man is a common enemy, and would be the tyrant of all others, if he could.” Again, (Sect. ix.) “Our inclinations ought to stand towards the publick: and this bias towards ourselves is the first spring of all disorder, in war, in politicks, in œconomicks.”

’Tis this bias towards ourselves which spoils all. In war it makes disputes about command, and just so in politicks; and even in church-matters, the desire of pre-eminence is a great spring of division. The same selfish bias is the ruin of domestic affairs, not only as it occasions what is called bad œconomy; but, which is of more importance, as it destroys the tenderest and closest unions.

AN older author says stronger things yet of the selfish principle, calling it by the names “self, me, nature, the old man;” and affirms it to have been the cause of Adam’s fall, and the devil’s before; both having affected to be somewhat, and arrogated to themselves, what they

they ought not. 'Tis a small book, entitled, *The German Theology*, and much esteemed by Protestants and Papists.

BUT to come lower down, to the damage that friendship suffers from self-love; it can hardly be better illustrated than by Arrian upon Epictetus, Lib. II. Cap. XXII. He makes friendship as uncertain as the agreement among children or little dogs, who play together very cordially, till some bone of contention is thrown among them: and he adds, that fathers and sons will be divided in the same manner, if they chance to interfere in their amours, or in any thing else. He also gives the instance of Eteocles and Polynices, two brothers who were brought up together, and lived in the strictest friendship till the sweet of dominion set them by the ears, and made them fight hand to hand, and kill one another on the spot: 'tis indeed unnecessary to go to old examples.

THE same philosopher says farther, that "if men take it in their heads, that the gods are opposite to their interest, they curse them and overthrow their altars." But his design seems to be far from advancing the interested principle, or the bias towards ourselves: he only shews how this selfishness is so rooted in our nature, that if we shall make a separation between interest and virtue, we shall of course

run

run to the side where we think our profit lies: for this, he says, is dearer to us than all things; this is our father, our brother, our country, our god. Arrian therefore, like the rest of the Stoicks, applies himself chiefly to direct the understanding; thinking if it was rightly informed, all the work was done: but it is easier to make the understanding see what is right, than to make the heart adhere to it; according to the famous exclamation,

_____ "*Video meliora, &c.*"

THAT honest confession of seeing the good, and approving it, and yet doing the ill, is also made by St. Paul himself, when he says, "the good that I would, I do not; but the evil which I would not, that I do, &c." A lively representation of our inconsistency, and the war arising upon it in the mind.

It seems very plain, that whatever relish we may have of virtue in our present state, we are not necessarily determined by it; as our natural bias to vice is not so strong neither, as to deprive us altogether of our liberty. But it is no less plain, that, being blinded and corrupted as we are, a superior principle, grace, or whatever it be called, is absolutely necessary for expelling that poison, wherewith self-love has one way or other infected and confounded us.

SECT. VII. NATURAL LOVE *considered under different denominations.*

AS all love implies both a desire of obtaining the beloved object, and a delight in it after it is obtained; self-love in the first of these views is nonsense, and in the second, 'tis the next thing to delusion: nay, if the complacency exceed the due bounds, no delusion can be greater, 'Tis silly and foolish in the eye of the world.

BUT there are three sorts of love, all granted to be natural, and even reasonable; our love to our children, our love to the sex, and our love to our friends. If any of these loves is right, or what it ought to be, self-love is wholly out of doors: at least, the more perfect they are, it has proportionably the less place. A father loves his children by a happy instinct (or whatever it be called) without a view either of profit or pleasure from them; for, as *Cicero says, we wish them to be happy after we are gone. The pleasure that may follow upon loving, is by no means the cause of the love. Nature has wisely and kindly designed that every man should take care of his own children in the first place: the care and affection of mothers is

* *Liberis consultum volumus, etiamsi posthumi futuri sunt, propter ipsos. De finibus.*

yet more remarkable: and what tenderness is there observed, even in nurses! The love of children to their parents, not being so much determined by instinct, has been sometimes called piety.

As to the instinct by which parents are said to love their children, a burlesque question has been asked, viz. If this love be an instinct free of selfishness, whence is it, that they feel that instinct for other people's children, when they believe them to be their own; and on the contrary, feel no such instinct for their own, when by accident they are ignorant of the relation? If a serious answer was to be given, this perhaps might be it, That the question makes neither for selfishness nor against it, and that in such cases, nature is hoodwinked; but still the end is obtained, which is, the caring for the young helpless creatures.

THE love to the Sex is a more delicate article. Every body knows what the desire of continuing their own species leads them to: this is hardly to be called love; and if any will call it self-love, they must allow other animals the same cool, deliberate motives of proceeding. 'Tis plain, that when a man is heartily in love, all self-considerations (provisions and settlements) must yield; and the lover will pursue his aim, unless an extraordinary principle

ple of justice, or regard for the person, make him lay it aside. And this too is honourable for love, that the mind is first engaged by the qualities of the woman: if fancy now and then gives the object a value, which in reality it has not, this is still another thing than self-love; the man is taken; and there arises not only a desire of possessing, but he feels a tenderness as a parent does for a child; and for proof of this we may appeal to * Catullus. Whatever the body may claim for its share, this cannot be said to proceed from reflection; but is rather a kind of mechanical sweet impulse.

LOVE then is a concurrence of ardor, respect, and tenderness. But some people seem hardly to have a right notion of any sort of love, when they suppose we must still be reasoning and reflecting in it, with a view to our own interest. An old naturalist speaks more sense upon the love he treats of:

“Unde feritur eò tendit.”

And 'tis remarkable, that Lucretius's metaphor here agrees with the modern philosophy of gravitation. And indeed St. Augustine speaks of love in general, as a weight or force by which we are carried: “Amor meus, pondus meum,” &c.

* *Dilexi tum te, non tantum ut vulgus amicam,
Sed pater ut gnatos diligit & generos. Ad Lesbiam,*

&c. But it seems the love of our philosophers sits very light upon them: they think they may put it in their pocket, like their gloves.

THE love that enters into friendship, is only free of that ardor which tends to the Sex, but is accompanied with no less respect, and little less tenderness, save what the weakness or delicacy of the sex calls for at the hands of the stronger. But the power of love among friends is sufficiently known, and remarkably expressed in these words of Moses, "If the wife of thy bosom, or thy friend whom thou lovest as thine own soul, &c."

It is evident now, that wherever love enters, the delight is from the object, not from self: the person is delighted, or pleased, but the pleasure is not from himself; since he receives it from somewhat else. If they say he still loves the object from self-interest, or his interest is the cause of his love, this is contrary to nature: and as Horace seems to reject the supposition in the case of friendship, Cicero is more express and full upon it. He shews excellently, (No. xii.) "That love is the principle and motive which engages us in friendship: that interest or profit may be made even by a friendship which is but acted; but in true friendship all is for the sake of the friend, all is free, genuine, and real. Therefore (adds he) love appears

“appears to be founded on nature, and not on
“our necessities and occasions; on a certain
“relish and bent of the soul, (*applicatiōe animi*)
“rather than any thoughts of reaping profit.
“That though interest may attend friendship,
“yet it is not the aim of it. But (he says) most
“people chuse their friends, as they do their
“cattle, to make a gain of them; and there-
“fore have no experience of that most beauti-
“ful and natural friendship, by which we love
“a friend for himself, and cultivate friendship
“for its own value. That, in short, as we
“love ourselves without a view to any reward
“at our own hands, we ought to love our
“friend after the same manner: for to love
“one, is to cherish him for his own sake,
“without any regard to our own indigence or
“interest.” Much more will be found to this
purpose, in that excellent little Treatise upon
Friendship. He supposes all along that virtue
or personal worth is to be the cement of friend-
ship, and the only thing that can render it du-
rable: and he reckons the charms of virtue so
great, that we cannot but love it, even in those
we have never seen, and can never hope to see,
and from whom ’tis impossible we can receive
any advantage.

THE only evasion some have fallen upon, is,
that we love for the pleasure we find in loving;

and so 'tis still (say they) self-interest at the bottom. But this, as it would take away the distinction of vice and virtue, and imply a fatal necessity, without leaving any thing to reason; so it is plainly a mistaking the effect for the cause: we are attracted first, and seized on by the object, without design upon either side; unless on some occasions, where certain agreeable intelligent objects are said to lay traps for lovers, by shewing their own charms: but then this forwardness of appearing, which the Sex is sometimes accused of, proceeds more from curiosity and a desire of amusement, than of exciting love, or even of drawing common admirers. But this is a speculation foreign from the purpose: whatever be in it, the natural attraction, whether love or friendship, is accompanied with a certain sweetness in which we are but passive, and can challenge nothing of it as our own contrivance. Pleasure is the result of friendship, not the inducement to it.

Now if the constitution of our nature is such, that pleasure is inseparable from loving our friends, and doing them friendly offices, this is the contrivance of our Maker, and we cannot alter our frame: nor have we any reason to wish it altered, because our Maker seems thereby to have designed that self love should be swallowed up by a more generous principle, in

which our nature finds its account, without laying a plot for it. And as generosity consists in giving, not in receiving, our Saviour declares, "that to give is more blessed." At this rate one would think friendship should not be such a rarity, since so much pleasure attends it: but let self answer for that. 'Tis enough for us to have the agreeable conviction, that our nature is capable of a finer cast; and they who would resolve every thing into sordid interest, do only argue from the abuse of our faculties, without a right knowledge of the natural use of them.

Sect. VIII. *Of other engagements of the*
AFFECTION.

BESIDE the three kinds of love mentioned in the last section, there are other things more properly called attachments than love; such as the concern about one's family, separate from the love to children, and the lawful concern we ought to have for our posterity and kindred, which lies in the desire of having representatives, and keeping up a mere name. We shall hardly discover a foundation for this love in nature, unless it be said to proceed from an abhorrence of extinction, or from an anxiety that at least a sound should remain after us to keep us from being forgot. Pride will affect that this name should be highly regarded, because

cause of its seeming relation to our persons; and so we wish our representatives to be rich and potent, not so much for their conveniency as our own glory.

To this sort of love, the love of our country is frequently sacrificed. But there is a nearer kind of self-love, which gets the better even of it: for we see good estates played away, or otherwise squandered, according to the humour of the proprietors. And these will be called no extraordinary discoveries.

THE love of our country has more of nature in it than the former, as if it was an instinct planted by the great Ruler of the earth, that all the habitable parts of it might be inhabited with contentment, and improved to the utmost, without wandering to finer climates, and dislodging other people: and we see how alluring the native soil has been in all ages. But the love of our country farther implies (and with greater reason) a peculiar affection and concern for the society wherein Providence hath placed us; as if we looked upon it as the household we belong to, and which we are therefore chiefly to care for, (the general law of humanity always observed) as being its most immediate and proper members. However, if that kind of self love, which aims no farther than the present gratification of the person, gets the better of

of the concern for the family; 'tis no wonder the concern for the country is so much forgot, and looked upon as an old-fashioned simple thing. The wise self-loving man has no country, no family, no friends; but where he can eat best, or make the greatest figure, there he lives.

THERE is a love which had almost been passed over, viz. party-love. It owes its rise to self-love plainly enough, whether it be considered as an accidental agreement of opinions, or a combination of interests and designs, without any cement of virtue, or regard to truth. And though we see this attachment to party sometimes producing strange offices of friendship; yet it must be a very ambulatory affair, according to the various changes of our situation or our humour.

THE short conclusion may be this, that friendship is the soul of all relations, and the soul of it is disinterestedness.

SECT. IX. *The meaning of DISINTERESTEDNESS. Two sources of NATURAL VIRTUE.*

PERHAPS it will be thought strange that disinterestedness, being but a negative sort of term, implying only an uncorrupt or unselfish state of mind, should yet be mentioned as a positive quality, and called the soul of friendship. To answer such people in their own way, it may

may be maintained that disinterestedness is really a positive term, as well as a positive quality: for interestedness is but the negation of integrity, and disinterestedness is the taking away that negation: an interested person is generally taken for an unjust person.

BUT not to dwell upon words: if man was originally upright and uncorrupt, by the removal of the opposite qualities, he is reinstated in his primitive integrity; so that an uncorrupt man is the same with an upright man, and disinterestedness but another term for uprightness. This way of speaking therefore, when the matter is well considered, will pass both with christians and deists; for both parties suppose man to be originally upright, the latter only denying his defection from that state. And most christians, though they acknowledge the sad effects of the fall, yet do not deny that there remains some sense of equity, and some fund of good-nature.

THERE seems to be a natural love of justice and order, as there is of proportion and harmony. We are pleased with a fine character, as well as with a fine picture, or fine musick. 'Tis true, the heart is properly called the seat of love: but the understanding has its objects of pleasure too, and what pleases is loved. The understanding not only sees, but it approves,
and

and approbation implies delight. Let us say plainly, every man has a sense of equity and fair dealing, whatever stretch we may make in our own favour; and every man is well persuaded of the difference between right and wrong, independent of education and example. As in things relating to the external senses, no man can be taught to see or taste; so no man can furnish another with a sense or relish of virtue: all that teaching can do in this case, is to lay things before the mind in such a way as it may perceive either the beauty or the deformity of them, by its own native force. Instruction, no doubt, is of great importance, as it helps to cultivate those innate powers of the soul, that * “vis insita,” as Horace calls it: but that is another affair.

To return, a man feels when the rules of equity are broke to his own prejudice, and he sees when they are broke to the prejudice of his neighbour, if the injury is done by a third person; for he does not always see it when it is done by himself. Thus the prophet accosted David under the parable of the ewe-lamb, which made him see his error immediately, and his conscience was convicted.

MR. Hobbes himself does not deny there is such a thing as right and wrong; he only says, *vis insita* is there doubtless enough. “the
* *Doctrina sed vim promovet insitam, &c.*

“the doctrine thereof is perpetually disputed
 “both by the pen and sword; whereas the
 “doctrine of lines and figures is not so,”
 (Leviath. chap. xi.)—And he gives a very
 good reason for it just after: “Because in this
 “subject men care not what be truth, as being
 “a thing that crosses no man’s ambition, profit,
 “or lust.” A Frenchman would have put
l’amour propre for all: but the principle still
 holds good, that truth, and justice, and virtue,
 are naturally agreeable to the mind, when it is
 free of biases in its own favour: and the cha-
 racter of an honest man will be as lovely as
 that of a scoundrel will be hateful; which it
 sometimes happens to be even among such folks
 themselves.

THIS sense or relish of virtue, without any
 view to self-interest, is one source of moral ac-
 tions; though often very unable to produce
 them, as was observed before, Sect. VI. To
 which this may be added, that our inclinations
 not only hinder us from following what our
 reason sees to be good; but they confuse and
 darken it in the first instance, making it often
 take the ill for the good. But we are here
 supposing reason, or the understanding faculty
 to be free of any influence from the inclina-
 tions, in which case it sees and judges of things
 within its sphere distinctly enough; and so may

be

be called one source of disinterested actions or human virtues.

WE may observe farther, that beside that relish or approbation which the mind gives to truth, either after a process of reasoning, or a more instantaneous perception, there is still in man, fallen as he is, a fund of compassion or tenderness, operating in a more warm and feeling manner, without any help of reflection. And this is another source of disinterested actions, seated in the heart, (as the former is in the understanding) which yet being but a happy constitution of soul, a man is no more to value himself upon it, than upon bodily health.

PERHAPS benignity had been a fitter word than compassion, to express that affectionate temper which prompts men freely to do good to others: but compassion came first up, and in the present distressed state of things, every man is some way or other an object of it; so it may be taken for a general inclination to relieve and assist. However, benignity has a more extensive signification, not only importing pity for the afflicted, but a desire to see every body happy, and an endeavour to make them so: and such a temper must extend to the whole sensible creation. "The just man is merciful to his
"beast."

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WHOEVER then has any thing of this compassionate temper in him, (as none but a devil is supposed to be wholly void of it) ought to cherish it carefully: for 'tis a surer and a more fertile principle of good actions than that wherein the understanding is only engaged. Most men can love better than they can reason: and thus they are to blame who talk of pity as a contemptible thing; as Seneca called it the defect of little minds: but this great man was carried away by a false philosophy, which did not allow what was due to the affections, and would needs set up for an unnatural stiff composure that was good for nothing, even supposing it to be free from grimace. Benevolence generally implies a warmth of heart, and care should be taken that be not too cool; otherwise it degenerates into indolence.

No doubt the warm temper ought to be regulated by discretion. A judge, for instance, is not to be prevailed on by more tenderness for one party, than the other; but must give the subject in dispute to the person whose right is clearest, though the other may be more necessitous: and merit is not in the question neither. Again, in giving charitable assistance, a man is not to strip himself in favour of the first object he meets; but to proportion his charity so, as none may justly complain for want of a share,

share, and that mercy may agree with judgment. As to our reserving for our own occasions, self-love will readily take care of that.

Sect. X. *Some acceptations of CONSCIENCE.*

CONSCIENCE is either the sense of equity in general, or the consciousness of our adhering to it; which is supposed to carry its reward along with it, as was said in an old elegant speech.

— “& mens sibi conscia recti.” VIRG.

AND a good conscience is called in sacred writ, “a continual feast.” If, on the contrary, we are conscious that we have done wrong, or departed from equity, this reflection carries a pain along with it, as the former carried a pleasure: and all the account we can give of those different effects upon our minds, is, that such is the establishment of things. St. Paul informs us very plainly, that this operation of the mind has been uniform in all ages of the world: “When the Gentiles which have not the law, do by nature the things contained in the law; these having not the law, are a law to themselves: which shews the work of the law written in their hearts, their conscience also bearing witness, and their thoughts the mean while accusing or else excusing, &c.” Rom. ii.

He says in another place, "He had kept a conscience void of offence towards God and towards men." So that conscience may be considered as one of the powers or faculties of the mind, like an ear for musick; with this difference, that some few persons have got no ear, but no man was ever without some conscience. The taste indeed may be corrupted, and so it fares with conscience.

THIS view of conscience, as a natural relish of moral rectitude, and not * "merely our own opinion or judgment of the moral rectitude or pravity of our own actions," (as an ingenious author defined it) will help to solve some

* Mr. Locke gives that definition in his *Essay on Human Understanding*: and arguing against innate principles, he says, "If conscience be a proof of innate principles, contraries may be innate principles; since some men with the same bent of conscience prosecute what others avoid." But this argument would seem to strike most against virtue, as it seems to take away the difference of right and wrong, or to render every thing so arbitrary and uncertain, that an appeal could not be made to the common sense of mankind in no case whatsoever. But Mr. Locke cannot be suspected to have had so bad an intention: the regard he expressed for the christian religion, as well as moral virtue, is sufficient to clear him from such an imputation. 'Tis remarkable too, that some profess deists not only set up for the moral sense, but also acknowledge the innate principles, which they call (after Epictetus) anticipations, or previous notices of the mind.

some difficulties arising from the different opinions of men, (particularly christians) and their mutual persecutions; each party really thinking themselves in the right. For it is to be observed, that these differences are chiefly in matters of belief, and concerning the interpretation of revealed doctrines, and that all parties are nevertheless agreed in the principles of justice and natural equity. For instance, every one's conscience declares to him, that God is to be honoured in the most perfect manner: so that the dispute comes only to be, what is the most perfect manner? As to which, (though men must necessarily be divided, so long as they differ in the interpretation of what has been revealed; or do not all equally agree upon the things that are to be received as revelation) their consciences (if they would hearken to them) would tell them that they ought to love one another, notwithstanding any such differences of thinking. But hurry, prepossession, and interest, darken the understanding; making people take human inventions for the commands of God, or less earnest to observe "the weightier things of the law," than the most inconsiderable ceremonies. But this confusion of the judgment does not infer that we have no such faculty, since it might be as reasonably said we have no sight, because sometimes we do not see

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clearly.

clearly. Nor is christianity to be charged with the persecutions among the different sects and parties, which its enemies make a handle of in their arguments against it: for religion is commonly but a pretence for such severities, the quarrel rather rising from ambition, or covetousness, or both. And if blind zeal or fury, without any other mixture (which is even very rare) should really be the cause of the severities, what more could the founder of the christian religion do, to inform mens understandings, than by making their love to one another, the principal mark of being his disciples? If people will call themselves christians (as each party call themselves the only christians) and yet retain their pride and ill-humour, and all the vices of nature, is christianity justly to be blamed for that? They who thus blame it, as they are no less corrupt than the christians, are also guilty of a manifest piece of unfair dealing; since any body that can read, may see what the gospel requires, and what it forbids.

THE same view of conscience, as a natural sense of equity, may help to settle the debate about innate ideas, which is not now so high as it was some years ago: for it needs not be asserted, that we came into the world with the ideas of virtue, or dictates of morality, no more than with the ideas of squares and triangles,

gles, and their several properties. 'Tis enough that the mind ripens as to its comprehension of truths both geometrical and moral: and whatever may be called science in either, is only as it were an evolution of some first principles which mankind are agreed upon; and so in matters of right and wrong there lies an appeal to the moral or internal sense, as in mathematical demonstrations there lies an appeal to the external.

It was very agreeable to find that Sir Matthew Hale had asserted both the moral sense, and the moral dictates, in a discourse on our Saviour's precept of "doing as we would be done to." Here are a few of his words, (*Contemplat. Part III. from pag. 154 to 198.*)

"As the eye of sense, as soon as it is open, discerns the light, without any solemn process to evince it to be such; so there be some kind of truths that the eye of the understanding assents to, as it were by intuition." —

He adds, "The great reason of inequality in our actions is self-love, that makes a man partial to himself, and warps him from that equality and justice, that should direct him."

—And speaking afterwards of the several parts of charity, he mentions, "A general frame of humanity and benignity to all mankind, whether relations or strangers, friends or enemies."

—The contrary whereof (says he) “is selfishness, making a man’s single self the center of all he doth.” And having said again, “That self-love blinds and seduces the judgment, whereby a man often attributes to himself such circumstances as render the very same action done by him to another, to be just and righteous; when the very same action done by another to him, seems to be unjust.” He therefore proposes a transposition of persons, which would put the matter in a quite different light: so he concludes most ingeniously, “The truth is, this precept doth discharge self-love from having to do in this business of moral righteousness or charity; or at least puts it in that condition, by transposition of the persons, that it speaks as much for Gaius as it doth for Titius, when Titius sustains the person of Gaius; and so self-love becomes equally an advocate for Titius and against him.”

OUR Saviour has in a manner proposed such a transposition of persons in that same glorious precept, when he says, “Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them; for this is the law and the prophets.” And he has made the command universal and absolute, without any prudential limitations which self-love would be too ready to suggest. But the same natural reason

son which sees the fitness of the command, sees also where the transposition is to take place; and that the precept is not designed to defeat order and government among men: as a parent is not to abstain from correcting a child, nor a judge from punishing a criminal: such power, being given for the good of others, must be exercised accordingly, and sometimes exercised with grief.

A WORLD of things might be said about conscience, were it not for fear of being too intricate or too obvious. But 'tis remarkable, that the same thing which acts within us sometimes as a judge, acts at other times as an accuser, and even as an executioner: and hence the usual expression of "the lashes of conscience." Nor is it any argument that people have no conscience, because they do not always feel those lashes, nor are troubled with any remorse. For, not to say that they sometimes feel more than they are willing to own, they are under the power of another principle (self-love) which hinders them from seeing that they have done wrong, or may at first push them on to commit it, contrary to their plain conviction. 'Tis this liberty they take of doing what they know they should not, that makes it be said they have no conscience; or, which is the same thing, a large conscience: both expressions importing that they stick at nothing.

IT is not possible to account for the difference of souls in the point of conscience: some have it of a very delicate sense, others of a very dull one. And this difference would seem to be in their very nature, like the difference of complexion, or any thing else. Why the same person has this sense quicker and duller at different times, is another secret, but the thing is certain in fact: for the same temptation will prevail at one time, that would have no force at another.

A SCRUPULOUS conscience implies a defect in the understanding, and is akin to superstition and bigotry; with this difference, that these two (which differ very little) often prompt men to do extravagant things: whereas scrupulosity restrains them from doing what may be very reasonable.

BUT it is not always scrupulosity to differ from the current practice of the times, the multitude being an ill guide; and bare example strong enough to carry people away, even when neither interest nor pleasure solicit. But this one observation may be made, that whatever may contribute to raise scruples, interest is very apt in most cases to remove them.

Sect. XI. *The REALITY of VIRTUE.*

IF there is such a thing in man as conscience, there must also be such a thing as virtue, tho' this is as hard to define as the former: but the
existence

existence of both is discoverable from the distinction of right and wrong, and so virtue may be considered as the adhering to what is right, the loveliness of which the conscience was convinced of before. Nor does it strike at the existence of virtue, that it is sometimes represented as an abstracted notion of the mind; for all qualities are nothing more, when they are considered separately from any particular subject; and men speak of such qualities that fall under the outward senses, as well as of those moral qualities affecting the mind; as they speak of straitness, both in lines and actions. What is there more common than to talk of sweet and bitter, without joining these words to any particular thing tasted, or any other way perceived?

THIS pedantry seemed the more allowable, that some men have called virtue, a chimæra, a phantom, and at best an arbitrary thing: but honest people are at no loss, when they hear of a virtuous action, to know whence the virtue of it proceeds, and they call both actions and persons good without hesitation; so that virtue and goodness often pass for the same thing, and no confusion ensues. Only it must be remembered, that the idea of goodness is less restricted than that of virtue, which is chiefly applicable to rational agents (called also moral agents) and their actions and intentions.

As every body allows that goodness is the object of love, so virtue must be the object of it too. Yet there is a sort of reasoning, which, if it took place, would destroy the very being of virtue: and that is, when people affirm, "That no man can love any thing but under the notion of good with respect to himself." But this in the first place is contrary to experience, since we love many things under the notion of good with respect to others, with whom we have not the least connection, and therefore cannot be said to love those things with respect to ourselves. In the second place, by that reasoning we could acknowledge no difference between good and evil, but in so far as we found our account (or thought we found it) in the one or the other: or, in other words, the goodness of things consisting only in their being good to us, or giving us pleasure, the ideas of goodness and virtue would be swallowed up in the sole idea of pleasure; and since vicious persons must be owned to be pleased with their pursuits, as well as virtuous persons are with theirs, the moral difference between these two parties would vanish. I do not say, that both parties are equally pleased with their pursuits; but both certainly are pleased. Nay, mad people are highly pleased with their extravagant fancies; and where shall the difference lie between them and the sober, if pleasure is the only thing to be appealed to, and

no appeal to be made to the common sense of mankind in their right wits? Both must be equally mad, or both must be equally sober.

THOSE reasoners bring themselves into this farther difficulty, that when 'tis asked them, Why they love any thing? and they make answer, Because it gives them pleasure; a second question (why pleasure?) leaves them nothing to say at all: unless they say they are pleased, because they are pleased. Whereas others, who acknowledge the moral difference of things, independent of private good, could answer readily, they loved a thing because it was lovely, or good in itself; which is much the same.

THE idea of virtne as a thing lovely upon its own account, shews the reasonableness of the old expression, viz. "virtue is its own reward," and that meer pleasure (without justice) does not constitute the happiness of rational creatures; otherwise vice might have been as well said to be "its own reward." 'Twas pity indeed the sincere Stoicks had not had some more lively thing to fix on, than their abstracted notion of virtue: if Brutus, who perhaps had more of it than any man at that time in Rome, had seen a little farther, he would not have called it an empty name. But 'tis possible his virtue (without disparagement to him) has been pretty much tinctured with the desire of applause, which is empty enough; and
like-

likewise the distress and perplexity of his mind at that time, may have forced that expression from him. But Cicero, and those who wrote of virtue deliberately, always represent it as a real thing, and infinitely charming.

HOWEVER, though the understanding may be pleased with certain ideas and speculations of moral goodness, and the heart (supposing it honest) may partake of the delight; yet the heart must have something to cleave to, that has life; since otherwise the affections would not have an adequate or suitable object: so that (if such a way of speaking can be allowed) we must conceive virtue and justice, and all that is lovely, even love itself; as it were in person, or united to an intellectual nature.

VIRTUE then is still a real thing, whatever way it be supposed to affect men: and there can hardly be a greater proof of its reality, than the melancholy state those are reduced to, who see it and forsake it. If a curse was to be wished to any, there could be none imagined heavier:

“*Virtutem videant, intabescantque relictâ.*”

THE pleasure that is found in the practice of virtue, is much owing to the relish or good taste of the soul. But as this taste is much vitiated since the fall of Adam, virtue is sometimes represented as a very uneasy thing; and no doubt is so, in many respects: for if it were so very natural

tural and easy as some make it, our Saviour's precept of self-denial would be superfluous; and if it were so very unnatural and hard as others make it, his declaring "that his yoke is easy," would not be agreeable to truth. But that which is easy to nature in a state of order, is not so in a state of disorder; for nature is one thing, and corrupt nature another: and they who never heard of the distinction, nor of the fall, had reason to recommend "a life according to nature;" and to maintain, * "that the never differed from wisdom." But the case is now altered, and to live virtuously and wisely is a matter of difficulty and labour: so that indeed our Saviour's declaration seems to import that his yoke is easy, rather in the consequences, than that it is always so in the first instance.

Now what makes virtue uneasy at any rate, but some unhappy turn of nature, some poison of self-love, something that is not right, whatever name it get? But this is certain on the other side, that, corrupt as our nature is, there are many practices of virtue, which are mighty agreeable; and therefore to affirm absolutely, "That nothing can be virtuous, but what contradicts, and does violence to nature," is not only false, but looks like a design to discourage all attempts towards virtue, whether natural or divine.

Sect.

* *Nunquam aliud natura, aliud sapientia dixit.* Juv.

SECT. XII. RELIGION.

AS religion is principally meant of man's duty towards God, it is therefore considered as a higher thing than virtue: yet if the distinction of natural and divine virtue, be admitted, the highest things in religion will suffer no disparagement in being called Virtues.

BUT the design here, and all along, is only to give a general view of religion, and to confront it with self-love, in order to see how far it gains or loses by its being mixed with that principle.

IF a formal definition of religion were to be asked, perhaps that might do well enough (with some variation) which the civil law gives of justice, viz. "a constant and perpetual will to render every one his due." A man cannot be said to have religion, unless he hath a love for justice; and this love ought to be in a very great degree, as our Saviour hath made use of the words Hunger and Thirst, and placed it in the number of the beatitudes; "Blessed are they that hunger and thirst after righteousness."

IT is very true, the above definition represents religion as a thing that is internal; and lying chiefly in the heart; but this does not take away the idea, nor the obligation of external religion, which consists in outward practices, either moral or instituted; no more than the actual exercise of justice

justice is taken away, by the perpetual inclination of doing justly. Virtue and vice both are internal things, breaking out according to the occasions that fall in our way. We call those practices of religion instituted or positive, the reasons whereof do not appear clearly to us, though there may be good reasons for them in the wisdom of God; if it was but to make them the figures of higher things, and to excite the dull affections, by striking on the outward senses. The Jewish ceremonies were remarkably calculated for that purpose; and christians will hardly disown that they have need to be awakened by sensible impressions. But this by the way.

THERE is a more exprefs definition of religion, given by a late author; which raises the idea of justice very high: 'tis in these words; "Religion then is nothing but a respectful worship of justice and truth, which makes us treat God as God, and the creatures as creatures." Perhaps few definitions will be found more exact, and there is none that captious spirits will not censure: this at least agrees with Mr. Wollaston's rule (*Religion of Nature*) "to treat things as they are." 'Tis also very plain, that the truest worship consists in imitation, and imitation is the effect of love: so that whatever ideas we form of religion, if they be formed right, they all hang together in an order that may be called natural,
and

and whereof reason itself may see the consistency.

As to Mr. Wollaston, his rule is most just: but then we can make no more of it, but to treat things only as they appear to us, or according to the notions we have of them; and however imperfect these may be, we may be said to act justly if we follow our light. But the same apostle, who tells us, "that the Gentiles do by nature the things contained in the law," tells us also, "that the natural man knoweth not the things of God; and that they are spiritually discerned." The things therefore contained in the law should seem to be those acts of humanity and natural justice, which we find instances of in all times and places; and the things of God may be supposed to be meant both of his unsearchable nature, and the mysteries of religion, which are but revealed as it were historically, or that they are, not how they are; and therefore, as the apostle concludes, only to be discerned by a spiritual light.

THE natural ignorance of man will easily be confessed by those who acknowledge revealed religion: and let those who deny it tell us honestly what things they know really, or in their true nature. Indeed the rule of treating things as they are, holds very well as to certain relations and characters: parents, for instance, ought to be
treated

treated as parents, and children as children, and so of other relations. Again, people of worth are to be treated in a different manner from the worthless; and in all cases, prudence and equity (which are never separate) will know how to distribute and render what is due to every relation and character.

BY thus considering the difference of relations and characters, we may form some imperfect notions of our duty, even to our Maker and the Creator of all things. If we suppose a Being of infinite power, wisdom, and goodness, the obligations of fear, reverence and love naturally arise: reason itself goes so far, as to make that plain inference and conclusion. Nor can we hinder ourselves from making such a supposition, if we allow reason any exercise at all. We see and feel enough to persuade us of the existence of such a sovereign Being, unless we are stupid or hurried out of our reflection. Though we cannot comprehend the divine nature, we cannot fail to see that it is; else we must fall into the absurdities of imagining things that are made, to have made themselves, or to have been made by nothing; or else to confound the Maker and the works together, like Spinoza; who, in that point, imitated some of the Stoicks, and (with them) is imitated by later authors.

RELIGION

RELIGION now is principally to be taken for the duties we owe to God : what we owe to men is usually called morality, though it is also a considerable part of religion, as being enjoined by God, who puts no value on any thing we do to shew our homage to him, if we neglect our duties to our neighbour. This is confirmed by many places of scripture.

RELIGION also may be divided into the internal and the external, and this again into the moral and the ceremonial. What a man hath of the internal, can only be known to God ; and the external will only be approved by him, as it proceeds from the internal. To instance even in the moral part ; giving of alms (which is of more value than going to church) is rejected by God, when it is done only to be seen of men ; or it is so far rejected, as it is tainted with that principle : for our Saviour told the Pharisees, " they had already their reward."

'Tis true, the ceremonial part of religion is much abolished by the christian dispensation (the Jewish ceremonies certainly are) and the few institutions or positive precepts in it may deserve a higher character : though still they are but ceremonies, when the heart does not go along with them. What else is taking the communion to secure an employment ? Baptism is also a matter of parade in the parents for the most part, and

and the children generally think as little about it when they come to age, as in their infancy. There is this difference therefore between the moral and positive institutions, that the former are of use to others, even though they are not done from a right principle; but the latter, unless they be done from a right principle, are good for nothing.

BUT true religion, as it contains all virtues, so it will not omit any the least observances, whether it may think them appointed by God, or men having his authority; nay, though it is not so sure of the authority, it will submit for peace sake, when the things enjoined seemed to impart no disadvantage to society, nor any dishonour to the divine nature.

'Tis only with reference to that disadvantage and dishonour, that the distinction of true and false religion has come in use: for false religion is no religion. There is indeed a difference between the disowning all religion (which is Atheism) and the defects arising either from the confusion of the understanding, or the perverseness of the will; and the last is by far the unhappiest. Bigotry and superstition flow from a disturbed understanding. Blind zeal or religious fury arises more from the temper or complexion, if these are proper words; and what is called enthusiasm is generally from the same fountain. I have no intention to enquire into all the sources of error. But religion

religion (which may be called “the wisdom that cometh from above,”) is first pure, and then peaceable, &c. Hypocrisy does not even deserve the name of false religion: ’tis a cheat upon the world, either to get money or applause, or both, when they can be had.

How many things may be added on this subject! But I shall leave the reader to his own reflection, which will furnish him with a thousand more, if he enters properly into the subject.

Sect. XIII. The Unfitness of SELF, as an Object of LOVE.

THE common ideas of love, happiness, and justice, shew pretty evidently what rank self-love should stand in. Some persons indeed seem to be fond of the very word: but if they mean by it the desire of happiness, ’tis plain we ought to desire the happiness of all men, and thus we should fulfil the command of “loving our neighbours as ourselves.”

BUT as love implies more properly a complacency in the object; what sense would it make, if self were said to be this object? The love of other creatures (that is, an ultimate acquiescence in them) is justly reckoned an absurdity as well as an impiety, because of their natural insufficiency to satisfy the heart. But still they are supports of a certain kind, which self cannot be, since
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it is like a void, that wants other things to fill it. So that the self-complacency of a creature is much of the same import with self-delusion; the notion of a creature always supposing indigence. For as the body cannot be food to itself, so the soul must depend for its nourishment upon some other thing than itself. And this difference is to be remembered between these two, that the soul cannot fall to pieces like the body, but subsists by its unextinguishable nature, (in misery and anguish) when its desires are not satisfied.

'Tis very true, in this short dream of life the soul has several desires; and these more upon the body's account than its own: nay, often we cannot say the things we desire are of use, either to soul or body; for instance, Titles and Ribbons. But the fancy (with a mixture of pride) finds its account in such things; and to that source we may refer most of the desires of men, women, and children.

If it shall be said, that those marks of distinction not only draw more money, but also the esteem of others; it must be only of such as are fanciful like ourselves. A thorow pride leads to the contempt of all external riches and pomp, that we may be thought sufficient for ourselves, like the philosopher in his tub. I shall not determine that Diogenes was led by the sole desire of esteem and admiration, though it was so said by some

some of his contemporaries, who have seen his weak side, as he has seen theirs: but wherever that desire prevails, it concludes for the insufficiency of self as an object of love or complacency, since we cannot be easy but from without.

NOR can we ever be said in this life to be satisfied, but only amused by getting one rattle or feather after another; (the delights of friendship are not of this class :) and when we come to shake off this body, and our stupidity with it, what a state, can we think, the soul will be in, that has been only accustomed to delight in vanity, and follow shadows; when all its imaginary buildings are pulled down, and nothing remains but remorse, shame, horror, and what no words are sufficient to express! This is upon the supposition of a future life: and christians profess a belief even of the resurrection of the body, the senses of which will be infinitely more quick, both as to pain and pleasure, than here. Men will make little by their self-love at the day of judgment.

As the consequences of self-love are such as have been represented, though faintly; the consequences of loving the most perfect object with the most perfect love, are not only rest and joy to the heart, but the whole man is dignified and exalted. The understanding is enlightened, and the heart enlarged, as David expresses it. If the divine love possessed us, we should be no longer
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those little, narrow, proud, angry, confused creatures, shut up in a hard shell; we should then be free, in another element, and without strife. Charity is the principle of union, self-love the principle of division.

ALL this appears from the nature of things, and experience of the world. Bating a few gentlemen who follow the Stoicks, every body complains of the imperfections of nature, which is indeed in a very poor state; and not only imperfect, but wretchedly disordered. To take a view of body and soul, many things occur, that are very disagreeable, and particularly with respect to the moral world, (still more out of order than the natural;) and let any body judge what those things are owing to. Our self-love not only makes us the tyrants of others, but also our own executioners and self tormentors; whereas the divine love, by making us lose sight of ourselves, leads us both into truth and peace. It rectifies our corrupted taste: 'tis no longer insufficient miserable we, that are the deities, but honour is given where it is due. If we see any thing excellent in our neighbour, we love it and him as rays of the divine excellency. If ever we turn an eye to ourselves (and the seldomer we do it with complacency, the better) we shall consider ourselves, and every thing we have as derived from that source.

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IF we observe this order, there can be no error. We can hardly love ourselves too much, if we love our neighbour as much; that is, if both these loves center in a higher. And lest people should deceive themselves with a fancy that they love God, when they do not, they ought to examine themselves, and see whether they love their neighbours also: "for he that loveth not his neighbour, whom he hath seen; how can he love God, whom he hath not seen?"

SECT. XIV. *The LOVE of the CREATURES.*

AS we have no commerce or known connection with any rational creatures of another species than our own, and love always supposing a desire of union with the object; we can only be said properly to love mankind, and but to desire the possession of other created things, which are still less able to satisfy our heart.

'Tis to be considered too, that the creatures of our own species, as they are desired by self-love only for our own utility, are reduced to the same class of inferior things; to the great indignity and contempt of human nature; nor are the defects of human nature, either as to soul or body, any reason for treating it at such a low rate. If the body decays and rots, it is but in the condition of plants and vegetables; and if gold and precious stones are of a firmer consistency and duration,

duration, than any animal or vegetable body, yet our love of those glittering things, is more on account of the distinction they give us, than for any sensible pleasure they are able to convey. 'Tis true, the eye has a certain pleasure in looking at them: but then the eye is never satisfied.

LET us suppose, that all the creatures together are not able to satisfy the heart of man, and then see what inference reason might make from the supposition: the inference would seem to be this, that mankind must naturally have recourse to the Deity, as the sole object of their acquiescence and love. But we see how small advances reason made this way: the great body of mankind were intent only on satisfying their lower appetites, and their pride; and the philosophers (who despised them) were ignorant themselves of the true state of things: the corruption of man and the fall was not found out by man, but discovered to him by revelation. This is so true, that some of the philosophers, who were sensible enough of the defects of the visible creation, raised an objection from thence against Providence, and even a creating power.

No body shews better than Mr. Pascal (Sect. iii. &c.) the opposite and imperfect schemes of the philosophers, for want of that discovery of the fall. If at present the great roll of miseries and calamities are objected, to disparage the divine

Providence; and those dismal scenes appealed to, that are so frequently heard of, murders, robberies, frauds, war, pestilence, famine, earthquakes, hurricanes, inundations; in short, all the evils, whether natural or moral, which afflict and destroy poor mankind; to say nothing of bodily diseases, and common death, which attacks us in so many forms, and often without any warning: if all those things be objected, it will mend the matter nothing to deny, (with the Stoicks) that there is any evil; it will be more reasonable to acknowledge (with St. Paul, Rom. viii.) that "the whole creation groaneth." And likewise it will be very proper to keep in mind the difference between moral evils and natural, and to impute all that belongs to the first class to the corruption of man, and even to self-love; as the natural evils may be reckoned either as punishments of the moral, or sometimes as preventions. How many extravagancies are prevented, as well as punished by sickness and poverty!

As to the natural evils, and death itself, they cannot be supposed (no more than the moral evils) to have been in the first establishment of things. "God made not death," Wisd. i. 13.

BUT farther, all the evils that are either felt or heard of (sometimes indeed very terrible) may yet be called little, in comparison of the good that remains in the creation. The eruption of a
burning

burning mountain is but like a chimney on fire in a great city : and the service of the elements in general is a large equivalent for the desolations they sometimes occasion, as the pleasure and fertility of a river makes well up for what it carries away in a stream. Not to mention the beauty and regularity of the heavenly bodies, with their beneficent influences, (a theme often and to good purpose insisted on) which sufficiently “ declare “ the glory of God,” Psal. xix.

SOME late ridiculers of Providence, who do not speak out, have occasioned this little digression, in acknowledgment of the infinite power and wisdom that framed the world, and still supports it, in a surprizing lustre and harmony. They would also have it believed that the world is without virtue, as well as without a governor ; and argue from the common practices of men, of whom they reckon christians the worst, and take a handle from thence to disparage christianity. But their cavils against revealed religion signify nothing, who deny the natural ; as theirs signify as little who ascribe more to the natural than its due, and who are justly suspected of a design against all religion, and as secret abettors of Atheism, by denying that religion, which alone accounts for the present disorders of men and things.

WE are indeed in a mixt state, and a very tolerable one. As we are among thorns and briars,

so we are among roses and violets: and our state here is justly reckoned a state of trial and discipline. The belief of a better life afterwards, and if we add the fall from Paradise, will make the present afflictions light, and account pretty well for affliction itself.

'Tis in the view of the afflicted, broken, unsatisfying state of things, that the love of the world and the creatures is so much forbidden in sacred writ: mankind being often addressed with arguments from their own interest, as well as from the point of justice. The natural disorders of the world seem to be the consequences of the moral. Our lives are short, our bodies weak and full of diseases, as if the souls that inhabit them could not have a fitter lodging: and from these proud and giddy souls proceed more sorrows than can be numbered. The enquirers into the origin of moral evil will ever be at a loss to account for it. We see there is pride, though we cannot tell how it first entered; and all our speculations labour under difficulties. But we see that of pride cometh contention, and that it doth more mischief in the world than covetousness and luxury put together.

THE love of the creatures then is condemned, because they are frail and unsatisfying of themselves; and by the love of the world may be meant the passion of following common custom,

as well as that of gratifying our own inclinations, some of which we must often drop for fear of censure.

BUT the love which is thus condemned is more properly a dotage: even the love of rational creatures may be so, and the love of money and fine things deserves not so good a name as dotage, but rather avarice and folly. The love of rational creatures is more excusable on account of their relation to us; and the natural capacity they have of delighting us, as any body will acknowledge, who has the least sense of friendship, or even a satisfaction in seeing faces and keeping company. At the same time, rational creatures are full of imperfections, and but like apparitions for their duration: so that our rest is not to be in them. Nor, on the other hand, are their imperfections so to disgust us, as to make us hate and despise them. The command of loving our neighbour imports a great deal, and is a divine thing, wherever we are not allured to it from our own satisfaction; for in that case it may be called natural love (the object making an agreeable impression upon us) but not self-love or interested love, unless our own interest were the only spring of it. And 'tis still to be remembred, that the divine principle does not extinguish the natural, and that the pleasure resulting from the constitution of things is not to be called self-love, nor the effect

of selfishness, no more than it is selfish to be pleased with the light of the sun. In fine, though we should neither suppose a fall nor a future state, the arguments for self-love (by which all along has been meant the selfish principle) can have no foundation: for if we do any thing that can be called good with reference to others, it is only so far good as we do it upon their account: and for this we may appeal to the common sense of mankind, especially to those who have not been corrupted with books.

Sect. XV. *The LOVE of GOD.*

RELIGION being considered as our duty to God, the highest part of this duty is love, which may be called the mother of all duties. Particular commands and prohibitions seem only to have been given for leading man back to that love, which was natural to him in his first state.

It was said before, (Sect. vii.) that love in general implies a desire after the object, and a delight in it. Now the perfections of the divine nature demonstrate the love of God to be perfectly reasonable, both in the pursuit and the acquiescence. And though love is called blind, as in some respect it is really so; yet the understanding being enlightened, actuated, and influenced by the same unerring spirit that influenceth the heart, both these powers are in perfect order and harmony;

mony; and their operations consequently must be complete, rational, and natural, every way right, strong, and consistent; nothing feeble, nothing foolish, nothing defective. The poor expressions of men are more defective than their conceptions.

BUT however imperfect either our words or our ideas may be, we can well enough perceive the distinctions of things and their properties. Nor does any distinction seem more necessary to be kept in mind, than that of the understanding and the heart. By the former we discern the beauty of an object, and by the latter we love it or cleave to it: in agreeable objects each of those faculties is pleased, but the pleasures are different. Again, our understanding is the seat of our opinions, the heart is the seat of our inclinations.

UPON the different operations of these two faculties, Dr. Henry More forms an argument for the disinterested or pure love of God; the substance of which is, "That as truth is the
" object of the intellect, and is assented to because
" it is true, without regard to the particular un-
" derstanding that contemplates it; so goodness is
" the object of love, which is loved chiefly for its
" own excellency." And he concludes, "We
" may as well affirm that there is no understand-
" ing, but what is self-interested, as that there is
" no love but what is self-interested."

No body was ever found that denied to mankind a faculty of loving, as well as a faculty of discerning : and one may be bold to say, that love is so much the perfection and happiness of our nature, that 'tis deplorable it were not directed to the proper objects, and attended with all the conditions that render it worthy.

THE heart is a term both for the loving faculty, and love itself. "Where your treasure is, there will your heart be also : and thou shalt love the Lord with all thine heart." It is indeed added, "and with all thy might ;" to shew that the dignity of the object requires that all our faculties and their utmost force should be employed in love and adoration. Again, an honest heart is taken for a sincere intention ; and in short, the heart is considered as the principal thing in man. "My son, give me thy heart."

I HAVE the rather mentioned this obvious distinction of the heart and the understanding, that some (and I believe very good persons) have considered the love of God only as an act of the understanding, by which the supreme Being is adored for its excellencies, and loved also ; but chiefly loved, because those excellencies are beneficial to us : and such persons are so much afraid of falling into enthusiasm (meaning the extravagance of a warm imagination) that they exclude love wholly from the heart, lest it should
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be called a passion, or an indiscreet thing. But why may there not be divine passions, as well as human? Spiritual affections, as well as natural? The imagination is by no means the seat of love, any more than it is the seat of hatred, joy, or any other affection of the soul. However, imagination may impose upon us, or be imposed upon itself, this is but like seeing through a false glass; the operations of the heart belonging to a quite different province.

“THE true love of God, says a late writer, is calm, and sedate, and permanent. The crackling blaze of passion is soon over; it dazzles, and it scorches, for a moment; but leaves no lasting warmth: whereas the silent glowings of the heart are strong and durable; and preserve an equal temper of heat,” [*Free-Thinker*, No. ccxvi.]

THIS is very well expressed. The author does not exclude the love of God from the heart; he rather says it ought to be there always, only in a calm sedate manner. But who can give rules to love? The state of the heart, either as to its sedateness or its disturbance, its coolness or its warmth, depends chiefly on the divine power that acts upon it; and the same person at different times is under very different operations; in distress, in joy, in hopes, in fears; as is evident from many passages in sacred writ.

I HAVE not the least intention of falling into a dispute with this author, for I know nothing at all about him, nor have seen any of his papers but this single one. I am willing only to quote some of his expressions, as being amongst the best and the modestest that are to be found in the advocates for self-love, who often write both saucily and confusedly.

HE says, "Whoever traces our love of others, he will find it ultimately terminates in ourselves; and that our affection towards any person is in reality a retaliation of some kind offices we either have received, or do (at least) expect from him. It is true, we often have a tender regard and a value for those who have been benefactors to others, though they never extended their kindness to us: but he who searches deep into human nature may observe, that here likewise we give a secret glance towards ourselves, and love the generous person, not so much because he did good to another, as because we imagine we also should have felt the same effects of his munificence, had he seen us in the like indigent circumstances."

HERE the charge against self-love is carried as high as necessary, though the author seems to have designed it no disparagement. The search into human nature can hardly be deep enough, so very latent is the bias towards ourselves. But the

the retaliation of good offices is by no means to be found fault with, gratitude being a part of justice; and it can have no tincture of self-love, when we expect no such offices for the future. What seems to be unnatural in the account given of our love of generous persons, is the founding it on an imagination, that we should have felt the same effects of their generosity; which is at most but a posterior reflection, and 'tis possible the fancy might never enter into one's head. And though the apostle says, "we love God because he loved us first," this is to shew the excellency of God's love above ours; we having such motives for loving him, whereas he had none for loving us.

THE opposition made to the pure love of God, by persons of integrity and good sense, has certainly arisen from the abuse which has been made of that doctrine by weak people, or vile pretenders; the former really taking their own fancies for the operations of the Almighty, and so falling into shameful familiarity and nauseous expressions; and the latter sort, having no sense of religion at all, have by their pretences to the highest things in it, imposed upon the society they lived in, and sometimes subjected them to their dominion and tyranny: as in the case of John of Leyden and others. Hence the cry of enthusiasm, heated imagination, and the like. Hence the love of God is put in opposition to all affection, and confined

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to a simple acknowledgment of the divine attributes, and (perhaps) a desire of keeping the divine commandments, which may be more from a regard to ourselves than the Deity. True love leads naturally to the keeping of the commands of God: and our Saviour only makes it the test of love, to undeceive any who may vainly think they love him without that inward disposition and outward mark.

ANOTHER thing that may have frightened people from the pure love of God, is their imagining it must cut off all natural and lawful affections. But this fear is groundless: "Husbands love your wives," says the apostle. Though God is to be loved with all our heart, yet we may and ought to love some inferior things, if we love them in the due order and measure: even self-love may stand, if it be turned down to its proper station.

BUT as our happiness does not consist in the love of ourselves, but in the enjoyment of things suited to our several faculties; so the supreme happiness and perfection of all intelligent natures must consist only in the love and adoration of the eternal goodness. No words can express the perfections of the divine nature, and mortals when they speak of it should be afraid of speaking absurdly. "The heavens are not pure in his sight, and he charges the angels with folly." What is man, wretched man, that he should presume to open his

his mouth on such a subject? But the love of God is a known expression, and a thing of all things the most reasonable; and yet unfortunately disputed! By the love of God must be meant the whole of man's duty and happiness, two distinct ideas, but inseparably connected together.

ST. Augustine gives a reason for that great duty, besides the point of justice, from the design of our existence and the nature of our soul. He says, * "God hath made us for himself, and our heart must be uneasy till it rests in him." Mr. Pascal likewise (after taking a view of all the hurry and amusement we are engaged in, and the different springs that move us) concludes, "That man can find no rest, neither in himself, nor in the creatures, but in God alone."

'Tis true, Moses lays it down with the authority of a lawgiver, "Thou shalt love the Lord with all thy heart, &c." But the command carries its reason within it, if the mind is but attentive. For without doubt the most proper object of our love must be, that which is in itself the most perfect; that which, though we love ever so much, we can never love up to its worth, having still new and greater cause to love it: and this can be nothing else but the alone uncreated, the infinite and eternal beauty. Plato's method

of
* — *fecisti nos ad te, & inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in te.* Confess. Lib. I. Cap. 1.

of ascent from the love of beauty, which we see in the body, to that which we see in the soul, and from that to the immense ocean of beauty, is very remarkable.

THERE are some who do not deny, that God ought to be loved with all the heart, or the affection, in the words of Moses; but then they would make self-interest the only foundation of all love, which seems not at all reasonable; and, as it was observed before, Dr. Henry More sufficiently exposes the opinion. I know Moses, though he speaks as a lawgiver, begins yet with an encouragement: "Hear therefore, O Israel, and observe to do it, that it may be well with thee, &c." But the highest encouragement that can be given to excite men to their duty, cannot take away the principle of it, otherwise duty would be subservient to interest; or a man's highest duty would be to himself, which no christian ever asserted in plain terms: and the idea even Horace gives of a * good man, shews how much he was of another opinion; for the difference between a good man and a bad, must consist in some other things than a regard to themselves, since the bad

** Nec furtum feci, nec fugi, si mihi dicat
Servus; habes pretium, toris non ureris aio.
Non hominem occidi: non pasces in cruce corvos.
Sum bonus & frugi: renuit negat atque sabellus.
Cautus enim metuit foveam lupo, accipiterque
Suspectos laqueos, & opertum milvius humum.
Oderunt peccare boni virtutis amore.*

are afraid of hurt, and desirous of happiness, as well as the good; and no body would bestow the epithet of virtue or goodness upon kites and foxes.

THERE is still a principle of justice, and 'tis the adhering more or less to it, that makes the difference between the good and the bad. Prudence is one virtue, and justice another; the former indeed respecting ourselves, the latter somewhat else. And Cicero says, * “Justice desires neither price nor reward, but is desired upon its own account.” If there is any beauty in virtue, any loveliness in moral characters, the charms must be independent of any profit, since they strike before such views or expectations can enter.

THE greatest part of what has been said in this article, has been to settle a point of speculation or bare philosophy, rather than to make encomiums on the thing itself; for there need none to those who feel it, and those who feel it not will hardly be affected with words. All a person can do, who presumes to say any thing of it without feeling it, is to ask pardon of those that do or wish to feel it. And perhaps the pardon will be granted, when 'tis considered that this doctrine has been so much decried of late, and the opposite doctrine magnified as the highest virtue, and made the foundation of religion: a miserable founda-

* *Justitia nihil expetii pretii, nihil præmii: per se igitur expetitur.*
De Legibus.

foundation! it has contributed to the disparagement of christianity, and given a handle for ridicule and triumph to its opposers, not to be answered but by owning the disinterested principle, and placing religion upon that solid and cleanly foundation.

THE reader may see how far the ridicule has been carried in the *Characteristicks*, by the quotation in the margin *, and indeed with good sense as well as severity. But the blame falls only upon the modern projectors, not upon the christian doctrine, which ought not to suffer from the weakness of some who meddle to explain it: and one thing is remarkable, that the Deists sometimes agree with those very projectors they had despised; for their system of calm benevolence and self-approbation is much about one with the cool deliberate selfishness of the other party.

BUT the unquiet heart of man must have somewhat else to satisfy it than its own approbation,

* Modern projectors, I know, would willingly rid their hands of these natural materials, and would fain build after a more uniform way. They would new frame the human heart; and have a mighty fancy to reduce all its motions, balances, and weights, to that one principle and foundation of a cool and deliberate selfishness. Men, it seems, are unwilling to think they can be so outwitted, and imposed on by nature, as to be made to serve her purposes, rather than their own. They are ashamed to be drawn thus out of themselves, and forced from what they esteem their true interest.

as may easily appear from the insufficiency of created beings, and the restless pursuits of men. And here one cannot but observe, how this sett of the Deists and some of the clergy distress each other on the article of self-love; the Deists charging the clergy with a finer sort of epicurism; since the most corrupt person in the world is willing to renounce smaller pleasures for greater. And, on the other hand, the clergy object against the Deists, "That if self-approbation is their
" principal aim, they must hug a phantom. And
" not only so, but their pride, which fills them
" with the notion of their own excellency, must
" render them incapable of those joys and per-
" fections only inherent in the Deity, and only
" communicable to such spirits, as are dispossessed
" of such imaginary fulness and real arrogance."

By the by, this stoical old-fashioned pride has been of late dressed up into a kind of system, by which the defective nature of man (to say no worse of it) and the whole visible creation, are represented as quite free of imperfection and evil. Now though it is difficult to argue against experience, or to talk people out of their senses; yet it is possible some minds of a certain cast may at length imagine their own particular nature to be of such perfection, as to stand in need of no helps but what they have from within themselves; or, in other words, that their reason is a sufficient
wells
guide

guide for all purposes of belief and practice; and consequently that they are not obliged to assent to any thing but what they see clearly by this light: nay, that it were absurd even to be in suspense about it, but immediately to reject it; and that, as to practice, their inclinations being free from any wrong bias or tendency, there can be no better guides than these neither! From hence proceeds the aversion to all revelation, and to the clergy or priests of all religions, whom they look upon as too cunning for the rest of mankind, and sometimes do them the honour to call them, "the compilers of the sacred records themselves;" not adverting to the demonstration of the facts, nor the purity of the doctrines, from which indeed the lives of the clergy as well as the laity are very different, to the hearty regret of the sincere among all ranks. And there is nothing but insincerity (a hard supposition) or plain delusion, that can account for such a strange representation of the excellency of human nature, as to reject all necessity of a Mediator, revelation, and the continual influences of the divine Spirit on the impure fallible spirits of men, who are blunderers in the commonest affairs. When one thinks of the ignorance and corruption of human nature, one is almost in danger of falling in with the opposite party of Deists, (and perhaps the name is too good for either party) who allow

allow nothing at all to mankind that is good, not so much as the least approbation of virtue, nor any virtue and decency, but what the fantastical humour of people happens to establish. But 'tis hard to say which of the extremes is worst: and some persons have been very unsuccessful when they undertook to go the middle way, and would needs lay the foundation of religion and all duty upon self-love; the very thing which religion designs to extirpate; that is, the selfish principle in which a man's good is his highest motive, or himself the center of all his aims. But to return.

THE asserters of the disinterested principle have this to support their doctrine, that if one was to consider love, as it is in the divine nature, the first idea that would probably occur, would be that of a free communication of good; as the sun sends forth its light and its heat.

THE source of joy and bliss can want nothing for himself; so that the design of making creatures, is to impart happiness or good to them. And 'tis very remarkable that St. John says, "God is love, and God is light;" as if he had designed to exhibit the Deity to our imperfect conception under the characters of disinterested goodness and diffusive joy.

'Tis true, God is said (Prov. xvi. 4.) "to have made every thing for himself:" for every thing

thing must be made for some end by an intelligent agent: and the source of all power, wisdom, and beauty, and whatever is excellent, must be an end to itself; since there can be no end higher. Again, we hear of the arbitrary pleasure of God, (Revel. iv.) “He hath created all things, and “for his pleasure they are and were created.” But the idea of goodness is inseparable from that pleasure.

SUCH is truly the inexpressible love of God, that he may be said to hire us to do good to ourselves. He has annexed pleasure even to those low things eating and drinking, as if we were to be bribed to support our own poor fabrick, as well as to replenish the earth. Nor are these pleasures denied to the inferior creatures: every thing living has its enjoyments. So that though the common way of speaking be true, “God “hath made every creature for his own glory. “and all things here on earth for the use of man;” yet it is no less true, that he makes every creature that has life for its own good. And if we might suppose greater and lesser motives in the incomprehensible God, we would have reason to conclude, that the good of creatures is his greatest motive in creating them. He has no need of us, and we have need of every thing from Him.

WE are farther told, that mankind stands in a near relation to the Deity: “For we are his
“offspring,”

“offspring,” as St. Paul says from a Greek poet, which was the fittest authority he could bring to those he was arguing with; though it was a bold stroke enough in that poet: but it is supported by Moses, who says, “God made man after his own image;” and Jesus Christ has enjoined us “to be perfect, as our Father in heaven is perfect;” shewing us at once our relation and our duty.

THIS relation (which we could not have supposed without the greatest arrogance) makes the duty the more apparent. We ought to imitate the divine nature, and be perfect as far as we are able. Now where can this perfection lie in us, but in disinterestedness? 'Tis the only thing wherein we can imitate the Almighty, who (we are told again) “does good even to the wicked and unthankful.” Love must be disinterested, or interested, or mixt: 'tis undisputedly disinterested towards ourselves, and is enjoined to be so towards others, even the wicked: how much more so ought it to be towards the fountain of all good? This seems to be plain reasoning, and no high flight, as the pure love of God has been unfortunately called by some professors of christianity, and thence a handle given the enemies of that religion to disparage it.

IF God then loves us disinterestedly, 'tis reasonable to think we ought to love him after the same manner: and if love implies union, that condition

condition of loving purely cannot be wanting ; as it is only in purity or disinterestedness that we can find the idea of justice, by which every thing has its due, and is loved for its own worth.

THE two objections against the pure love of God (for a third can hardly be imagined) are first, that our nature cannot attain to it ; and secondly, that it is not required of us. If the first were true, the second would be so of course ; for impossible things would not be required by the God of righteousness. But it is plainly required in the Old Testament, “ that we should love God with “ all our heart ;” and by our Saviour in the New, who makes it the sum of the law and the prophets. The annexing promises and threats, appears easily a condescension to human weakness.

LET our nature be called as weak and corrupt as any body has a mind, for 'tis certainly in a very pitiful condition ; but let not the capacity be denied of being transformed into a new nature by the power of God, or what is called grace, as being out of the number of ordinary or moral virtues, which must be owned to come from above also. 'Tis for grace that prayers are so often put up by the clergy of all denominations, and the love of God is prayed for in express terms. Properly grace means favour, and the love of God to us is the highest favour that can be

be vouchsafed ; as our love to him is the greatest tribute we can offer, and at the same time the most perfect state we can be in, and the happiest for ourselves. By grace is farther understood the removal of those impediments and obstructions which hinder the divine influences from operating on the hearts of men ; and so the prayer runs, “Cleanse our hearts by the inspirations of thy holy Spirit, &c.” For the divine nature may be compared to the sun, than which we have no visible object of more force and efficacy. And what can be more necessary to be done away, than that selfish disposition of heart, which has no reason either for its love or aversion, but the appearance of gain or loss to itself?

THIS article of the love of God has been drawn out to a much greater length than was designed, and 'tis pity any thing should have been mixed with it that looks like wrangling : but, as was before observed, the advocates for self-interest have raised it so high, as to make it the only principle of acting, not only among common men, but the apostles and ambassadors from heaven. They have likewise perplexed the matter by substituting self-love for self-interest, and so have rendered it an unfavourable thing to differ from them ; since it is so natural to love ourselves, and even to consult our interest. But they are to understand, that there is no difference but in this
single

single point, "Whether God is to be loved
"principally for his sake or our own."

It is not to be denied, that rewards and punishments are laid before us in the scripture, and that many of its arguments are accommodated to hope and fear: but religion designs also that our hopes and fears should have a just and reasonable foundation; in which case they are of great service to us, as the spur and the bridle, to animate our dulness, or restrain our forwardness.

BUT though hope and fear have their place in religion, they are not to have the highest place. St. John hath assured us, that "perfect love casteth out fear," 1 John iv. And St. Paul, 1 Cor. xiii. hath very decisively given charity (that is, love) the preference above all gifts and graces.

BOTH hope and fear may be considered either as divine virtues, or natural dispositions, qualities, or what other term the reader shall chuse.

THE objects of our hope and fear are pleasure and pain in the general. And though fear serves as a restraint upon our actions, yet it serves also as an inducement; the shunning of pain being often as strong a motive, as the procuring of pleasure.

AGAIN, 'tis chiefly with reference to pleasure and pain in this life, that our hopes and fears are awakened: so that our present quiet or security as to the next life is very much owing to our
stupidity.

stupidity. And the pain that we are principally afraid of in this world, is the censure of others, who we cannot but see will take the same liberty with our character, that we take with theirs; and thus we pass our few days in dread and slavery: this certainly will be owned by the polite part of mankind, and there is hardly the meanest person but has his fears and his pride.

WHAT is shameful in the fear of censure is the excess of it, and when we are convinced our judges are ignorant. What is shameful in the fear of death, or bodily pain, or loss of goods, is when we are too much disconcerted, and especially when we are frightened out of our virtue.


WHEN hope and fear are directed to the next world, they must continue in such a station (with every thing that God has planted) as perfect love shall assign them. We are told it casteth out fear, that is, any apprehension about ourselves; for by fear is meant also honour and reverence, which can never be cast out: and this divine hope is founded on a sense of the infinite goodness, and not on self-love, for this were but presumption. We may see nothing worthy of love in ourselves, and yet have a great confidence in the divine mercy. And we are never fit objects of that mercy, 'till we lose our good opinion of ourselves, and see our own insufficiency and corruption. "For God resisteth the proud."

THE pure love of God may be called an element, which we can never breathe in till we get free of self-love: or, these two loves having (as St. Augustine says) made two cities, a man cannot at the same time be an inhabitant of them both. But a very little reflection may shew us, which of the two cities or elements can afford us most pleasure: for the highest pleasure is to love: and the highest perfection is to love what is most excellent.

WHATEVER helps we can think of, to excite our love to the Deity, whether it be the consideration of his goodness or his power, hopes or fears, gratitude, prudence, or any thing that can occur to a reasonable mind, should all be made use of in their order, and conspire to lead us to that indispensable duty; which though it be our infallible interest, is yet to be pursued chiefly as our duty: otherwise we have neither the true notion of love nor justice, nor even of our own interest, but confusedly jumble all three together, or perversely give interest the preference, and set up ourselves in the place of God, and consequently fall into the element of trouble, or (at most) into a delusive quiet while it lasts.

F. A. N. I. S.





"The 'Army' martyrs" to fortune, & the social
iniquities, that I despised & I struggled for but they
man paper off on man - all - they bright
land, here & so, I will consecrate the
terrible - London, & make a holy thing -
poverty - by a sacrificial spirit of & they
glorify her."

"Spiritual presence, suffering all
things, it is injustice ~~most~~ hard to
turn to right - our social ~~justice~~
purpose, living & smiling, daily
martyrs to their creed - good"

the lost comes first

My letter & a page or 9 read &
re-read & ~~to read again~~ ^{all} written - praise for
a loftier tone & reverence for ver-
tues of poverty ^{that} men I agreed to
despise. If every could understand
a noble mind, it is I every & feeling
author when he wrote it.



